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French South Pacific Policy 1981-1996

2. New Caledonia

Cross of Lorraine, Nouméa

W.S. McCallum

The State must take care to erase all traces of colonialism.

President Mitterrand, speaking to the Council of Ministers, 14 May 1986.(1)

Listening to Mitterrand, I had the feeling he didn't know the file. For him there is a colonial problem, while I don't think this is the case.

Bernard Pons, RPR Minister of the DOM-TOM in 1986, recalling Mitterrand's speech.(2)

The Advent of Mitterrand

Mitterrand's idealistic remark concerning New Caledonia and its derisory commentary by Pons are symptomatic of the conflicting responses to the territory made by French political leaders of the Left and Right during most of the 1980s. In evidence are two different frames of reference. Mitterrand employs a term which is denied any relevance by Pons. Lack of consensus on the validity of ideologically loaded words such as 'colonialism' provoked much similar disagreement among French politicians in the 1980s.

The sophistic tendencies of French political leaders were not the monopoly of any one party. Moreover declamation was by no means foreign to New Caledonian political debate in the years preceding the troubles in the territory from 1984. The French presidential election campaigns conducted in New Caledonia in April and May 1981 are revelatory in this respect. During this period the leaders of the conservative RPCR, the New Caledonian political party with the biggest support, sought to discourage votes for Mitterrand. After the poor national showing in the first round of Jacques Chirac, the RPR candidate, the RPCR stressed the necessity to re-elect Giscard d'Estaing. Accordingly, a vote for Giscard d'Estaing would help preserve the stability of territorial institutions, while a vote for Mitterrand was portrayed as a step toward undermining those institutions.(3) In displaying opposition to change by largely voting for Giscard d'Estaing in the second round on 10 May 1981, the New Caledonian electorate proved to be at odds with the national majority vote for Mitterrand. (Tables 1 and 2) The national political mandate for the Socialists, contrasting with the territorial block behind the RPCR, was symptomatic of the gulf between political outlooks at national and territorial level from 1981. Differences between the RPCR and the Socialists were to form a major barrier to the construction of policy consensus between Paris and Nouméa in the 1980s.

The RPCR painted an uncertain future for the territory should Mitterrand be elected. RPCR leaders sought to discredit Mitterrand in the eyes of the predominantly conservative New Caledonian electorate by linking him with two concepts viewed negatively by its members. The first of these concepts was 'change'. To accentuate the threatening image of possible change under a future Socialist President, 'Marxism', the second negative concept, was invoked. Jacques Lafleur, the RPR Deputy for New Caledonia and one of the founders of the RPCR, predicted the imminent arrival of Soviet style administration for France should the PS receive widespread support in the legislative elections.(4) This prospect was abhorrent to New Caledonian conservatives, partly due to the anti-colonialist stance of the PC.

It may be observed in hindsight that predictions offered by Lafleur concerning a Communist takeover of French institutions were erroneous. There existed speculation early in 1981 that a Socialist Government under Mitterrand would be constrained to make concessions to the PC in order to maintain majority backing in the National Assembly. Such an eventuality did not come to pass. The PS obtained a sufficiently large majority in the French legislative elections of June 1981 to forestall this scenario. (Table 1) The electoral decline of the PC became apparent in the elections and has continued into the 1990s. If at national level the threat of Communism was exaggerated, at territorial level this was even more the case. No Communist party had been present in New Caledonia since the 1940s. Only marginal New Caledonian support was evident for Georges Marchais, the PC candidate in the first round of the presidential elections. As he received but 3.40% of the territorial vote (see Table 2), it could not be said that a local PC revival was imminent. The gap between New Caledonian political assessment and reality could indeed be wide.

The threats supposedly posed to New Caledonia by change and Marxism were to be repeated by local conservatives after the national successes of the PS in the French legislative elections. Of the two concepts, the prospect of change proved to be the real challenge to conservative interests in the territory. Just what forms change would take in New Caledonia were a Socialist Government to be elected was not clear to the territorial electorate early in 1981. There were three principal reasons for this.

Firstly, direct PS representation and support in New Caledonia were absent. Unlike the RPR, which had maintained close ties with the RPCR from the time of the latter's formation in 1978 (RPCR representatives in the National Assembly and Senate sit in the RPR group), the Socialist presence in New Caledonia in 1981 was marginal and fragmented. The PSC had been established by local European activists in 1976, although it did not have any formal link with its metropolitan counterpart of the sort the RPCR enjoyed with the RPR.(5) After the PSC became a member of the FI in 1979, its influence was confined to that of a minor member in the Melanesian nationalist coalition.(6) The socialist vote formed the expression of a minority of predominantly European voters in the west of the Grande Terre, as mainland New Caledonia is known. Melanesian UC votes for Mitterrand and the PS were to be of greater significance during the elections of 1981. (See Table 4) Far from strengthening the position of the PSC, Mitterrand's victory in the presidential elections served to undermine it. A fledgeling pro-Mitterrand party, the RCMP, sprang up in the wake of his success, proclaiming the imminence of socialist ascendancy in the territory.(7) The result was a split in New Caledonia's already marginal socialist vote, caused by divisions evident in the PSC.(8)

The main link for the FI with PS representatives in Paris was through Roch Pidjot, the coalition's only parliamentary representative there. A senior member of the UC, the oldest and largest party within the FI, Pidjot had been a Deputy for New Caledonia since 1964. Although Pidjot did not belong to the Socialist group in the National Assembly, he did have direct access to PS Deputies. Owing to its parliamentary representation, its stable organisation, and its large membership, the UC was best placed to negotiate on behalf of the FI. Considering that such PS policy as existed on New Caledonia was not articulated from a unified local base with formal links to the metropolitan party, and taking into account the conservative voting preferences of the majority of the territorial electorate, it is not surprising that votes for socialist parties in the territory were low.

The second hindrance to wider local understanding of PS policy on New Caledonia in 1981 was that policy's lack of depth when considered alongside the rest of Socialist policy. The PS had not formulated any detailed reform proposals for the administration of the territory. New Caledonia remained far from the forefront of metropolitan French political debate in 1981. The policy orientation of the PS, as of its opponents, was devoted to questions of more immediate concern to metropolitan French voters. Land reform, and the rise of Kanak nationalism in New Caledonia appeared to be marginal, parochial concerns when viewed from Paris, where national unemployment, social welfare reform and economic recovery constituted more pressing issues. Neither the PS election manifesto, finalised at the Créteil party congress in January 1981,(9) nor Mitterrand's accompanying presidential election manifesto (the "110 propositions pour la France") made any specific mention of New Caledonia.(10) This policy gap did not augur well for either the PS or New Caledonia. PS leaders were to spend their five years in government from 1981 belatedly and not very successfully formulating rushed legislation in response to increasing tensions in the territory.

The third barrier to wider New Caledonian comprehension of PS aims was, paradoxically, its main advocate in the territory; the FI. What little PS policy on New Caledonia existed tended to be filtered through the intermediary agency of FI representatives. FI declarations in favour of Mitterrand and the PS in the elections of 1981, and the FI interpretation of PS policy for the territory, hinged on the question of independence. The electoral support of the FI for the PS rested on certain statements offered by the Socialists which appeared to support New Caledonian self-determination. The negative response to the PS offered by the New Caledonian conservative majority stemmed directly from the FI's promotion of the PS as the party most likely to give the territory its sovereignty. To ascertain what PS policy implied for the future of New Caledonia, a distinction must be drawn between what that policy actually stated and the interpretation placed on it by the FI.

Initial contacts between the FI and the PS involved no policy ambiguity. The first links between the two formations were consolidated in November 1979, several months after the FI formed to contest the territorial elections in July of that year. Pierre Declercq, the UC Secretary-General, was instrumental in setting up a meeting in Paris on 9 November between UC leaders and the PS. Declercq and Pidjot met with Pierre Bérégovoy, then a member of the PS executive,(11) and issued the following joint communiqué

The Socialist Party and the Independence Front condemn the colonialist policy that the [parliamentary] majority is conducting in New Caledonia, the main manifestation of which is opposition to political emancipation. The Independence Front has expressed the Kanak people's valid claim to independence and its willingness to guarantee fundamental human rights upon independence. The Socialist Party has expressed its full solidarity with the Independence Front in the struggle that it is leading against the policies of the Right and reaffirms its willingness to support and guarantee the Kanak people's right to freely determine its future.(12)

This communiqué was couched in the classic polemical style of the French Left and employed ideologically charged terminology of the variety noted earlier. It should be noted that at this time the FI did not confine itself to obtaining PS backing for its claims. A similar statement was signed between the FI and the PC.(13)

The guarantee by the PS to the "Kanak people" of a freely determined future was clear and unambiguous in its support of Kanak self-determination. However the statement made no mention of the non-Kanak majority in New Caledonia. What would become of the majority of the New Caledonian population that was content to stay French? It was this aspect of the declaration which aroused the ire of the RPR and UDF, and was to give them grounds for pointing out that the communiqué advocated an undemocratic policy which would go against the interests of a majority of the local population. Pierre Messmer, a former Prime Minister and the RPR Deputy for Moselle, commented on the declaration in May 1984

In other words, the Socialists were promising power and independence to a minority, without worrying about the majority [in New Caledonia]. A fine piece of democracy!(14)

However Melanesians had become a minority in New Caledonia as a consequence of government policy under the Fifth Republic. From the 1950s, and particularly during the nickel boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Paris had approved of the migration to the territory undertaken mainly by metropolitan French and Wallisians. In 1972 Messmer himself had described the territory as one of the last 'colonies de peuplement' in the world where a developed nation could settle its inhabitants. As Prime Minister that year he advocated entrenching French influence there through a "massive immigration" of metropolitan French citizens.(15) From a Kanak nationalist perspective, this advocacy was not necessarily democratic either, in that French migration to the territory drastically diminished the likelihood of New Caledonia becoming independent via a one-person one-vote self-determination referendum.

It was this immigration that the joint communiqué of September 1979 made reference to when condemning the "colonialist policy" of the majority implemented in New Caledonia. In recognising the right of "the Kanak people", as opposed to the wider New Caledonian population, to claim sovereignty, the PS accepted the FI perspective on this issue rather than that of Messmer. PS endorsement of the right of the inhabitants of the DOM-TOM to accede to independence dated back to the party's first government programme, issued in 1972.(16) The Socialist Project, a party manifesto adopted in January 1980, restated this policy in terms more favourable to the FI.(17) The joint communiqué between the FI and the PS went further than either of these general policies in offering specific recognition to the FI as the representative of the "Kanak people" and in expressing "its full solidarity" with its push for sovereignty. Mitterrand's own position on the possibility of New Caledonia becoming independent was less clear. Speaking in the National Assembly on 23 November 1979, he appeared to support the message of the joint communiqué issued earlier that month, without stating precisely where he stood on the issue of Kanak independence.(18)

Statements by Mitterrand on New Caledonia, like those of the PS, were neither abundant nor detailed before the elections in 1981. No conclusive evidence existed that Mitterrand supported the independence programme of the FI before 1981. While he affirmed the right of the TOM to accede to independence in Ici et Maintenant,(19) a book published in 1980 which outlined his political views, he did not clarify under what conditions, although he probably meant under established constitutional arrangements whereby independence could be gained through a majority vote in a self-determination referendum. Mitterrand did not address the question of whether he was amenable to granting independence to a territorial electoral minority. Consequently, FI campaigning for Mitterrand was not initially very vigorous. The UC urged its members to vote for Mitterrand in the first round of the presidential elections, but did not mobilise to campaign for Mitterrand until immediately before the second round.(20) The FULK urged its followers to abstain in both rounds due to the lack of debate offered by election candidates on the issue of independence.(21) Other FI members left to their followers the decision of whether to vote for either Mitterrand or Marchais, or to abstain.(22) With the additional exception of the unconvinced Palika, most of the FI campaigned for Mitterrand prior to the second round of the elections. In doing so, the majority of the FI was affirming its rejection of continuity under Giscard d'Estaing, opposition to the RPCR line, and the hope for social change should Mitterrand be elected.

Whether such social change would lead to independence for New Caledonia was an issue which Mitterrand chose not to address. Pidjot received a letter from Mitterrand after the first round that illustrates the presidential candidate's care in avoiding the question of independence. The emphasis in the letter to Pidjot was on social reform.(23) While affirming the need for social justice and the righting of neo-colonialist wrongs, no mention was made of self-determination.

Declercq asserted after Mitterrand's victory in the second round that for the UC, independence was not a campaign issue, and that the debate on that subject still lay ahead.(24) However, Pidjot clearly regarded any projected PS territorial reforms as the first step toward an independent New Caledonia.(25) Although during the legislative elections the PS displayed no prolixity on the topic of its past declaration of solidarity with Kanak nationalism, neither did it offer any indication that it had abandoned this commitment. The Government of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy remained silent on this issue in the first few months after its appointment in June 1981.(26)

The advent of Mitterrand as President and the installation of the Fifth Republic's first Socialist Government implied an uncertain future for New Caledonia, one in which existing territorial administrative structures were to be transformed, although not to a prearranged agenda, under the new Socialist order. To that extent, the cited predictions both of local conservative leaders and of Kanak nationalists were correct. That the arrival of a PS administration in Paris necessarily implied the beginning of a territorial transition to independence, as local conservatives feared, and as Kanak nationalists hoped, was by no means certain. Neither was it certain that major political parties in New Caledonia, including the FI, would be receptive to changes implemented from Paris.

Whatever specific reforms for the territory the Mauroy Government was contemplating, circumstances were predisposed against their warm reception in Nouméa. New Caledonia's Territorial Assembly was dominated by elements hostile to the PS the conservative RPCR and the liberal FNSC.(27) The FNSC had backed Giscard d'Estaing and the UDF in the elections of 1981. The disparate minority elements within and outside the FI which had campaigned for the Socialists to varying degrees (or not at all) did not constitute a stable platform for the promotion of Socialist reforms. Were the Mauroy Government to show any hesitation in discussing conditions for New Caledonian self-determination, Kanak critics had the potential to be just as vehement as those of the FNSC and of the RPCR should independence be pushed to the centre of political debate. Whatever course the new Government might choose in New Caledonia, it ran the risk of alienating either the greater or smaller part of the territorial electorate.

The Giscardian Heritage: New Caledonia in 1981

New Caledonia had become an Overseas Territory in 1946 under the Fourth Republic, an event of pivotal importance in the shaping of its political and social development until 1981. It was under the Fourth Republic that local party politics took form. The impetus for this formation was provided by newly enfranchised Melanesian voters, represented by the UC.(28) UC demands for social, land, and administrative reforms in the 1950s marked the starting point of political events that led to the rise of Melanesian nationalism from the middle of the 1970s. The greater territorial autonomy advocated by the UC in the 1950s received recognition in 1956 under the 'loi-cadre Defferre', a Socialist Government administrative reform promulgated in Paris which aimed to facilitate the transition of France's African TOM to greater autonomy, but which equally applied to its Pacific TOM. After 96.51% of voters in New Caledonia backed continued adherence to France in a self-determination referendum held in September 1958,(29) the internal administrative autonomy the Defferre law ceded was revoked under the Fifth Republic.

The pace of liberal reform slowed from 1958. In the 1960s conservative political groupings coalesced into a united front which came to dominate local government at the same time as the UC experienced increasing internal divisions and a loss of confidence. De Gaulle reduced local administrative control and centralised local government around the High Commissioner, the state representative to the territory. The Billotte laws of 1969 accentuated the trend toward centralisation by establishing 32 communes administered according to metropolitan French law. Formerly the administration of communes had been a direct territorial responsibility. The Billotte laws in addition passed control of mineral resources to Paris. The nickel boom from 1969 to 1972 accentuated the stifling of UC plans for greater territorial autonomy. Migrating French citizens from mainland France and the other two Pacific TOM who arrived to partake of New Caledonian economic prosperity furthered the reduction of the local Melanesian population to minority status,(30) and thereby entrenched the electoral power of local conservative parties. These immigrants to New Caledonia shunned the political agendas of local Melanesians and displayed support for conservative parties led predominantly by Caldoches.

The frustration of Melanesian aspirations to greater social and administrative participation in a more autonomous New Caledonia during the 1960s and 1970s led an increasing number of Melanesians to abandon hope of developing their identity within the French Republic. The frustration of Kanak demands for internal reform caused the leaders of those in the UC and its break-away parties in the late 1970s to accept that Melanesian particularism could only be recognised through independence from France. The birth of Kanak nationalism occurred just before Paris opted for a programme of liberal reforms in New Caledonia, intended to recognise at least some Melanesian aspirations. For Kanak nationalists, Paris's recognition of the desirability of change represented a belated response that offered them little.

The Socialist electoral victories of 1981 effectively brought Dijoud's reforms in New Caledonia to an end just over two years after their introduction there. Too few of the Dijoud Plan's goals had been achieved in the interim to permit a balanced assessment of it. The pattern of a newly appointed Government in Paris cutting short the policy activity of its predecessor in New Caledonia was to be repeated later in the 1980s. However some analysis of the plan can serve as a basis for comparison with subsequent reforms.

The Dijoud Plan was presented to the New Caledonian Territorial Assembly on 21 February 1979. The ten year development plan proposed a series of reforms which would assist local economic expansion, and aimed to eliminate some of the social inequalities Melanesians faced. The UC criticised the plan as inadequate. Like the redefinition of the territorial statute in 1976,(31) the Dijoud Plan did not devolve existing state administrative responsibilities for New Caledonia. Dijoud's assertion that New Caledonia was underpopulated and should be opened to more immigration(32) was not well received by Kanak nationalists, who resented the fact that the Melanesian population had already been reduced to a minority in the territory. Another contentious point was represented by Dijoud's assumption that acceptance of the plan by the Territorial Assembly would imply a commitment to a ten-year moratorium on the question of New Caledonian independence.(33) This assumption was unacceptable to the UC and the other Melanesian parties which were to form the FI in July 1979. In recognition of some of the advantageous aspects the plan held for Melanesians, the UC abstained from voting on the plan rather than directly opposing it. Territorial Councillors from other pro-independence parties took their opposition further by boycotting the assembly debate. In spite of this opposition, the Territorial Assembly approved the Dijoud Plan through the support of the RPCR, the FNSC and the PSC.(34) These representatives were receptive to the economic assistance the plan offered to New Caledonia, and regarded a moratorium on self-determination positively.

In response to an economic decline in New Caledonia, territorial trade growth represented a major concern of the plan. By 1979, the nickel boom had receded into the past. Metallurgy and mining, the single most important productive sector of the territory's economy, was in decline due to the instability of the international market. This trend was reflected in falling New Caledonian production and through its declining percentage of territorial GDP27.53% in 1974; 15.93% in 1979.(35) The average price of a kilogram of nickel fell from around 125F CFP in 1974, to a low of around 70F CFP in 1978, before climbing to a short-lived peak of about 140F CFP in 1979 that tailed off in years to follow.(36) These variations influenced the fate of the territorial economy in that period. Total annual GDP in New Caledonia dropped to 95% of the 1974 GDP total in 1978, reached 101% of the 1974 total in 1979, and declined to 93% of the 1974 total by 1981.(37) As territorial economic fortunes were largely dependent on nickel exports, this decline was troublesome for New Caledonia.

The Dijoud Plan expressed the need for local economic diversification and for the creation of import substitution industries in terms which were to be repeated on a larger scale in the Eighth Plan for the DOM-TOM. An agricultural revival in New Caledonia was projected.(38) The importance of increasing tourism in the territory was outlined. Mining would be diversified through the introduction of foreign investment, while other industries had to be encouraged to increase territorial self-sufficiency. The Plan also pointed out the desirability of exploiting local maritime resources.

The means to these ends foreshadowed the orientation of the Eighth Plan. A diversification of New Caledonian economic activities would be undertaken through government initiatives such as the establishment of credit facilities,(39) encouragement of foreign investment in mining and fisheries,(40) and the improvement of the territorial educational, technical and administrative infrastructure.(41) New Caledonia would be aided in its economic expansion by the development of closer economic relations with its Pacific neighbours, who would provide it with export markets.(42) The initiative for these links would, of necessity, have to originate from Paris. Foreign relations remained the prerogative of the State rather than of the Territorial Assembly.

By 1981, only the beginnings of these reforms had been set in motion. The effects of the Dijoud Plan on the New Caledonian economy in 1980 and 1981 were not remarkable. In that period, the local balance of trade did not improve. The value of exports covered 84.3% of the value of imports in 1980, and 82.1% in 1981.(43) The territory depended on state subsidies to stabilise its balance of payments. However generous by the standards of the day, the territorial budget proposed by Dijoud in February 1979 of 130 billion CFP for the next ten years would have been inadequate in addressing this ongoing balance of payments problem.(44) (Table 5) Government spending in New Caledonia was to outstrip this projection in the 1980s.(45)

Dijoud's recognition of the inhabitants of New Caledonia was a major policy innovation for a French Minister, as it included land, cultural and social policy renovations as well as administrative reforms, although it entailed certain conceptual limits. While Dijoud hoped to encourage New Caledonians to participate in the development of their territory, he refrained from going so far as delegating greater administrative powers to them.(46) The Dijoud Plan, like the Eighth Plan, failed to answer the question of how meaningful local participation in territorial policy formation was to take place while Paris retained executive and financial control. Dijoud and his ministerial colleagues were not prepared to reduce the powers of the French State, possibly because greater autonomy might allow territorial leaders to steer reform in a direction deemed undesirable in Paris.

The manner in which the Dijoud Plan addressed the interests of indigenous Melanesians is of particular importance in the context of the increasing vehemence of Kanak calls from the late 1970s and into the 1980s for greater recognition of their identity and problems. The unwillingness of Dijoud to respond to the demands of Kanak parties to their satisfaction contributed to the foundation of the FI and its call for more radical reform in greater recognition of indigenous particularism.

Part of the objection of the FI to the Dijoud Plan resided in the treatment of the recognition of Melanesian cultural identity. Here the interests of Melanesian cultural particularism clashed with stress on cultural pluralism within a dominant French culture. Dijoud's plan was the first for New Caledonia which recognised and supported Melanesian culture as well as local European culture, but it did so within the wider context of establishing recognition of ethnic plurality in the territory.(47) Dijoud's aim was to promote Melanesian culture while considering it a component within the Fifth Republic.(48) Melanesian culture would be encouraged, not as the basis of Kanak nationhood, as Kanak parties would have preferred, but as a regional culture, in the same way as Paris reluctantly began giving recognition to Breton, Basque, Occitan and Corsican culture in metropolitan France in the early 1970s. In much the same fashion as in Brittany, Euskadie, Occitanie and Corsica, indigenous culture in New Caledonia would be encouraged through the organisation of indigenous language courses, the funding of traditional artisanal activities, and through the establishment of cultural centres.(49) Another target of the plan was to consolidate the character of the European community in the territory.(50) Assuming this consolidation was necessary, a debatable point given the already existing dominance of European culture in New Caledonian educational institutes, the media, business and administration, it could only grate on the sensibilities of Kanak nationalists. Equally controversial to Kanaks was the plan's target to integrate the cultures of Wallisians, Tahitians, Indonesians and other non-European immigrant minorities into the local cultural milieu. Kanaks tended to regard these minority communities in New Caledonia as interlopers, whose presence deprived Kanaks of work and land. Henceforth these non-indigenous minorities were to receive state cultural funding as well. Rather than promoting harmony through pluralism, the Dijoud Plan served to aggravate Kanak disenchantment through the recognition of non-indigenous cultures. The FI would have preferred a recognition of Kanak exclusivism in response to the status of the indigenous Melanesian population as the single largest ethnic group and as the prior occupants of New Caledonia.

As part of the cultural reforms in the Dijoud Plan three bodies, the Melanesian Cultural Institute, the Bureau of Vernacular Languages, and Melanesian Promotion (a territorial initiative) were founded. The last of these bodies began its work in August 1979, and prepared a broad agenda for Melanesian land, educational, legal, cultural and womens' rights. This agenda was boycotted by the FI, which argued that Franck Wahuzue, the chairman of Melanesian Promotion, represented neither its interests, nor the better interests of Melanesians in general. At the time of his appointment, Wahuzue was an RPCR Terrritorial Councillor.(51) The refusal of the FI to cooperate with Melanesian Promotion was part of a wider rejection of the cultural policy installed under the Dijoud Plan.

The most contentious issue of all addressed by the Dijoud Plan was land reform. Confrontations between European landowners and Melanesian tribes over tribal land claims had multiplied from 1976. Melanesian tribes were increasingly claiming the return of lands they had been forced to abandon decades earlier during European rural settlement. The growth of tribal populations, the return of unemployed Melanesian youths from Nouméa since the start of the economic depression from the mid-1970s, and the growth of Kanak identity contributed to this trend. Arguably the most racially divisive issue in New Caledonia, land redistribution was an immediate concern to Kanak nationalists, for whom the return of ancestral lands often meant the enhancement of traditional tribal pride and identity.(52)

The Dijoud Plan recognised the importance of land to Melanesian identity, but could not accept tribal ownership as a privileged form of land tenure under French law. On the contrary, individual rather than tribal title was promoted in the Dijoud Plan. As part of the goal to encourage cash cropping, it was hoped that Melanesians could, through land redistribution, be encouraged to establish themselves as freehold farmers outside the tribal milieu.(53) The Plan mentioned that European landowners would be subject to land purchases by means of government funds administered by the territory, although this would only be done "amicably".(54) The forced eviction of rural Europeans was not envisaged, but later this position was revised when the FNSC furthered tribal interests by lobbying at territorial and national level for compulsory purchase. The FNSC held that various European landowners were holding up land redistribution by refusing to sell land they were not cultivating, whether because they thought the price was not good enough, and/or because they opposed passing it over to Melanesians. This aspect of the land reform proposals outlined in the Dijoud Plan was modified by a land reform law adopted by the National Assembly on 20 December 1980, which allowed under certain circumstances for land to be purchased compulsorily from Europeans in favour of tribal claims.(55) European landowners resented this turn-around.

After decades of government neglect of land reform the redistribution of New Caledonian land undertaken during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing was a major achievement. Land redistribution steadily increased in the late 1970s. Approximately 2,000ha were reattributed in 1977, 4,000ha in 1978, 8,000ha in 1979, and 10,000ha in 1980.(56) Tribal landholdings in New Caledonia increased from an estimated 374,000ha in 1976,(57) to over 375,000ha in 1978,(58) and to more than 376,000ha by 1980.(59) It is plain that not all of the reattributed land went to Melanesian tribes. Private Melanesian ownership of land increased substantially in this period, to the point that by 1981, 162 Melanesians either tenanted or owned 15,750ha outside the tribal milieu.(60) Nevertheless, these individual titles represented a minor proportion of Melanesian land holdings. The large scale conversion of tribal holdings to individual tenancy did not appear to be an immediate prospect.

Much controversy surrounded redistribution of land to tribal title. The RPCR contested the priority it believed was accorded to tribal land claims, preferring to encourage modern individually owned farms rather than what it perceived as economically backward tribal land tenure. Rural Kanak activists advocated much wider redistribution and contested the Plan's recognition of individual Melanesian land tenure, while some European landowners believed that reforms had already gone too far. The latter group's grievances were to increase, as the land reforms undertaken by Dijoud presaged greater changes to be introduced under Socialist Governments in the 1980s.

In New Caledonia from 1981, Socialist Governments were to build on the Dijoud Plan's guarded, liberal reforms until 1983, before accelerating the rate of change in the territory to a pace far beyond that envisaged by Dijoud.

New Caledonia and Henri Emmanuelli

Henri Emmanuelli, Prime Minister Mauroy's first Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM, offered a moderate and somewhat conventional initial message to their inhabitants on 25 May 1981. Emmanuelli expressed his intention of furthering social justice in the DOM-TOM, and of consolidating their links with the Republic, as his contribution to the Socialist "national recovery" which aimed to renovate French society.(61) His message appeared reassuring for the FNSC and the RPCR, although it inevitably failed to address the nationalist agenda of the FI, or indeed the pro-independence stances of other nationalist parties in the DOM-TOM.

Emmanuelli was, as might be expected, a novice as far as New Caledonia, and the DOM-TOM in general, were concerned. Like previous appointees to the post he had not had direct experience in the administration of this domain. With a career in banking before his election as a PS Deputy for Landes in 1978, he could not be described as an habitué of DOM-TOM policy.(62) He had a knowledge of economics and finance which was to serve him in understanding New Caledonian economic difficulties, but he did not have the opportunity to overcome these problems during his 22 months overseeing the DOM-TOM. From 1981 to 1983 New Caledonia's capacity for self-sufficiency slid drastically due to the drop in the international market value of nickel, the ongoing decline of local agricultural production, and the limited progress in promoting the creation of new businesses in the primary and secondary sectors. In 1981, territorial exports covered 82.1% of the value of imports. In 1982, this figure fell sharply to 62.0%. By 1983 it had declined further to 49.4%.(63) This trend served to underline the pressing need for territorial economic development. While preoccupied with a policy agenda designed to assist the most disadvantaged group within New Caledonia, namely its indigenous Melanesians, Emmanuelli neglected the overall economic well-being of New Caledonia.

Emmanuelli's first contact with New Caledonia was on 7 August 1981, the beginning of a five day visit. During this visit, he avoided the question of New Caledonian independence. In his speech to the Territorial Assembly on 11 August he called instead for radical social change through land reform and Melanesian development. Emmanuelli deplored the inequalities and injustices he had witnessed during his brief stay.(64) He denounced the state of land distribution, announcing that more must be done to increase tribal domains, a conciliatory message for the FI. Social equality would be furthered by adapting education to local needs, and by the introduction of a personal income tax system intended to redistribute private wealth for public spending. These observations were not greeted with enthusiasm by the RPCR Territorial Councillors present. The RPCR did not recognise an ethnic problem in New Caledonia, and held that its troubles were solely the result of a depressed economy.(65) Redistributing more land to Melanesian tribal societies was considered a detrimental commitment. This undertaking would not assist the resurgence of commercial agricultural production, as Melanesian tribes preferred subsistence agriculture to cash cropping. Income tax was perceived by the RPCR as a state infringement of individual liberties.

Overall, Emmanuelli announced:

[...] now is the time to bring about fundamental change to the economic and social situation, both in terms of the system of production, with its disproportionate emphasis on imports, and land problems, regarding which it is clear that a new redistribution of land must immediately take place.(66)

The difficulties he addressed were the same ones which had concerned Dijoud. Emmanuelli's response was not dissimilar either, apart from the left-wing veneer in his speech provided by adjectives such as 'colonial'. The administrative dirigisme of Emmanuelli's predecessors appeared likely to continue, although he attempted, unconvincingly, to render this prospect more acceptable. He recognised the need to avoid an imposition of solutions, although he maintained that if the Government were to find itself confronted with indecision or inertia at territorial level, it would impose its judgement.(67) In an attempt to reassure the conservatives present, Emmanuelli rounded off his speech with a stirring evocation of the nobility and virtue inherent in French Republican values.(68)

In August, whereas the UC was prepared to wait in order to give the new administration time to come to terms with the situation in New Caledonia, the other Kanak parties believed that the Government had shelved any idea of independence and therefore boycotted Emmanuelli during his visit.(69) By October, the leaders of the UC had also become impatient. Pidjot and Jean-Marie Tjibaou, then an FI Territorial Councillor and the Mayor of Hienghène, unsuccessfully lobbied the Government in Paris.(70) The visit culminated in a discussion with Mitterrand at the Elysée on 26 October. In response to Tjibaou's questioning about what position he held on the recognition of Kanak sovereignty, Mitterrand did not deny the right of Kanaks to claim independence, but pointed out that as President he was obliged to take into account the interests of those New Caledonians opposed to independence as well.(71)

Emmanuelli, when questioned in early October 1981 by an Australian journalist on his Government's attitude to the political programme of the FI, gave a similarly measured, constitutionally-observant response. His criterion for offering self-determination to New Caledonia, or to any other component of the DOM-TOM, was consistent with Franceschi's outline of PS policy offered in the National Assembly debate held on 10 June 1980. Accession to independence would be dependent on a local electoral majority advocating this option.(72) In the absence of majority backing for independence the FI would have to wait.

The PS displayed internal solidarity over this position, but no such consensus was evident among the socialist minority groups in New Caledonia. In October 1981, the PSC split over the question of promoting independence. A new party, the Parti Socialiste de Nouvelle-Calédonie, was formed. It adopted the stance of the PS regarding independence. The remainder of the PSC continued favouring immediate self-determination.(73) The gaps between the New Caledonian sympathisers of the PS had not closed.

At this time neither Mitterrand nor the Mauroy Government could afford to express messages of solidarity with the FI such as that of 1979. Tensions in New Caledonia had been heightened by the murder of Declercq on 19 September 1981, the first assassination of a politician in the territory. Kanak militants occupied farms around Canala from the following day to pressure the Government into recognising their nationalist claims. The official response was to send in gendarmes and to condemn the tactics of violent confrontation, a reaction repeated as troubles continued sporadically into 1982.(74) A government stand in support of Kanak nationalism at that point risked provoking further violence from extremist conservative elements in New Caledonia. As far as the Mauroy Government was concerned, discussion of independence would have to wait until the FI enjoyed wider support for its position.

In the meantime, Paris intended to provide the basis for Melanesian social advancement through reforms under the existing territorial statute. On 13 December 1981 government aims were announced by Emmanuelli in Nouméa. He presented to the Territorial Assembly the case for implementing legislation in New Caledonia by ordinance. Such a measure would permit the Mauroy Government to legislate rapidly without the constraint of having to gain the assent of Parliament.(75) The Territorial Assembly rejected this proposal in a vote on 22 December.(76) The RPCR and FNSC were unenthused about giving assent to a Socialist Government to fast track legislation which might be ill-conceived. This opposition counted for little in legislative terms. Under the Constitution, the Government was only required to consult with the Territorial Assembly concerning legislation directly affecting New Caledonia, prior to presenting that legislation to Parliament. Nouméa could oppose legislation emanating from Paris, but held no power of veto over it.(77)

Emmanuelli cited two reasons for recourse to legislation by ordinance. The first involved the dominance of the FNSC and the RPCR in the Territorial Assembly, which he stated would block normal channels of legislation.(78) His explanation did not square well with his professed respect for the wishes of the local majority on the question of self-determination. It was considered permissible for the FNSC and the RPCR to form a block against independence, but not for them to stand in the way of social reform. Emmanuelli omitted mention of the fact that under the territorial statute, whatever the stance of the majority of the Territorial Assembly, Paris held more administrative power than Nouméa, and could forestall initiatives by the Territorial Assembly of which it disapproved.(79) Ordinances were not necessary to control the Territorial Assembly. Emmanuelli later admitted that he wanted to circumvent Parliament to some extent. He cited the raft of other Socialist reforms tabled for consideration by Parliament in 1982, and claimed that had his proposals been tabled as bills, their legislation would have been delayed until late 1983.(80) More to the point, Emmanuelli wanted to avoid obstruction in the National Assembly and the Senate from the RPR and UDF of the sort that would delay and hinder his decentralisation bill for the DOM in late 1982.(81)

The paradox of a Socialist Government adopting extraordinary powers to fast track legislation for New Caledonia while simultaneously expressing support for decentralisation, whether elsewhere in the DOM-TOM, or in metropolitan France, did not pass unnoticed. The RPR concentrated on this contradiction during the National Assembly's debate on Emmanuelli's ordinance bill on 14 January 1982. Didier Julia, an RPR Deputy, chided:

Indeed, when you want to decentralise, you decentralise and when you want to administer from Paris, you administer from Paris; but you cannot use the pretext of decentralising in order to administer from Paris.(82)

The logic of M. Julia's argument was clear enough, although the RPR was to find itself following in the footsteps of Emmanuelli in similar fashion between 1986 and 1988. Like the Mauroy Government in 1982, the Chirac Government in this later period was not prepared to cede the administrative powers which would have allowed the Territorial Assembly to formulate its own administrative structures.

Thanks to both the PS majority and the support of the PC, the National Assembly approved recourse to ordinances. The finalised law allowed the Government to legislate by ordinance until 31 December 1982. Ordinances issued would have to be ratified by Parliament by 28 January 1983.(83)

Of the seven ordinances approved under the new law, three were of special significance.(84) The first of these, Ordinance no.82-878, established the ODIL. The ODIL aimed to encourage rural commerce, and was jointly administered by government, territorial, and communal representatives. Ordinance no.82-879 created the OCSTC, an institution with a wider mandate than its Giscardian forebear, the Melanesian Cultural Institute. The OCTSC was assigned the role of coordinating existing bodies related to Melanesian culture, including the territorial museum and archaeological department. There was no hint in the ordinance of the cultural pluralism advocated by Dijoud. The promotion of things "Canaque" was considered an overriding priority. Ordinance no.82-880 created the Land Office, which had as its conflicting tasks the redistribution of land in favour of Melanesian tribal claims, and the encouragement of land use for agricultural production. The individual Melanesian land tenure advocated under Dijoud was not mentioned, and the ordinance expressly recognised that tribal land claims took precedence over those of Europeans.

The ODIL, OCSTC and the Land Office formed the tripodal base for Emmanuelli's renovation of New Caledonia, a renovation which would strengthen Melanesian identity and supposedly promote balanced dialogue.(85) Emmanuelli overestimated the capacity of New Caledonian leaders to change their mentalities. In particular, he underestimated the entrenched conservatism of the RPCR. It was an error of judgement to be repeated by his successors up to the end of Socialist rule in March 1986.

The response of the RPCR to Emmanuelli's reforms was strenuously negative, particularly as the FNSC had aligned itself with the FI in the first half of 1982. As had been the case with land reform in 1980, the FNSC and the RPCR found themselves holding divergent positions on social reform, with the former being more responsive to change. The liberal FNSC did not find the renovations as unpalatable as did the RPCR. Government avoidance of the issue of independence helped Emmanuelli to gain the confidence of the FNSC, which asserted that Socialist reforms would calm Kanak militantism. In January 1982 the party joined with the FI to vote in the Government's proposed personal income tax system for New Caledonia.(86) By June, FNSC support for government initiatives had led it to form an alliance with the FI that resulted in the formation of a new territorial Government Council. Tjibaou was appointed Vice-President, subordinate only to the High Commissioner. The FI held four seats on the Government Council, and the FNSC had two, while the remaining member was an independent. The balance of power in the Territorial Assembly shifted to the advantage of the FI. Its 14 councillors formed a coalition with the seven FNSC representatives. The remainder of the chamber consisted of 13 RPCR Territorial Councillors and two independents.(87) This alliance was to survive until late 1984. It upset the previous conservative dominance of territorial institutions, and provoked a conservative backlash.

The RPCR argued in vain that the Territorial Assembly should be dissolved and new elections should be called, on the grounds that the FNSC had betrayed its supporters by aligning with the FI.(88) Members of an extreme-right group, the MOP, illegally occupied the Territorial Assembly on 22 July and shouted at FI and FNSC Councillors to resign, before riot police were called in and a mêlée broke out.(89)lxxxix Faced with FI and FNSC unwillingness to address this argument, Lafleur provoked a by-election for his post as Deputy on 5 September 1982 to test his support. His re-election was achieved with an impressive mandate. He obtained 86.26% of the vote after campaigning against a political unknown.(90) With 23,345 votes, Lafleur gained 7,056 votes more than he had in the legislative elections of 1981. (Table 4) It was probable that large numbers of former FNSC supporters had voted for him. For all the posturing this gesture involved, it did serve to underline the strength of the RPCR vote. The FI/FNSC alliance succeeded in further alienating the RPCR from the Mauroy Government's political, social and economic remodelling of the territory.

Although the FI had moderated its agenda by forming an alliance with the FNSC to promote Socialist reform, the rift between the Mauroy Government and the FI over immediate self-determination remained. The FI backed Emmanuelli's reforms for their promise of improving Melanesian welfare but had not abandoned support for independence. Having failed to achieve its earlier target of Kanak independence by September 1982,(91) the UC still retained hopes of achieving sovereignty by September 1984.(92) The minority parties in the FI still shared the hope for independence with the UC, even if they disagreed on the need to wait so long.

Lemoine: in Search of Conciliation

In March 1983, Emmanuelli's involvement with New Caledonia came to an end as a result of a portfolio reshuffle under Prime Minister Mauroy. Emmanuelli was appointed Secretary of State to the Budget, a post where his banking experience could be used to greater effect. In the weeks prior to his reappointment, it was apparent that the evolution of mentalities he had hoped for in New Caledonia had yet to materialise. Confrontation between Kanaks, Europeans and the forces of law and order broke out on 10 January 1983. Two gendarmes were killed when a Kanak protest over logging compensation for a Melanesian tribe escalated into violence, resulting in the arrest of 18 Kanaks. The RPCR and LKS organised demonstrations, the former against Kanaks, and the latter in defence of them.(93) The decision by Mauroy and Mitterrand to shift Emmanuelli to another portfolio may have been motivated by a realisation that he had not managed to gain the confidence of the majority of New Caledonians, as well as by disappointment at the checks imposed on his decentralisation reforms in the DOM.

For Emmanuelli's replacement, Georges Lemoine, New Caledonia was to become a preoccupying aspect of the DOM-TOM portfolio. Intermittent violence, and the deterioration of relations between the RPCR and the FI/FNSC coalition, were symptomatic of worsening rifts which needed to be addressed by Paris. The Mauroy Government resolved to respond to the situation in New Caledonia by redrawing the territorial statute, with the aim of promoting greater social justice.

Consultations with local party leaders over the drafting of a new territorial statute had begun during Emmanuelli's last months in office, but it was under Lemoine that the bulk of preparatory work for a new statute took place. The responsibility for the implementation of Emmanuelli's ordinances also rested with Lemoine. Lemoine took up the post of Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM with greater knowledge of the DOM-TOM and New Caledonia than Emmanuelli had had in 1981. With Lafleur among others, Lemoine had been on the committee which drew up the Eighth Plan for the DOM-TOM in the late 1970s.(94) Lemoine had become personally acquainted with other New Caledonian political leaders during his time as Secretary-General of the Association of French Mayors.(95) Lemoine's contacts and skills of negotiation were to be tested to their limit and ultimately fell short of producing a local entente.

In Nouméa on 20 May 1983 Lemoine announced his policy priorities for New Caledonia to the Territorial Assembly. His pronouncements on the recognition of Melanesian culture, land rights and territorial development echoed those of Emmanuelli. Unlike Emmanuelli, Lemoine addressed the issue of self-determination in his first speech to the Territorial Assembly. He mentioned that independence was not ruled out by the Government, but he was suggestively vague as to whom voter eligibility in a self-determination referendum might apply:

To speak of self-determination means that a choice must be offered to the inhabitants of the Territory. And when I say that the future of the Territory is the concern of all its inhabitants, by that I mean the real inhabitants and of course I exclude those who are just passing through on a short-term assignment.(96)

The conditions under which a referendum might be held had not been touched on by Emmanuelli. It was a sensitive subject. In keeping his statement vague, Lemoine wished to avoid upsetting either the RPCR or the FI at that time the latter wanted the franchise to be restricted to exclude immigrants with no parents born in New Caledonia, a concept which the RPCR rejected as undemocratic. Moreover, for Lemoine the referendum was not a pressing matter which demanded detailed exposition.(97)

Lemoine realised that the validity of any new statute would be undermined in the absence of some form of cooperation between New Caledonian political leaders. During his speech he took the opportunity to propose negotiations with local parties over the forthcoming statute. Lemoine devoted his efforts in the following months to the organisation of multilateral discussions between the Government and the main New Caledonian parties. After considerable negotiation by government representatives, delegations from the FI, the FNSC, the RPCR and the Mauroy Government, agreed to converge on Nainville les Roches, in metropolitan France, for discussions from 8 to 12 July 1983. The Nainville les Roches discussions resulted in a joint declaration which was intended to provide the basis for a consensual solution to New Caledonia's future.(98) The Government, the FI and the FNSC signed this declaration. The RPCR did not.

In the context of PS policy, the Government's signature to article 1 involved no change in its previously announced position. The willingness of signatories to confirm the abolition of the colonial heritage in New Caledonia and the recognition of the equality of Melanesian culture, with a role for custom law in forthcoming reforms, was in line with past statements promoting recognition of the territory's Melanesians. The recognition of the legitimacy of the "Kanak people" and its innate right to independence in article 2 marked a reaffirmation of the PS's joint statement with the FI in 1979. The explicit recognition of the rights of non-Kanaks to participate in any self-determination referendum harked back to the reference of the joint FI/PS statement to the just claims of the Kanak people and its willingness to recognise fundamental human rights under independence. Article 3 was the boldest undertaking, in that it committed the Government to a timetable on self-determination for the first time. The granting of greater administrative powers at territorial level was characterised as a desirable precondition to a referendum.

The principal shortcoming of the Nainville les Roches declaration was that the RPCR could not agree to its definitions. Apparent in objections voiced by the RPCR to the declaration was a divergent ideological frame of reference, of the sort discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The declaration's advocacy of the abolition of the colonial fait accompli and the legitimacy of the Kanak people was repugnant to RPCR leaders.(99) They did not accept that reference to colonialism was appropriate to statute discussions, and saw no need to confirm its abolition when New Caledonia had not constitutionally been a colony since the days of the Third Republic. Mention of the legitimacy of the Kanak people clashed with their Republican outlook. All citizens were considered equal under French law, and granting special recognition to one group in New Caledonia was regarded as an unsettling precedent. Just how the Kanak people might be defined was another point open to debate. RPCR leaders pointed out that while the FI claimed to speak for Melanesians, not all Melanesians supported independence or thought of themselves as Kanaks. The most prominent example was Dick Ukeiwé, a Loyalty Islander who attended the Nainville les Roches negotiations as an RPCR delegate.

RPCR representatives had come to Nainville les Roches to discuss a new statute, not to be drawn into debate on self-determination conditions. To recognise the innate right of Kanaks to independence was interpreted as provocative. To proceed to state that Kanaks recognised the rights of other ethnic groups in New Caledonia to participate in a self-determination vote was regarded as presumptuous. The right of non-Kanaks to vote was granted by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, not by the FI, the self-appointed representative of Kanaks. By this stage, the RPCR was supportive of greater territorial autonomy, particularly if that autonomy would reduce Socialist Government control over New Caledonia.(100) But its representatives would neither admit the primacy of Kanak nationalism nor consent to a statute that might lead to independence.(101) Without the adherence of the RPCR, the Nainville les Roches declaration was a hollow accomplishment. Consensus could not be built without the cooperation of this major New Caledonian party.

For its part, the FI too soon became dissatisfied with the Nainville les Roches declaration. At the end of July, a joint statement by the UC, LKS, FULK and the PSC downplayed the importance of the declaration, calling it "a statement of intent, moreover an unclear one, by the French Government".(102) Suspicion remained that the Government was not really supportive of Kanak independence. There was some cause for this suspicion. Neither Mitterrand nor the Mauroy Government had offered the unreserved backing of Kanak independence that would have been preferred by the FI. That recognition of Kanaks' innate right to independence had been accorded was not indicative of backing for Kanak independence. Under French law the right of Kanaks to independence was no greater or lesser a right than that which any other segment of the population of the TOM enjoyed. The joint UC/LKS/FULK/PSC statement denounced ongoing government reforms as "an attempt to demobilise the Kanak people and to implement a policy contrary to its interests". To the contrary, the Nainville les Roches declaration was far from having a demobilising effect on Kanaks, as the joint statement itself reflected. As to whether the policy being implemented was contrary to Kanak interests, that remained to be seen. The reforms already undertaken by the Socialists had offered positive recognition of Kanak claims to social reform. The UC/LKS/FULK/PSC statement in addition expressed fears that the Nainville les Roches propositions were steering Kanaks away from independence and towards some form of autonomy. This assumption was based on a possibly willful misreading of the Nainville les Roches declaration, which had not described the new statute as a preliminary to Kanak independence. It was possible that Kanak independence would not be attained however, particularly if the FI found itself without the majority electoral support necessary to gain independence through a self-determination vote.

In the RPCR, reverse suspicions existed about the intentions of the Mauroy Government. It was assumed that the Mauroy Government intended to promote Kanak independence through the implementation of a transitional statute prior to a self-determination vote.(103)

Of the three main New Caledonian parties, only the FNSC seemed content with the Nainville les Roches declaration. It asserted, like Lemoine, that the document could form the basis of a consensual solution in New Caledonia. Christian Boissery, an FNSC spokesman, described his party colleagues as "the guardians of the spirit of Nainville",(104) who would act as local mediators between the RPCR and the FI. Lemoine mistakenly took the Nainville les Roches declaration as a green light for further reform. He believed that the meeting had provided the basis for the consensus which he desired.(105) Lemoine pressed on after Nainville les Roches and tried to establish a new administrative base for New Caledonia, despite the fact its three main political parties remained at odds on the question of independence.

Consensus in New Caledonia was nevertheless not entirely absent from the territory following Nainville les Roches. Unfortunately, such consensus as existed took the form of opposition to the forthcoming statute. On 19 April 1984 the Territorial Assembly rejected the territorial statute bill by 32 votes to four.(106) It is a measure of the discontent of the FI and the RPCR that they were united in their opposition to Lemoine's proposals, albeit for different reasons. Included in the bill was mention of a self-determination referendum, scheduled for 1989. Lemoine had first mentioned this date for a referendum during his second visit to New Caledonia in November 1983.(107) In conceding a date Lemoine offered more than Emmanuelli had, although Dijoud had offered the same date for self-determination as early as February 1979. For the FI, the statute proposals did not go far enough, while for the RPCR they went too far.

The Government showed no sign of being overly concerned by this vote. Its attitude was that Paris knew what was best and that reform would continue regardless.(108) At the time, the Government did not consider it extraordinary to ignore the Territorial Assembly's objections to the statute bill. The three major parties in Nouméa were at odds over the statute, and in the absence of a coherent majority response to its plans, the Mauroy Government decided to keep going. As has already been noted, the Territorial Assembly had no power of veto over government legislation, and this was not the first time that Paris had acted against the wishes of Nouméa. Conversely, because the Territorial Assembly had no power over government reforms, its members were prone to adopt extreme reactions in the knowledge that they were not responsible for their consequences, as was seen in the absences and abstentions of Territorial Councillors during the vote on the Dijoud Plan. A more cautious politician than Lemoine might have discarded the statute bill and called for further negotiation, but at that time there was no reason to assume that the unpopularity of government reform would have any serious consequences.

The new territorial statute,(109) known as the Lemoine Statute, was adopted by the National Assembly after its third and final reading on 31 July 1984, 14 days after Mauroy was replaced as Prime Minister by Laurent Fabius, leading a new Socialist Government. 321 Deputies, mainly from the PS and PC, voted for the statute, while 151, mainly UDF and RPR, voted against it.(110) Communist support was offered because the statute was considered a preliminary step to self-determination, although the PC criticised the Government for not guaranteeing Kanak self-determination.(111) RPR and UDF criticisms were that the statute did not delegate sufficient autonomy to the Territorial Assembly, and was discriminatory in promoting Melanesian culture above others.(112)

The first article of the statute created a State-Territory Committee charged with preparing the conditions for the self-determination referendum, and declared that in five years' time the inhabitants of New Caledonia would be consulted by means of a referendum in accordance with article 53 of the Constitution.(113) The Government in this way applied the Capitant Doctrine formulated and used by its Gaullist and Giscardian forebears in the 1960s and 1970s. This step was in accordance with established constitutional usage, and past statements by the PS and Mitterrand on self-determination. The FI took exception to the terms of this article, as it did not offer the Kanak independence which it claimed that the Nainville les Roches declaration had recognised. It asserted that the innate and active right of Kanaks to independence set out in the Nainville les Roches declaration established the FI as a privileged partner, a debatable and controversial position.(114) The FI called for electoral reform which would assure a pro-independence vote of a majority in New Caledonia. In February 1984 Eloi Machoro, the Secretary-General of the UC, announced that he had sent a telegram to Mitterrand on behalf of the FI urging the repatriation of all non-indigenous inhabitants opposed to independence.(115) For the FI the "populations interested" in any self-determination vote, as referred to by article 53 of the Constitution, would have to be predominantly pro-independence, regardless of whether actions taken against French loyalists constituted an infringement of their civil liberties under French law. It was an unrealistic stance to which the Mauroy Government could not accede. The mass deportation from New Caledonia of French citizens on the basis of their political views would have been illegal. Determining just who would be eligible to vote was a controversial issue which was not to be durably resolved until 1988.

Article 3 defined six new custom regions, each of which would have its own tribal council, in order to give Melanesian custom authority a greater role in territorial administration. In this respect, it was true, as the RPR and UDF claimed, that the statute promoted Melanesian culture above others. The Mauroy Government instituted this recognition of custom authority to give Melanesian tribal leaders a greater role in the French administration in New Caledonia. While the majority of tribal leaders supported the FI, this article was not unambiguously to the advantage of the Front. Those tribal leaders who sympathised with the Front did not necessarily agree with the concept of the foundation of a unified Kanak people to the detriment of tribal identity. Freedom of religion and rights of free association were not threatened by the statute bill and non-indigenous immigrant groups were able to continue to promote their cultural interests through church groups, clubs and associations. European residents were not threatened by the creation of custom regions. French law, French education and French cultural values continued to play the pre-eminent role in New Caledonian life, as evidenced by the formulation, debate and promulgation of article 3 by a group of French parliamentarians in Paris. That objections to the ex officio presence of Wallisian kings in the territorial administration of Wallis and Futuna were not raised by RPR and UDF politicians was indicative of the degree of politicisation of the question of recognising traditional indigenous authority in New Caledonia by 1984.

Article 4 stipulated that the territory would be responsible in any field not reserved to the State under Article 5. However the list in article 5 was considerably longer than the list of state powers outlined in the statute of 1976. While the State ceded some powers to the territory, namely in the areas of secondary education, and audiovisual communication, it retained the bulk of its powers under the statute of 1976, and expanded its controls to some new areas. The responsibilities retained were over foreign relations, immigration, external communications, finance, defence, law and order, civil law to the exclusion of custom law and commercial law, justice and the organisation of the judiciary, the state public service and communal administration.(116) State control of territorial natural resources was expanded. Under the 1976 statute, Paris had controlled only mineral resources. The Lemoine Statute broadened this definition to encompass the "exploration, exploitation, conservation et management of natural, biological and non-biological resources".(117) This all-encompassing description of anything that could be found on land or under the sea demonstrated that the Governments of Mauroy and Fabius did not immediately intend to surrender state control of territorial resources. The State also retained command of the implementation of Emmanuelli's ordinances. Paris was reluctant to let control of these reforms fall into territorial hands, for fear that a hostile administration might stall them, although it did leave open provision for passing the ODIL, OCSTC and the Land Office to the territory should it ask and should Paris agree.(118) Overall, state powers over New Caledonia were not greatly changed by the Lemoine Statute, despite some tinkering with previous legislation. The RPR and the UDF were justified in pointing out the statute's lack of decentralisation, although neither party had made much effort in this area either when previously in government.

Greater innovation was to be found in the legislation's reorganisation of territorial institutions, although this reorganisation did not constitute any great decentralisation of the territory. The High Commissioner was replaced as the head of New Caledonia by a Territorial President, elected by the Territorial Assembly. A Regional Assembly ("assemblée des pays") was created, composed of 24 communal representatives, and 24 custom representatives, as was an Economic Expansion Committee, representing business and labour.(119) The Regional Assembly and the Economic Expansion Committee were intended to be consultative bodies which would advise the territory on legislation within their respective fields of competence. Certain similarities can be seen between the new administrative structure and that erected in September 1984 under the Internal Autonomy Statute for French Polynesia, notably the new post of Territorial President.

The Lemoine Statute was a major undertaking for the Government, and for New Caledonia, but was to founder on territorial opposition which Paris had underestimated during the preparation of the legislation. Kanak opposition to government reforms was to lead to a level of political violence and civil unrest in New Caledonia which Lemoine could not have foreseen.

Kanak disaffection with the Government intensified during the months leading up to the adoption of the Lemoine Statute. Pidjot criticised the statute bill during its three readings in the National Assembly. He repeated earlier criticisms that the statute did not guarantee rapid progress toward independence, and attempted to amend the bill so that independence could be attained in 1985, without necessarily having recourse to a popular referendum.(120) Pidjot also proposed that only permanent New Caledonian residents, and those inhabitants who had a locally born parent, should be eligible to participate in the self-determination referendum. The electoral balance was such in 1984 that voters who supported independence constituted a clear minority of the New Caledonian electorate, reflected by the FI's possession of only a relative majority of 14 out of 36 seats in the Territorial Assembly. Were the self-determination referendum to be open to all New Caledonian voters, then the majority vote would in all likelihood oppose independence.

The aim to tip the electoral balance in favour of the FI's cause was impractical, contentious, and extremely provocative to migrant French loyalists who would have been excluded from voting by its terms. Pidjot's amendments were rejected by the Law Commission as undemocratic. Lemoine described them as unconstitutional, in that they would deprive some French citizens of their voting rights.(121) No compensation for the electoral disadvantage that immigration had created for Kanaks was contemplated by the Government in 1984, as Pidjot pointed out.(122) The Government had backed away from Mitterrand's statement in November 1979 that the minority status of Melanesians should be considered alongside the fact that immigration was its cause. The Socialist Government found itself defending a situation which the PS had criticised in opposition. Had the Government acceded to Pidjot's amendments, the Opposition would have had recourse to the Constitutional Council, and discord within New Caledonia would have increased to a dangerous level.

Pidjot's discontent was such that he withdrew from the Socialist group in the National Assembly in June 1984.(123) This decision was followed by the FI's announcement at the end of July that to protest at government refusal to implement legislation to the advantage of Kanak voters in the self-determination referendum, it was withdrawing from territorial institutions, and would boycott the territorial elections scheduled for November 1984.(124) Faced with the absence of absolute majority support from the territorial electorate, the FI radicalised its opposition in its own self-interest.

The nadir of Lemoine's time as Secretary of State to the DOM-TOM came with the foundation of the FLNKS on 24 September 1984. Formed from the FI (with the notable exception of LKS, which believed the new formation was extremist, naïve and irresponsible), the FLNKS adopted a more militant approach in protesting Socialist Governments' lack of support for Kanak electoral primacy, and in announcing the goal of independence by 1985. The election boycott became part of what the FLNKS referred to in its charter as a "national liberation struggle".(125) The FLNKS resolved to force the issue by setting up a provisional government of Kanaky which would unilaterally declare independence, and called on Kanaks to organise "the conquest of liberty".(126) Accusing the Mauroy Government of being in league with the forces of colonialism in New Caledonia, the FLNKS broke off dialogue with Lemoine.

Much of the FLNKS position consisted of little more than vehement hyperbole as it did not enjoy the means by which it might convert its revolutionary rhetoric into concerted armed struggle. The FLNKS faced a lack of resources which set it apart from the circumstances of the Algerian national liberation movement of the 1950s. The support base that the FLNKS claimed, namely indigenous Melanesians, was far less imposing than the millions from whom the Algerian FLN had drawn its support. The FLNKS was hindered by the culturally segmented, undeveloped nature of the indigenous Melanesian population in New Caledonia, which constituted 42.56% of the territorial population in 1983.(127) Of the 61,870 indigenous Melanesians recorded in that year's census, 42% were under the age of 15.(128) While the FLNKS described its support base as "the Kanak people", indigenous Melanesians were in fact far from constituting a homogeneous group: they belonged to 319 tribes, speaking between them 27 different languages.(129) Supporters of the FLNKS tended to be found in the least-developed parts of the territory. In 1983, 73% of indigenous Melanesians lived in tribal societies in the rural hinterland, which relied on collective, subsistence agriculture.

Melanesian political divisions represented another challenge to the concept of a unified Kanak people. The FLNKS itself was an electoral coalition of five parties, three lobby groups and a trade union.(130) While it was demonstrated in the regional elections of 1985 that a large majority of Melanesian voters backed the concept of Kanak sovereignty, not all of them supported the FLNKS. In 1984 the LKS was the most prominent Kanak party to reject the Front's claim to represent Kanaks. Still other Melanesians, estimated to represent around 20% of indigenous voters in 1985, rejected Kanak nationalism in preference to French loyalist parties, usually the RPCR.(131)

On 1st December 1984 the FLNKS announced the establishment of the provisional government of Kanaky. While the term provisional government held an imposing air, in reality the body was a skeletal structure unsuited to governing New Caledonia, even in the unlikely circumstances that it found itself in that position. It was not until the second FLNKS congress in February 1985 that the roles of the provisional government and its subordinate structures were defined in the most general terms. The Front did not have a detailed vision of what its Republic of Kanaky would be like, and had formulated neither social nor economic policies. Tjibaou, the president of the provisional government, was at the head of a shadow structure lacking in substance, power or effective authority.

Any chance of achieving the territorial consensus which Lemoine had hoped to cement had been greatly reduced by the time of his unproductive third visit to New Caledonia in October 1984. The FLNKS refused to talk to him. The RPCR, contemplating its almost certain dominance of the Territorial Assembly as a result of the FLNKS election boycott, moderated its opposition in its own self-interest. The party pressed Lemoine for an assurance that law and order would be maintained during the territorial elections.(132) This was done with some difficulty. The FLNKS active boycott of the territorial elections on 18 November 1984 caused considerable setbacks for the Government. Only 50.13% of voters turned out. (Table 6) Nonetheless, the boycott did not succeed in invalidating the elections. FLNKS roadblocks, pickets and occupations of rural polling booths were not widespread enough to justify a postponement of polling. The RPCR succeeded in sweeping the electoral field, gaining 34 of 42 seats as a result of the absence of the FLNKS from the ballot and the mass desertion of voters from the FNSC. The FNSC, representing "the guardians of the spirit of Nainville" had collapsed and was reduced to one seat. It was clear from the result of the elections that an overwhelming majority of the FNSC's supporters had deserted it because of its dialogue with the Socialists and the FI. LKS gained six seats, on a moderate pro-independence platform, but this was scarcely sufficient basis for Lemoine's consensus-building. The centre ground in New Caledonian politics looked very unstable, faced with polarisation toward Melanesian nationalism on one hand, and RPCR conservatism on the other.

By late November 1984 the Fabius Government, showing signs of panic, announced the need to accelerate the self-determination process in New Caledonia. Lemoine proposed holding the referendum before 1986.(133) It seemed by that stage that staving off the referendum had been the cause of New Caledonia's mounting troubles and that an abrupt change of tack might yet preserve peace. The Government did not respond to UDF and RPR claims that postponing the referendum further might serve better to keep the peace. The Socialists acted to satisfy Kanak demands rather than those of French loyalists. However this step was unlikely to calm the FLNKS. In the absence of electoral reforms designed to give Kanaks an absolute majority, a more immediate self-determination vote would not satisfy the Front's nationalist agenda and would lead to greater disillusionment with French institutions. Lemoine would in any case be incapable of engineering the cooperation necessary for setting up a referendum considering that he had resoundingly failed to inspire confidence in his statute. His assessment of New Caledonia remained out of tune with developments there. New Caledonia's situation had moved from the problematic to the critical. There were gloomy forecasts of impending armed insurrection.(134) Lemoine, and the Government he represented, were at an impasse.

Pisani: from Delegate to Minister

The provisional government of Kanaky may not have had the means to convert its proclamation of a national liberation struggle into armed resistance which would overthrow French sovereignty, although it did have the potential to force concessions from Paris. Its existence posed an embarrassment to the Fabius Government, which was pilloried by the Opposition for not dissolving the Front as a threat to Republican law and order. On 4 December 1984, to cries of "Pauvre Lemoine!" from the RPR benches, Fabius announced to the National Assembly that he would be assuming personal responsibility for the New Caledonian portfolio.(135) While this decision was a measure of the extent to which Lemoine had failed to resolve New Caledonia's increasing difficulties, it also indicated the extent to which FLNKS activism had gained the attention of the highest authorities in Paris. No longer was New Caledonia the peripheral, neglected area it had been on the French political landscape in 1981. The territory's troubles, compounded by an increasing law and order problem as Kanak militancy prompted conservative reaction, were propelled to the centre stage of French political debate.

At the time of the announcement by Fabius, his Government's new special delegate to New Caledonia had just arrived in Nouméa. Edgard Pisani was best known for his term as Minister of Agriculture under de Gaulle in the early 1960s. Pisani assumed the functions which were normally the reserve of the High Commissioner in Nouméa, as well as being assigned by Mitterrand the task of restoring law and order in New Caledonia, and to formulate reform proposals.

In the atmosphere then reigning in New Caledonia, this would be no easy task. On 25 November, the FLNKS had selected its provisional government of Kanaky, and on 1 December had installed its President, Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Over 20 gendarmes had been injured during and immediately after the FLNKS boycott of the territorial elections. FLNKS roadblocks erected for the election boycott remained as points of confrontation with French gendarmes. Farmhouses and homes were sacked and burnt down by Kanak militants. The circling of the mining centre of Thio by Eloi Machoro, the Security Minister of the FLNKS provisional government, and a band of his followers, caused the hurried organisation of local militias by French loyalists in other rural centres. Armed confrontation led to the death of two Kanaks and two Europeans at the end of November.(136)

The man who faced these and more deep-seated problems in New Caledonia had no knowledge of the territory prior to his appointment.(137) Pisani's introduction to New Caledonia came in the form of some visits to ministerial officials in Paris during the days before his departure. Pisani complemented these meetings with a reading of official files during his flight to Nouméa in the presidential jet.(138) This hasty acquaintance with territorial issues was not an auspicious base on which to formulate answers to New Caledonian political divisions. The expectation that these divisions could be overcome by an appointee with no prior experience of the territory, whose knowledge of the issues consisted of a few days spent perusing ministerial files and conversing with officials in Paris, was an optimistic one.

In his favour, Pisani had long experience working on Third World economic development. He had also gained a reputation as an innovative administrator during his time as Minister of Agriculture, helping to modernise the conservative outlooks of various rural pressure groups which stubbornly resisted change. In spite of these specific, technocratic qualifications, his appointment as government delegate to New Caledonia appeared incongruous. Pisani was neither a government employee prior to his appointment, nor an expert on New Caledonia. A high official from the DOM-TOM Ministry with experience in New Caledonia might have been a better choice to replace the High Commissioner. It might have seemed odd that Mitterrand should have entrusted this sensitive post to a former Gaullist Minister whose main link with the PS was his friendship with Michel Rocard, then Minister of Agriculture, and one of Mitterrand's greatest rivals.

Part of the explanation as to why Pisani was appointed delegate to New Caledonia resides in the fact that he was an outsider. Two Secretaries of State had already had their reputations harmed by the declining fortunes of New Caledonia. If Pisani experienced reverses, this setback would not directly affect the Fabius Government in the same way as if a third Socialist Minister were overseeing the territory. The supervisory role over the New Caledonian portfolio exercised by Fabius demonstrated greater government concern for the territory while also installing a control mechanism over Pisani should he fail. Additionally, as a former Gaullist Minister, it was hoped that Pisani would be more easily able to communicate with New Caledonia's conservatives. Initially this was the case, but it was not to last.

Pisani's appointment was not without precedent. Almost thirty years before, another Socialist Government had chosen a maverick Gaullist to serve it as proconsul in a troublesome territory. Like Mitterrand's appointment of Pisani, the choice by Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France of Jacques Soustelle as Governor-General to Algeria in January 1955 constituted an original response to a difficult situation. Like Pisani, Soustelle's instructions were to continue ongoing government reforms and to settle ethnic tensions between European conservatives and pro-independence indigenes.(139) Again like Soustelle, Pisani failed, unable to reconcile the conflicting interests of these groups.

While his Gaullist pedigree was beyond reproach, Pisani no longer associated with Gaullist leaders, having abandoned the movement in the late 1960s. Although the question of independence in Algeria in the 1950s differed substantially from the prospects for New Caledonian independence in the 1980s, his imaginative approach to reform turned out to be as unacceptable to New Caledonian conservatives as Soustelle's had been to French Algerians. Original thinking demonstrated by Pisani over New Caledonia became anathema to local conservatives, who wished to preserve their social and electoral dominance. To Pisani's dismay, his novel solutions to local troubles were to earn him the status of the most hated government representative in the territory during the 1980s.(140)

Yet in December 1984 there still appeared to be some room for manœuvre for the Fabius Government. While endeavouring to maintain law and order, the Government did not heed calls from Pons and other RPR representatives to dissolve the provisional government of Kanaky.(141) Mitterrand was perhaps mindful of his time as Minister of the Interior in 1954, when he had advocated, and obtained, repression of a nationalist insurrection in Algeria and the dissolution of the party at its head.(142) His intransigent refusal to negotiate with Algerian nationalists in 1954 had not forced an end of their claims. With the FLNKS, his response was more measured. As in Algeria, he had no intention of abandoning French territory, and aimed to uphold Republican law.(143) However, this time, some attempt was made via Pisani to defuse local nationalist tensions through government negotiation and concessions.

The first priority for Pisani was to re-establish law and order. In the first week of December, he negotiated an agreement with the FLNKS which involved the lifting of Kanak roadblocks in exchange for the release of 17 activists held in police custody.(144) His chances of implementing this agreement seemed seriously diminished by the ambush of unarmed FLNKS members near Hienghène on 5 December. The ambush, made by a group of Europeans and métis, resulted in the death of ten Kanaks, including two of Tjibaou's brothers. In spite of the provocation to further violence this ambush could have represented for the FLNKS, the coalition honoured its agreement with Pisani. By 12 December, Fabius was able to inform the National Assembly that the last of the FLNKS barricades, around Thio, had been lifted.(145) Law and order had been restored and road communications in rural areas were reopened.

The leaders of the Kanak national liberation struggle did not turn out to be as unswervingly militant as might have been believed from a reading of the FLNKS charter. Halting their campaign of disruption in exchange for a minor prisoner release, and the hope that Pisani might be receptive to Kanak demands for independence, were not traits characteristic of the conduct of a relentless campaign against French colonialism as prescribed by the FLNKS charter. The FLNKS executive resolved that the provisional government would gain political stature in Paris by not retaliating for the ambush at Hienghène.(146) A belated realisation that the provisional government of Kanaky was of an embryonic nature and was not prepared to push confrontation to the extent of possibly provoking civil war may well also have played a part in its restraint.

The peace remained fragile throughout December while Pisani conducted his consultations with local leaders over the future of New Caledonia. He did so in the most difficult of situations. He had been assigned the unenviable position of negotiating with two fiercely antagonistic camps, polarised over the issue of independence. The FNSC had been marginalised as a force for moderation by its losses in the territorial elections, and although Pisani appreciated the moderation shown by the LKS, he was aware that its electoral strength was insufficient to play a determining role in negotiations.(147)

By this stage, New Caledonia had become a cause célèbre for the parliamentary opposition in Paris, a portfolio which for them was symptomatic of the purported inability of Socialist Governments to govern. Acting as the self-appointed guardians of French Republicanism, the UDF and the RPR united in attacking the Fabius Government's handling of New Caledonia.(148) On 21 December, Giscard d'Estaing and six former Prime Ministers(149) from the two parties issued a joint statement condemning the conduct of government policy, accusing Fabius and his Ministers of wishing to subvert the self-determination process and Republican law to the interests of Kanak nationalism, thus endangering French sovereignty over New Caledonia. Neither the RPR nor the UDF were formally opposed to a self-determination referendum, but both harboured the suspicion that the Government would rig it to the advantage of the FLNKS.(150)

The key issue was to whom the Government would apply the expression "interested peoples", mentioned in article 53 of the Constitution. RPR and UDF fears were not calmed by Mitterrand's statement on TF1 on 16 December 1984 that he favoured "the emancipation" of New Caledonia "in a form of autonomy or independence" that the territory "must define itself".(151) This was evidence that the Fabius Government was discarding the reluctance of the Mauroy Government to discuss independence in some form, paradoxically at a time of greater violence than in earlier years, when it had previously held back on the question so as not to provoke strife. FI and later FLNKS activism had largely been effective in forcing the issue.

The willingness of the Fabius Government to contemplate the issue of self-determination and some form of independence for New Caledonia gained it the ear of the FLNKS, but caused the RPCR to cut off dialogue.(152) The RPCR refused to negotiate with Pisani throughout December. For its leaders the Fabius Government was working in league with the FLNKS to push New Caledonia into independence. Lafleur referred to New Caledonia as being "in a state of legitimate self-defence".(153) Considering the financial and logistical support of Lafleur and the RPCR for rural militias in November and December, these words were not empty rhetoric.(154)

Pisani announced his Propositions for New Caledonia (hereafter the Pisani Plan) on 7 January 1985.(155) He proposed a self-determination referendum for July 1985, thus confirming the government decision in November 1984 to hold one before 1986. Pisani also proposed that the referendum should exclude any voters who had resided in the territory less than three years. This formula had already been used for the self-determination referendum that had led to the independence of Djibouti in 1977. The referendum was only a partial concession to changing FLNKS demands, which by late November 1984 involved a consultative referendum encompassing the Kanak people alone.(156) In spite of RPR and UDF claims that the Government was contemplating otherwise, Pisani had no intention of restricting the franchise to Kanaks, for the reason that such a move would have been in violation of article 3 of the Constitution.(157)

Pisani announced that should an absolute majority of voters back independence, the Government would grant it by January 1986. This prospect was regarded with horror by the RPCR, the RPR, and the UDF, although it was by no means a foregone conclusion. An estimated 5,500 of New Caledonia's 79,271 voters would be excluded from the referendum, a number insufficient to reduce local majority support for continued ties with France evident in past territorial elections.(158) Nor ultimately was the FLNKS satisfied by the kind of independence that Pisani offered. The form that independence would take, "indépendance-association", entailed the continuation of a French presence in New Caledonia. The Republic would maintain control over defence and foreign relations, and those New Caledonians who desired to remain French could do so, while the rest could opt for Kanak citizenship.

The Pisani Plan entailed a compromise solution to three interests: the intention of the Fifth Republic to retain a geostrategic presence in New Caledonia; the desire of New Caledonian loyalists to remain French; and the demands of Kanak nationalism. Pisani aimed, by partially meeting the interests of the State, Kanaks and French loyalists, to bridge the gap between the interests of French and Kanak nationalism. Pisani's compromise was unsatisfactory to both the FLNKS and the RPCR. The FLNKS wanted a fully sovereign Kanaky with administrative authority over the territorial economy, resources, defence and foreign relations. The Front announced that the Pisani Plan represented a neo-colonialist solution, whereby France would retain sovereignty in all but name.(159) The RPCR for its part pointed out that once independence was granted, there would be no guarantee that New Caledonia would maintain its association with France, should an FLNKS-dominated government opt to sever links.(160) This was a point validated by French experience of decolonisation in Algeria. The Evian Accords negotiated between France and the FLN in 1962 before Algerian independence had granted France the maintenance of certain strategic interests and accorded privileges to French citizens who wished to remain in Algeria after independence, although these provisions were abandoned by the FLN once in power.(161)

Whatever agreement Pisani had hoped to inspire turned improbable as a result of two shooting incidents that alienated both Kanaks and French loyalists days after the announcement of the Pisani Plan. The FLNKS cut off dialogue with Pisani after the fatal shooting of Eloi Machoro and an associate, Marcel Nonnaro, by members of the elite GIGN near La Foa on 12 January 1985. Controversy persists over the details of this incident.(162) The FLNKS and its supporters claimed the deaths constituted the murder of unarmed men giving themselves up.(163) The GIGN claimed that the pair were armed and hostile at the time of their deaths, which were the result of poor marksmanship intended to wound rather than kill. The FLNKS blamed Pisani for having given express orders to kill Machoro. Pisani denies this, although he does not completely rule out the possibility that their deaths might not have been accidental.(164) Whatever the truth of the matter, the incident irreparably harmed relations between Pisani and the FLNKS.

The RPCR, for its part, was further disillusioned with Pisani by the fatal shooting near Bouloupari on 11 January 1985 of Yves Tual, a Caldoche teenager, by a Kanak. While the party took the opportunity to condemn Pisani further for failing to maintain law and order, conservative militants rioting on the streets of Nouméa aggravated the situation by causing additional lawlessness.(165)

Pisani's response was to use his powers as state representative to declare a state of emergency. Public assemblies were banned, a curfew was declared, the transport of arms and munitions was forbidden, and the right to deport anyone deemed a threat to public order was invoked.(166) These were not promising conditions under which to continue negotiations to determine calmly the future of the territory.

Mitterrand attempted to lessen tensions by visiting New Caledonia on 17 January, but this effort was largely ineffectual. Such a brief visit could not hope to remedy Pisani's increasing isolation from local leaders. The trip had greater effect as a media coup, and as a riposte to opposition accusations that Mitterrand and the Fabius Government were neglecting New Caledonia. However the presidential visit gave local conservatives an opportune target for their discontent, and they took the chance to organise large protest demonstrations.(167)

For all his troubles, Pisani remained optimistic about the chances of implementing his plan.(168) By March 1985, a more cautious administrator might have decided to adopt a reticent approach towards talk of independence, given the adverse reaction this word had already provoked. Heedless of the wishes of New Caledonian loyalists, Pisani was by this stage publicly convinced that New Caledonia's independence was historically "ineluctable".(169) Like Lemoine, he possessed a misplaced optimism about his capacity to inspire consensus in New Caledonia. Like Lemoine, Pisani had trouble calming political unrest in New Caledonia, although it is difficult to ascertain what solution could have satisfied both local nationalists and conservatives in 1985.

One of the consequences of Mitterrand's visit to New Caledonia was that he witnessed the gulf between Pisani and New Caledonians, whether Kanak or loyalist.(170) He responded almost immediately. The President announced on his return to Paris that Pisani was to rework his proposals.(171) This was the first indication of revisions which were to lead to an overhaul of the Pisani Plan overseen by Fabius. Pisani was aware of hesitations by Fabius over his plan and consequently sent his suggestions for revisions directly to Mitterrand on 26 March.(172) Pisani suggested to Mitterrand that the referendum should take place in September 1985, with independence by the end of 1987 should New Caledonians thus choose. This recommendation was ignored.(173)

The definitive course of action decided on in Paris was announced by Fabius after a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 25 April 1985. The self-determination referendum would be deferred until after the legislative elections in 1986, but would occur before 31 December 1987.(174) The Government postponed the self-determination referendum to calm the situation in New Caledonia. While the FLNKS might not be satisfied, the action was intended to quieten opposition claims that New Caledonia was too rapidly being led to independence. In doing so, the Government postponed the issue of independence without resolving any of the fundamental differences between Kanaks and French loyalists in the territory. There was no likelihood of Paris meeting the FLNKS demand for a vote restricted to Kanaks. The fact that a referendum would still take place did not satisfy the RPCR position that the vote was unnecessary, as the FLNKS did not have the backing of an absolute majority of the territorial electorate, and that a referendum might be divisive if the Socialists decided to erode loyalist electoral predominance by restricting voting rights. In the interim, another transitional statute would be introduced to replace the Lemoine Plan. This new legislation was to respond to Kanak demands for autonomy by granting greater administrative responsibilities to the New Caledonian regions. This response was perceived by the Opposition as indicative of government indecisiveness and as an unmerited concession offered to a rowdy minority.

Despite its postponement, the President was not reluctant to hold a self-determination referendum. At this stage, Mitterrand did not share the conservative view that setting up a referendum for New Caledonia might lead to self-determination claims in the rest of the DOM-TOM.(175)

Pisani was replaced while preparations for the new territorial statute were being debated. He was no longer needed in Nouméa by the Fabius Government, and his continued presence there would only prompt further resentment from his local opponents. The Government adroitly removed him by promoting him to the newly-created post of Minister to New Caledonia, which he assumed on 24 May 1985.(176) This promotion was in effect a face-saving measure on the part of the Government. To dismiss Pisani outright would have constituted an admission of failure. While the official explanation of the appointment was that Pisani was needed in Paris for the preparation of the statute bill, Fabius had already decided his own orientation for the new statute. The post of Minister to New Caledonia itself was exceptional in the extreme: no other French region with fewer than 200,000 inhabitants could claim to have a Minister devoted solely to its affairs. Under Pisani, the New Caledonian portfolio attained unprecedented status in Paris.

The definitive statute,(177) an amalgam of the Pisani Plan and of new ideas overseen by Fabius (hereafter, the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute), superseded much of the Lemoine Statute. The new statute was intended to give the rural Melanesian population greater territorial representation. Article 3 created four new regional boundaries which were drawn up in such a way as to permit Kanak control over at least two and possibly three of them. Each of these regions would be self-administering under article 4, and would have their own councils. Under article 22, the Regional Councils were responsible for their own agricultural and maritime resources, public works, cultural development, housing, health, industry, professional training and primary education.

In increasing regional powers, the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute was designed to decrease the influence of the Territorial Assembly (renamed the Territorial Congress) on regional development. The Territorial Congress also had its powers reduced by the re-establishment of the High Commissioner as the head of the territorial executive under article 25, a reversal of the situation created by the Lemoine Statute. Article 27 allowed the Government to legislate once more by ordinance, until 15 November 1985, in order to set up the Regional Councils, finalise the definition of territorial responsibilities, and to further territorial development in general. Government recourse to ordinances was aimed at circumventing the absolute majority enjoyed by the RPCR in the Territorial Assembly prior to the regional elections scheduled for September, as well as intended to circumvent to some extent parliamentary opposition in Paris, opposition which had already caused delays in the statute bill's implementation.

The PS was the only major party in the National Assembly which voted for the statute bill. The PC, which until then had voted for Socialist reforms in New Caledonia while criticising them for not promoting rapid decolonisation, had lost patience. The Communists opposed the legislation as a retrograde step on the path to independence.(178) Central to RPR and UDF criticisms of the statute bill were its regional divisions. The Opposition complained to the Constitutional Council that these divisions were undemocratic, giving New Caledonia's rural and predominantly Melanesian inhabitants disproportionate representation in the Territorial Congress. The complaint was upheld on 8 August, when the Constitutional Council announced that the statute bill was contrary to the Constitution on these grounds. The decision forced a redistribution of seats to the advantage of the South. Whereas originally the bill had proposed seven seats for the Loyalty Islands, nine for the North Region, nine for the Centre and 18 for the South, the new distribution gave three more seats to the South.(179) This concession failed to satisfy RPR leaders, who once again lodged a plea with the Constitutional Council, although this complaint was rejected on 23 August, and the statute was promulgated.

The rejection of the new statute on 31 May by the Territorial Assembly was as predictable as the government decision to ignore its objections. In a remarkable about-face, at its Hienghène congress on 26 May the FLNKS announced approval of the statute for the very reasons that the RPCR opposed it. In spite of its rejection of the statute's "neo-colonial logic",(180) the FLNKS decided to participate in the September elections, thus ending its boycott of territorial institutions. Although its timetable for independence had once again been lengthened by acceptance of the new schedule for the referendum, the FLNKS responded to the greater regional powers under the new statute. The reduction of Nouméa's control over the Melanesian-dominated hinterland of New Caledonia would, they argued, permit lasting local autonomy and serve as a strong basis for independence.(181)

This pragmatic cooperation with French institutional reform called into question the commitment made by the FLNKS in its charter to attain full sovereignty for Kanaks through a national liberation struggle against French rule. Participation in the new reforms indicated that the FLNKS was not invariably entrenched in its opposition to French institutions.(182) At the Hienghène congress, Tjibaou and the UC successfully urged other FLNKS members to employ the finance and administrative powers offered by the new statute as a mechanism which would enhance Kanak rural autonomy as a preliminary step toward independence. The acceptance of French state funding for regional administration underlined the slender financial means of the Kanak provisional government, and the inadequacy of its plans to institute independence unilaterally.

The new FLNKS policy of pragmatic cooperation with government reforms allowed it to gain 16 of the 46 seats in the regional elections on 29 September 1985. (Table 7) All but one of these were outside the South. The Front also gained majority control in all except the South Region, to the dismay of its opponents in Nouméa and Paris, who reiterated accusations of Socialist gerrymandering under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute in spite of the ruling of the Constitutional Council.(183) Nevertheless, the RPCR confirmed its overall majority, with 25 seats and 51.60% of the territorial vote. Other parties standing which opposed independence, the FN and Rassemblement Progrès et Coutume,(184) gained a combined 8.8% of the vote. This gave anti-independence parties over 60% of the vote. On the basis of these figures, the chance of the FLNKS obtaining majority support in the forthcoming referendum of 1987 looked slight even if all its voters in September 1985 would vote for independence.

The implementation of Socialist reform in New Caledonia was cut short by the change of Government in Paris in March 1986. As with the Dijoud Plan, it is not possible to judge the full consequences of the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute; it did not survive long enough to make a lasting impact on the territory. The little that can be said for it is that its concessions led the FLNKS to participate in New Caledonia's administration, despite the contradictory maintenance of the provisional government of Kanaky as a reminder that the coalition might yet abandon its pragmatism. The FLNKS had not surrendered its nationalist agenda, however it was not in a strong position to promote it. It was prepared to wait for independence longer than either it or the FI had been in previous years. Kanak nationalist hyperbole on the liberation struggle had stumbled on the limited resources of the FLNKS to wage such a campaign, and on the determination of representatives of the French State to defend law and order.

A gap remained between the unrealistic Melanesian nationalist expectations of the FLNKS, and what Paris was prepared to concede to meet the Front's agenda. The eligibility conditions for the self-determination referendum, a major point of dissension with Paris, had not been finalised. The Chirac Government inherited this problem, and the potential for confrontation it entailed, from the Socialists.

Although the RPCR erroneously continued to insist, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that there was no ethnic problem in New Caledonia,(185) its concern for economic depression in New Caledonia was justified. Territorial economic dependence had not been diminished under Socialist administration, rather it had continued its erratic course since the late 1970s.(186) The troubles of 1984 and 1985 caused a marked drop in tourist arrivals, disturbing the steady growth that tourism had experienced since 1980. (Table 8) Australian and New Zealand tourists were discouraged by reports of violence, although Japanese arrivals did not greatly diminish due to lack of coverage of local political events in the Japanese media.(187) Despite property damage,(188) rural confrontation in 1984 and 1985 did not significantly disrupt agricultural production. Its stagnation had preceded the troubles.(189) From 1981 to 1986, Socialist Governments were distracted from development issues by the debate over self-determination to the point that, by 1985, Pisani was preoccupied with the former to the effective exclusion of the latter.

The Pons Interlude

The electoral majority attained by the RPR/UDF alliance at both national level and in New Caledonia in the legislative elections of March 1986 (Tables 9, 10) marked the beginning of a new, albeit brief, political era for New Caledonia. With the RPR dominating the new liberal-conservative coalition Government in Paris, to the relief of the RPCR New Caledonia was to be subject to policy priorities more conservative than those of Dijoud or his Socialist successors. As the inheritors of Gaullism, RPR leaders tended to present themselves as the purest exponents of French Republicanism, the guardians of the institutions and values established by the General. In 1986 there was no indication that this assumption had weakened. Pons, as the new Minister to the DOM-TOM, announced renewed government policy emphasis on DOM-TOM policy.(190)

The parliamentarians of the new majority were viscerally opposed to New Caledonian independence. For example Chirac held that secession would diminish the territory of the Republic, and would lessen the global grandeur of France.(191) It was speculated that New Caledonian independence might also encourage support for Maohi nationalists in French Polynesia.(192) The Chirac Government nevertheless agreed with the Socialist Governments from 1981 to 1986 in insisting that if independence must occur, it could only legitimately take place if desired by a majority of the territorial electorate, and if accomplished within the confines of constitutional law. The RPR's insistence in the 1980s on observing constitutional requirements was more scrupulously legalistic than de Gaulle's policy conduct had been in the 1960s. With Algeria, the magnitude of opposition to French rule had been such that the Constitution, which did not allow secession of Departments from the Republic, had to be disregarded. No such exception would be made by the RPR for those among the 65,000 or so Melanesians in New Caledonia who called themselves Kanaks. In December 1984 Jacques Toubon, the Secretary-General of the RPR, had declared to the National Assembly that any self-determination referendum would have to respect constitutional considerations regarding equal voting rights for all the adult inhabitants of the territory, and rejected the idea of an ethnically-based vote restricted largely to Kanaks.(193)

As has been noted, the FLNKS was not likely to gain Kanak independence through a referendum which contained no electoral advantage to Melanesians. The RPR therefore had no hesitation in promising to adhere to the Fabius Government's timetable for a self-determination vote even before it entered government.(194)

In spite of much vehement declamation by RPR Deputies over the reforms of the Fabius Government, and the advancement of the proposition that the Socialists had been steering New Caledonia toward independence, the position of Gaullists on self-determination for New Caledonia was essentially the same as that of the Socialists. As was pointed out in chapter 1, the UDF shared this position with the PS and the RPR.

The primacy of "the Kanak people" was at best a marginal concept for the RPR. Kanak claims to privileged status, either through socio-economic policy aimed to improve the material situation of Melanesians, or through a restricted self-determination vote guaranteed to result in independence, were rejected by the RPR. French democratic principles took precedence over Kanak particularism. For Pons the inhabitants of New Caledonia were above all French. In one telling outburst during a National Assembly debate in 1985, Pons interjected when a speaker referred to the "different communities" in the territory, riposting "There are no different communities! There's only one!"(195) This was not an isolated remark. In a Senate debate in 1986, Pons was to go a step further in exclaiming "There is no [such thing as a] Kanak people!"(196) He asserted that the concept of a Kanak people could not be considered a valid one when not all of New Caledonia's Melanesians aspired to Kanak independence.(197) With his formally democratic agenda of equality under law for all, Pons absolved himself on the levels of statutory, institutional and voting reform from recognising either Kanak identity or the historical disadvantages of New Caledonia's Melanesians, although his social reforms held the same advantages for Kanaks as for the rest of the territorial population. His position differed radically from that of the PC which, during cohabitation, continued calling for decolonisation and recognition of the Kanak people.(198) To an even lesser extent than during the time the Socialists were in government, PC parliamentarians were insufficiently numerous to bring about such policy.

For Pons, and for other RPR conservatives, the concept of a single Kanak identity had no validity. They rested their case on the tribal and linguistic divisions existing among the indigenous inhabitants of New Caledonia, and on the fact that no Melanesian nation had existed prior to French annexation of the islands. They pointed out that no historical basis existed for indigenous claims to sovereignty and that concepts such as 'the Kanak people' and 'Kanaky' were recent inventions, dating from the 1970s. Although these were valid points, this outlook led the Chirac Government to underestimate the depth of nationalist sentiment amongst those New Caledonian Melanesians who referred to themselves as Kanaks. Whether or not the Chirac Government subscribed to the FLNKS view of Kanak identity, the existence of an overall majority of the Melanesian population in New Caledonia which called itself Kanak could not be discounted, even though this was the tendency of the Government due to an aversion to its claims of legitimacy.

The most outstanding expression of Kanak identity, the provisional government of Kanaky, represented an affront to the Chirac Government's interpretation of Republican legitimacy. It was asserted by the Gaullists as well as by Giscardians that in establishing its provisional government and in actively boycotting the territorial elections in November 1984, the FLNKS had placed itself beyond the protection of the law and should be sanctioned. The arrival of the president of the provisional government of Kanaky in the public gallery of the National Assembly on 23 January 1985 provoked a hue and cry, not only from RPR Deputies, but also from their UDF colleagues.(199)

However FLNKS campaigning had had its limitations. Although from November to December 1985 107 roadblocks had been erected both by French loyalists and Kanaks, 96 buildings and cars had been torched, 41 properties had been vandalised or looted, 15 bombings has occurred and 86 firearms had been confiscated,(200) it is difficult to characterise this low intensity conflict as constituting a civil war or a rebellion. The efforts of the FLNKS provisional government to resist French rule appeared half-hearted compared to the effects of the Melanesian tribal rebellions of 1878 and of 1917 when, respectively, approximately 1,400 and 220 people had been killed.(201) During the 1980s more than 50 people were killed as a result of sporadic political violence, mainly from 1984 to 1988, although Kanak activism did not lead to civil war for the reason that the FLNKS was not equipped to wage one. Rather FLNKS militant activism involved rowdy, violent pressure tactics, alternating with pragmatic cooperation with the French State.

For all their hostility to the FLNKS in opposition, it should be noted that RPR leaders never went so far as to outlaw the Front when in government. At the height of the FLNKS active boycott of the presidential and territorial elections in April 1988 Pons announced that he had asked Chirac to dissolve the Front, but the Prime Minister did not go beyond considering the proposal.(202) There was perhaps a realisation among them that such an undertaking would serve only to aggravate discord in the territory. However much the RPR scorned the FLNKS, opposed its nationalist philosophy, and decried its periodically violent activism, the Chirac Government did not deny the party its legal existence.

Concern for law and order formed another determining feature of RPR policy in New Caledonia. Gaullists maintained that blame for the surge in violence there from November 1984 ultimately rested with the Socialist Governments. Socialist Ministers were alleged to have encouraged divisions in New Caledonia by legislating discriminately in favour of Kanaks.(203) For this reason, the RPR called for Lemoine's resignation,(204) and demanded the return of Pisani to Paris when violence continued into 1985. For the RPR the spread of violence in New Caledonia represented one of the most visible signs of deficiencies in Socialist Government policy conduct there. Once in government, the Gaullists found themselves the subject of similar allegations from the Socialists and Communists. To its chagrin, the Chirac Government too experienced law and order problems during its time in office, particularly when the FLNKS mobilised for its active boycott of the territorial and French presidential elections from April 1988. The increased police and military presence from 1986 to 1988, particularly around Melanesian tribes, had not served to dissuade violent Kanak activism.(205)

Pons rejected Mitterrand's thesis that there existed in New Caledonia a colonial situation which needed to be redressed. Pons conceded that some injustices existed, but claimed that these were mainly the result of Melanesian tribal values, which hindered local social and agricultural development.(206) For Pons, colonialism was a word from another age with no validity in the French Republic in the last quarter of the twentieth century. It was claimed that New Caledonia had become an integral part of that Republic, just as Brittany, Savoy and Corsica had, although unlike them New Caledonia was an Overseas Territory which was constitutionally permitted to accede to independence. RPR stalwarts tended to make reference to colonialism in New Caledonia only when projecting scenarios of foreign expansion there should France withdraw.(207)

RPR criticism of the limitations of Socialist decentralisation has already been noted. Socialist measures were characterised either as half-hearted, imbalanced, or as the opposite of decentralisation. The Gaullists claimed they had their own concept of decentralisation, by means of which they attempted to transform New Caledonia while in government. A concise description of what form decentralisation should take in the TOM was offered in 1984 by Toubon during debate of French Polynesia's new statute by the National Assembly:

[...] each territory should have at its disposal a specific statute which responds to the democratically expressed aspirations of a majority of the population, in addition to its geographic, human and economic characteristics. Naturally these various statutes must have the common characteristics requisite for the exercise of democracy. They must be based on electoral representation and if they confer great powers to the local executive, they must leave in the hands of the State those responsibilities necessary for sovereignty, the integrity of national territory, defence and international relations.

We are therefore very much in favour of decentralisation, as elsewhere in France, and internal autonomy when a territory is capable of it and willing, but we are against independence.(208)

This was decentralisation with a Republican streak, internal autonomy designed to consolidate ties with Paris rather than weaken them. In New Caledonia, Pisani had conceived regionalisation as a preliminary step to possible independence. For the RPR, the delegation of administrative powers to the territory should not go so far as to allow this. In New Caledonia in 1986, founding the administrative framework on a democratic basis by reinforcing the powers of the territorial executive would shore up the influence of the RPCR, the formation with the most representatives in the Territorial Congress. Under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, the institution of greater autonomy at regional level and the restoration of the High Commissioner as the Territorial President had reduced the influence of the RPCR, as had the unrepresentative distribution of seats in the Territorial Congress (until overruled by the Constitutional Council), and the new regional boundaries.

In implementing the RPR vision for New Caledonia, Pons had certain advantages over the Socialists. He had paid numerous visits to the territory prior to becoming Minister and had cultivated close relations with the conservative electorate and its leaders. His party had abiding links with the RPCR and enjoyed majority support in the Territorial Congress. But to his detriment, Pons did not have the confidence of Melanesian nationalists. His denial of Kanak identity, his opposition to Kanak self-determination, his affirmation of the backwardness of Melanesian tribal culture, and his insistence on the importance of French nationalism above Kanak nationalism did not endear him to the FLNKS. This attitudinal gulf between Pons and the FLNKS did not presage well for his appeal for openness and dialogue in discussions between Paris and Nouméa concerning New Caledonia. Pons was to have a difficult time convincing Melanesian nationalists of his sincerity. In his first weeks as Minister, the opportunity for dialogue with the FLNKS remained open, but avenues of debate turned into dead-ends because of the mutually exclusive theses of Pons and the FLNKS regarding political prospects in New Caledonia. Pons met an FLNKS delegation in Paris on 8 May 1986, although this meeting produced no more than declarations of their respective positions.(209) Following the start of government reforms in April 1986, the FLNKS announced it would organise passive demonstrations.(210) To protest at the refusal of the Chirac Government to limit the franchise to Melanesians in the self-determination referendum, the FLNKS announced in August 1986 at its congress at Wé preparations for a campaign of civil disobedience and an eventual withdrawal from territorial institutions.(211) By December 1986, the Front had cut off dialogue with Pons, and demanded in vain of Chirac the dismissal of his Minister to the DOM-TOM.(212)

Immediate differences hinged on conditions for the referendum. As they were unrealistic demands, Tjibaou abandoned past FLNKS claims to an exclusively Kanak franchise for the referendum, and conceded that eligible voters, Kanak or not, with a least one parent born in New Caledonia might vote. Pons made the same response to this proposal as the Mauroy and Fabius Governments had when called on to restrict voting eligibility to the advantage of Kanaks. He rejected the proposal as discriminatory and undemocratic.(213) Bringing policy conduct in line with the criteria used for the self-determination vote in Djibouti a decade before, Chirac announced at the end of January 1987 that voter eligibility would be restricted to those who had resided in New Caledonia for three years of more at the time of the plebiscite.(214) This was a major concession for the RPR, in that it also brought the referendum conditions in line with those proposed by Fabius in 1985. Previously, the RPR had only supported the exclusion of otherwise eligible voters who had lived in the territory less than three months.(215) This concession was not capable of satisfying the FLNKS. Perhaps hoping for further concessions, it responded by stepping up its opposition to the Government. The provisional government of Kanaky, of which little had been heard since 1985, was reactivated in February 1987. By May, the FLNKS was preparing a non-violent boycott of the self-determination referendum, which had been scheduled for September.(216)

Part of the FLNKS lobbying against the Chirac Government entailed seeking presidential intervention. At the end of January 1987, Tjibaou called on Mitterrand to arbitrate the Front's dispute with the Government.(217) Mitterrand professed to be alarmed by developments concerning New Caledonia. He described the disregard in which the Chirac Government held the FLNKS as reactionary, but he hesitated to interfere in government legislation for New Caledonia. Under cohabitation, the informal arrangement arrived at between Mitterrand and his political opponents in government was that the President retained executive control over defence and foreign policy, leaving executive and legislative decisions about other portfolios to Chirac. This division of responsibilities was necessary to reduce disagreements between the President and the Government which otherwise would have disrupted national administration. Consequently Mitterrand did not determine DOM-TOM policy as it was a component of internal affairs. Mitterrand had the capacity for recourse to the Constitutional Council if legislation could be deemed unconstitutional: he contemplated using this option in May 1986, and concluded that he had no justifiable grounds for doing so.(218) Limited in his capacity to directly influence government legislation concerning New Caledonia, Mitterrand attempted instead to influence public opinion by declaring his objections to government policy conduct. But with regard to the referendum, the Chirac Government was fulfilling policy initiatives which Mitterrand's colleagues had set in motion. The referendum was to be held within the time limit that the Socialists had scheduled, and the electoral eligibility criteria applied were those envisaged under Fabius.

The territorial self-determination referendum on 13 September 1987 confirmed what had been expected an absolute majority of New Caledonian voters preferred to remain French. (Table 11) Of the 58.04% of eligible voters who participated in the referendum, 98.3% desired to remain in the Republic, while 1.7% were for independence. The territorial abstention rate was 41.96%, and was much higher in the North, Centre and Loyalty regions, where Kanaks enjoyed an electoral majority. The LKS, with its support base in the Loyalty Islands, backed the boycott in a display of solidarity with the FLNKS and of opposition to the Chirac Government. In the absence of violent protest by the FLNKS, the LKS was prepared to join a boycott against a referendum which did not meet Kanak demands. The LKS moreover had less confidence in the Chirac Government than it had in the Socialists to formulate policy responses satisfactory to Kanaks. The number of abstentions in these three regions provided evidence of the level of general Kanak support for the FLNKS boycott, although not necessarily with FLNKS positions, and contrasted with the high participation rate in the South.

These results were hailed by the RPCR, RPR and the FN as a triumph for the Republic, a strong sign of New Caledonian determination to remain French.(219) After the referendum Chirac and Pons called for the FLNKS to reconsider its boycott and to take part in negotiations for the new territorial statute.(220) Tjibaou's reaction came in a statement on 14 September declaring that the FLNKS had not abandoned its goal of independence and retained its insistence on a self-determination referendum with voter eligibility conditions predetermined to the advantage of a majority vote for Kanak independence.(221) This declaration was not regarded by the Chirac Government as being of any great importance. Pons considered the referendum to be an affirmation of support for his ongoing reforms. As with Lemoine, this confidence was misplaced. Although, unlike Lemoine, Pons had local majority support for the bulk of his reform proposals, he had not inspired a territorial consensus backing his reforms. This fact was not regarded with any trepidation, although it should have been considering the deaths and property destruction which had ensued under Lemoine when the FLNKS had demonstrated the extent of its discontent. Pons did not show great public concern for the reaction of the FLNKS. As he had pointed out in February 1987, he did not regard the FLNKS as an "obligatory interlocutor ".(222)

A cautious Minister might have hesitated to overturn the existing territorial statute, particularly as it had not hindered the exercise of French sovereignty over New Caledonia, or undermined the democratic majority of the RPCR. If aspects of the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute were deemed faulty for whatever reason, they could be adjusted by legislation or by administrative practice designed to override specific parts of the statute, as Pons had already done during 1986, rather than by abandoning the whole. But these measures were considered inadequate and were too easily undone in the event of a change of government. Mindful of the approaching presidential elections in April 1988, which would probably result in a PS victory due to RPR differences with the UDF, after the self-determination referendum Pons prepared a new territorial statute. The statute turned out to be a fruitless undertaking due to the re-election of Mitterrand in May 1988 and the consequent installation of a new Socialist Government led by Prime Minister Michel Rocard.

Pons had already committed himself to a major redefinition of the administrative structure of New Caledonia in 1986. Rejecting Socialist Government reforms, Pons outlined the need for an economic revival of the territory after the damage done in 1984 and 1985, and declared that another reorganisation of territorial institutions would be necessary.(223) The initial step toward the fulfilment of this reform schedule was the promulgation in July 1986 of what came to be called the Pons Law.(224)

Article 2 of the law established special aid and development funding for New Caledonia. This measure responded to long-standing RPCR economic policy. Pons offered compensation to New Caledonians for property destruction suffered from late 1984.(225) Compensation allowed for 30% supplementary funding to individuals wishing to re-establish themselves outside Nouméa, aid intended to encourage loyalists to re-establish themselves in the rural hinterland.(226) Pons stimulated the economy with development subsidies to local government and industry.(227) In 1986 250MFF of funds(228) were allocated to be dispensed by the High Commissioner under article 3 of the law. This spending formed an interim measure designed to fill the gap before the implementation of a new statute and the presumed more efficient administration it would install. With the aid of this funding, and coincidentally of rising nickel prices on the international market,(229) New Caledonia experienced an increase in the value of its exports from 1986 to 1988. (Table 5) In spite of this expanded income, solutions to fundamental problems such as the territory's lack of rural development, its continued dependence on nickel exports, and the preponderance of tertiary sector employment, were not found. The Chirac Government found itself in the same situation as the Socialist Governments before it, too preoccupied with debate over self-determination and rewriting the territorial statute to undertake fundamental economic restructuring.

The Government was reluctant to dispense this additional development funding to the FLNKS-controlled regions and preferred to dispense it in the South or directly to communes.(230) The three FLNKS-administered regions found themselves marginalised under Pons, who characterised them to be administratively incompetent, prone to overspending, and incapable of fulfilling the multiple responsibilities ceded under Fabius.(231) The three FLNKS Regional Presidents rejected this characterisation. They responded that it was unreasonable to expect the regions to have fulfilled their potential in a matter of months after their creation, and pointed out what they had achieved since 1985.(232) Allocation of regional funding assumed great importance to these three regions, as regional development formed the basis on which Kanak autonomy was to be constructed. In 1986 expenditure reductions were forced on the Centre and Loyalty Islands after the High Commissioner used his powers, as defined by the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, to annul their 1987 draft budgets. Pons dismissed the two regions' budget proposals as having projected expenditures beyond their means, declaring that his decision was financially and not politically motivated.(233) This revision of regional funding was regarded by the FLNKS as a government attack on its credibility and as an attempt to erode its power. The decision was probably both politically and financially motivated. Its effect was to aggravate differences between the FLNKS and the Government.

Articles 29 to 38 of the Pons Law eroded another key aspect of the establishment of Kanak identity: the reclamation of ancestral lands. A new land agency, the ADRAF, was established to replace the Land Office. The ADRAF abandoned the recognition under the Land Office of the priority of Melanesian tribal land claims. Existing provision for the compulsory purchase of land, which had been introduced under Dijoud, was removed.(234) Pons declared that tribal land claims had largely been satisfied, and that the major hurdle to land reform now lay in the need to convince tribal leaders to abandon traditional forms of land tenure for modern, economically viable, owner-operated farms.(235) Land distribution by the ADRAF would be multi-racial. While the orientation of the ADRAF was claimed by the Chirac Government to be more egalitarian than the Land Office, its shortcomings later became public knowledge. In September 1989 a report by an Inspector-General of Finances confirmed earlier allegations both by the FLNKS(236) and by the extreme right in New Caledonia(237) that the RPCR members and associates running the ADRAF were using their powers in a less than impartial manner. Collective Melanesian land claims were marginalised under the ADRAF from the time of its establishment till the departure of the Chirac Government in May 1988. Of 717 Melanesian land claims in that period, only 17 were approved, and these were mainly awarded to individuals.(238) To the detriment of tribal claims and ethnic harmony, RPCR leaders and supporters, from Lafleur down, found themselves benefiting from personally profitable land sales made by the ADRAF.(239) It was not until after the appointment of the Rocard Government in June 1988 that any attempt was made to set the ADRAF in order. The need to do so did not reflect well on the Chirac Government, or on the RPCR.

The Regional Autonomy Statute, promulgated late in the day for the Chirac Government on 22 January 1988,(240) furthered the government dismantling of Melanesian specificity as recognised under the Socialists by revising the organisation of territorial cultural institutions. An ethnically pluralistic Caledonian Culture Office was set up.(241) The specific promotion of Kanak culture was avoided in preference to a multicultural emphasis harking back to Dijoud. The stance of the Chirac Government with regard to Melanesian custom authority as expressed in the Regional Autonomy Statute was less reformist. Article 4 retained tribal representation through a Custom Assembly. Not that the role of the Custom Assembly was innovative. Its function as a territorial advisory body, outlined under article 9 of the Regional Autonomy Statute, followed past legislation.

Pons considered his Regional Autonomy Statute to be the culmination of his reforms for New Caledonia. Owing to the impending presidential elections, the legislation was contemplated with general scepticism in the National Assembly. As the PS, the PC, and even the UDF, pointed out, were Mitterrand elected for a second term of office overseeing another Socialist Government, the Regional Autonomy Statute would be rendered a dead letter.(242) This projection was later vindicated and the Regional Autonomy Statute, like other statutes which had preceded it in the 1980s, was to be short-lived. The FN rejected the legislation formulated by Pons for its espousal of regional autonomy, claiming that the Chirac Government was weakening territorial bonds with France and offering aid and finance to the enemy of the Republic, the FLNKS.(243) The FN, hostile to Kanak nationalism as well as to RPCR electoral dominance in the territory, would have preferred the stripping of regional powers from both the FLNKS and the RPCR as part of a marked recentralisation in New Caledonia.(244) This FN preference, like the unconditional decolonisation still being promoted by the PC, was to remain in the realm of fantasy for want of wider national electoral support for such options.

The Regional Autonomy Statute did not in fact decentralise to the extent that the FN claimed. Neither did it stifle regional administration to the extent that the Socialists claimed. On 19 January 1988, the Constitutional Council rejected a complaint from Socialist Deputies that the statute bill accorded too many powers to a proposed territorial Executive Council.(245) It was asserted that the Executive Council would be dominated by the RPCR. However, provision was made to include representatives from regions where Kanak parties were electorally dominant, and each remaining member was appointed from the Territorial Congress on a proportional basis. The Executive Council consisted of ten representatives including the four Regional Presidents, and five Territorial Councillors appointed from the Territorial Congress. The High Commissioner experienced a reduction in his status in that he would no longer be the president of the territory, and would only exercise a casting vote in the Executive Council. A Territorial President elected by the Territorial Congress led the Executive Council, and assumed formal control over territorial affairs. Had they wished to participate in the elections scheduled for April 1988 under the new statutory conditions, minority Kanak parties would have enjoyed the power of veto over an RPCR majority in the Executive Council. Article 40 required the Council to have a two-thirds majority before major items such as the territorial budget could be passed.

Otherwise, the Regional Autonomy Statute provided only a symbolic reorganisation. Under article 6 the High Commissioner retained the bulk of his powers as representative of the State in New Caledonia. As had been the case under the Lemoine Statute, he oversaw foreign relations, immigration, external communications, finance, defence, law and order, civil law to the exclusion of custom law and commercial law, justice and the organisation of the judiciary, management of state bodies, communal administration, and retained control over natural resources.(246) Like the terms of the Lemoine Statute, some provision was left open to the territory to organise higher research facilities, and partial control was given over secondary education. The new territorial administration involved institutional rearrangements, although the basic distribution of powers between it and the State had not greatly changed. As had been the case under the Socialists, the Chirac Government was not prepared to decentralise to the extent of seriously diminishing state authority over New Caledonia. Ironically, the Chirac Government ended up promulgating a statute which did not differ greatly from the Lemoine Statute in its distribution of state and territorial powers, in spite of RPR and UDF criticisms in 1984 that Lemoine had been promoting excessive decentralisation to assist Kanak nationalism. But in 1984 the Lemoine Statute had been an interim framework prior to a self-determination vote concerning which the precise conditions had not been finalised. With the issue of self-determination assumed to have been settled by the referendum of September 1987, the Chirac Government felt secure in according powers to territorial leaders which its members had declared risky in 1984.

Regional responsibilities were not greatly different from those accorded under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute either. Article 8 of the Regional Autonomy Statute changed little. As they had since 1985, the regions would still control their own agricultural and maritime resources, health, cultural development, housing, public works, and professional training. Major changes included the attribution of administration over tourism, as well as the removal of control over primary education, and the implementation of land reform. This aspect of the final legislation calls into question the veracity of Pons's position in 1986 that existing regional administrative powers were too extensive in 1988 he left the regions with the bulk of their responsibilities untouched. The decision made to leave these powers largely unchanged rendered questionable Gaullist claims to have a different conception of decentralisation from the Socialists. Their New Caledonian statute failed to demonstrate this assertion.

Overall, the Regional Autonomy Statute did not involve a great break from preceding legislation. Its major innovation was a further redefinition of regional boundaries under article 3 which was intended to diminish FLNKS regional dominance. These new divisions were likely to give the FLNKS a clear electoral majority in two of the four new regions (the East and the Loyalty Islands), rather than three of the four pre-existing regions. The aim was to counterbalance the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, which had given majority control of three of the four New Caledonian regions to a formation with the support of less than 30% of the territorial vote. (Table 7) Another Kanak advantage gained under the Socialists was struck down. Here, Pons legislated to the advantage of loyalist electoral interests in the same partisan fashion as the Fabius Government had changed boundaries to the benefit of the FLNKS with the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute in 1985. The Centre and North Regions disappeared, to be replaced by an East/West division of the Grande Terre. While Kanak support on the east coast of the Grande Terre would have assured the FLNKS a majority in the East Region, the West Region was destined to be dominated by loyalist parties. Territorially large non-indigenous rural centres such as Dumbéa and Bourail, which were also loyalist electoral strongholds, were to be found there. While during the regional elections of 24 April 1988, mainly Kanak abstentions in the East totalled 75.86% of eligible voters, in the West they amounted to 46.31%.(247) The electoral favouritism of the Chirac Government extended to organising the first elections under the new statute to coincide with the date of the first round of the presidential elections. This decision was made in response to lobbying by the RPCR, which feared a decline in its electoral support should the regional elections be held in the wake of presidential elections lost by Chirac.(248)

The final months of the Chirac Government involved increasing FLNKS-initiated violence which became as troublesome to Pons as it had been to Pisani. Pons had inspired considerable enmity from Kanaks with his disregard for their interests in preparing the self-determination referendum, the Pons Law and the Regional Autonomy Statute. The FLNKS was powerless to influence the course of government legislation due to the Front's marginal electoral base in French national politics. It enjoyed only minority representation in New Caledonia, and no longer had parliamentary representation as a result of its decision to boycott the legislative elections in 1986. UC confidence in the French Government had diminished considerably since 1981, when the party had hoped the Mauroy Government would facilitate independence by September 1982. Pidjot concluded that his parliamentary presence had been a waste of time. Of the reform proposals for New Caledonia he had tabled in the National Assembly since the 1960s all had been disregarded by a succession of governments.(249) Just as working within the French parliamentary system had not produced lasting results satisfactory to the FLNKS, largely pacific protest and participation by FLNKS leaders in the territorial administration since 1986 had been ineffectual in furthering the FLNKS agenda. The reduction of regional funding in 1986, the annulment of regional budgets for 1987, the creation of funds to assist Europeans to re-establish themselves in rural areas, the replacement of the Land Office with the ADRAF, the French military escalation in tribal areas, lower emphasis on Melanesian identity in cultural policy, and the organisation of a self-determination referendum that Kanaks could not win, had not instilled the FLNKS with a conciliatory disposition. Kanak disillusionment with the rule of French law was aggravated by a Nouméa court's acquittal, on 29 October 1987, of charges against the Hienghène ambushers.(250)

Rather than quelling Kanak activism and removing the question of independence from territorial politics once and for all, the reforms of the Chirac Government ended up exacerbating existing political tensions in New Caledonia. On 12 March 1988 at a meeting at St Louis, north of Nouméa, the FLNKS executive decided to swing back to militancy to break out of its stalemate.(251) As it had in late 1984, the FLNKS resolved to foment disorder in an attempt to force a reconsideration of government policy in Paris. In spite of the fact that Mitterrand's first term in office had not led to the fulfilment of Kanak demands for independence, either with Socialist or liberal-conservative governments in power, Tjibaou held out the prospect that the re-election of Mitterrand and the return of a Socialist Government would permit a reconsideration of the question of self-determination.(252) This stance differed radically from the repudiation of the Socialists announced by the FLNKS charter in 1984. There were indications that Mitterrand was sympathetic, although he had not gone so far as to concede to the FLNKS demand for a restricted self-determination vote. He had however denounced the reforms of the Chirac Government as unnecessarily divisive and looked forward to the possibility of a reconciliation with the FLNKS.(253)

Not all of Tjibaou's hopes were pinned on the Socialists. In the meantime, the FLNKS adopted a more active response to the Chirac Government, assuming that violence would prompt change where peaceful protest had not. The member party of the FLNKS which advocated a more militant line was the UC. Other FLNKS members questioned the appropriateness of an active boycott. Doubts existed over whether the struggle committees were equal to the task, and it was feared that militant action might provoke a violent reaction from French loyalists and the forces of law and order,(254) as had been the case with the Hienghène ambush in December 1984, and the shootings of Machoro and Nonnaro in January 1985. As had occurred in 1985 when the FLNKS abandoned militancy to cooperate under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute, in early 1988 Tjibaou employed the UC's majority following in the Front to push a new line. He apocalyptically presented the boycott as the last ditch chance for the Kanak people, claiming it entailed:

[...] resistance against efforts to eliminate the Kanak people. Our mobilisation will be forceful to cause the elections and the implementation of the Pons Statute to fail. [...] The Government alone will be responsible for all the sliding out of control which is about to occur. It's not going to be a bed of roses. There will possibly be bloodshed.(255)

Blaming the Chirac Government for placing the FLNKS in a position where violence seemed the only choice was an act of self-exculpation. It was an exaggeration to state that government reforms constituted an attempt to eliminate the Kanak people. While Pons did not recognise the existence of a Kanak people, and the effects of his reforms were not beneficial to Kanak interests, Tjibaou gave a false impression. Had the FLNKS chosen to do so, under the Regional Autonomy Statute it could have received political representation in the Territorial Congress even though its influence at regional level had been diminished.

FLNKS struggle committees were mobilised, as they had been in November 1984, to actively disrupt the territory, particularly the elections on 24 April 1988. On the Grande Terre, sporadic confrontations occurred in March, April and May between armed Kanaks and gendarmes. On 24 April, Kanak activism partially disrupted the elections but, as in November 1984, did not prove capable of preventing them. Scattered roadblocks and pickets forced the closure of 31 of the 139 polling stations in New Caledonia.(256) Violence on the Grande Terre peaked on 2 May when a naval gunboat off the coast from Pouebo intervened to disperse around 30 Kanak activists with heavy machine gun fire.(257)

It was on Ouvéa that Kanak militants gained the lasting attention of Paris. In the Loyalty Islands the FLNKS boycott fell short of expectations. Militants on Ouvéa, Lifou and Maré were originally intended to go into action simultaneously but in the event only the Ouvéa struggle committee mobilised.(258) A raid on the gendarmerie at Fayaoué two days before the elections on 24 April led to the killing of four gendarmes and the abduction of the surviving personnel.(259) The operation was carried out by the Ouvéa struggle committee of the FLNKS, a polyglot formation comprised of members from the UC, FULK and Palika.(260) The leaders of the struggle committee were Chanel Kapoeri, a UC Territorial Councillor, and Alphonse Dianou, the head of the UC youth section.(261) Dianou normally resided in Nouméa, but had shifted back to Ouvéa for the operation. Initially, there was some uncertainty as to whether the FLNKS executive had condoned the operation. This question was clarified by an FLNKS political bureau communiqué issued on 24 April:

what has occurred on Ouvéa is not the isolated action of a few extremists or uncontrolled terrorists. To the contrary it is a unified action falling within the framework of the stalemating of the Pons Statute resolved by the 7th Congress of the FLNKS at Tibarama.(262)

The day before, three members of the FLNKS executive, Tjibaou, Yeiwené Yeiwené and Léopold Jorédié, had called on Chirac to withdraw French troops from Ouvéa, annul the territorial elections, and to open discussions on a new self-determination referendum more amenable to the FLNKS. Only then would the hostages be released.(263)

The captives were split into two groups by the members of the Ouvéa struggle committee. The gendarmes in one of these two groups were later released. The fate of the others was to become the central issue of a hostage incident which ended on 4 May when French army, marine and gendarme detachments stormed a grotto in the north of Ouvéa where 23 captives were still being held. In total, 25 men, including 19 Kanak activists, died as a result of the raid on the Fayaoué gendarmerie and the assault on the cave.(264) All of the captives held at the time of the assault were released through the efforts of the French military.(265)

The conjunction of the storming with the presidential elections led to a new round of polemicising in Paris. It did not pass unremarked that the assault had taken place four days before the second round of the presidential elections, which pitted Chirac against Mitterrand. The Chirac Government hailed the storming as a heroic feat in defence of the honour of France, and praised the military units involved for restoring the rule of law in New Caledonia.(266) RPR leaders blamed Mitterrand for the assault at Fayaoué, claiming that Kanak activists had been encouraged by his criticisms of government administration of New Caledonia, and had hoped for presidential leniency in response to their guerilla tactics should he be re-elected.(267) The French Left in turn attacked the assault on the grotto for being excessively violent, and claimed Chirac had ordered the assault as a ploy to gain the votes of members of the extreme-right in the presidential election.

In many respects, the operation was too violent, although the same criticism could be made of the occupation of the Fayaoué gendarmerie by the Ouvéa struggle committee. Like the killings of the four gendarmes by Kanaks at Fayaoué, the deaths of four Kanak captives (Wenceslas Lavelloi, Waina Amossa, Alphonse Dianou and Samuel Wamo) while in the custody of the French military(268) were morally reprehensible. That the number of deaths in each instance amounted to four suggests that la loi du talion had been in operation. Pons and Chirac had wanted a rapid resolution of the hostage situation by armed intervention, although their pressure on the military was initially met with opposition, notably from Captain Legorjus, commander of the GIGN.(269) Legorjus, who acted as negotiator with the hostage takers, was reluctant to become involved in any rushed plan which might inadvertently cause the deaths of hostages. Faced with failing negotiations with the FLNKS executive in Nouméa, he later concluded that an assault was the only way of saving the lives of the hostages.

The theory that the assault was a vote-catching ploy neglected certain considerations. Partial responsibility for the events that led to the coincidence of the assault on the grotto and the electoral period lies with the FLNKS, whose militant tactics were intended to pressure Paris at this sensitive time. The FLNKS also shared some culpability with the Chirac Government for the failure of negotiations which might have resulted in the hostages' release. In addition, leftist critics tended to neglect the fact that Mitterrand, Chirac's opponent in the presidential elections, had given his assent to the assault as head of the French armed forces. Without presidential approval the operation could not have taken place. It is contestable that Mitterrand would have approved the operation had he thought it might have hindered his re-election. Although Legorjus speculated that Mitterrand wanted the hostage situation resolved one way or another before the conclusion of the elections and his probable re-election so that blame could reflect on Chirac,(270) it was most likely that the safety of the hostages overrode electoral considerations.(271) Finally, if the assault was an electorally motivated attempt by Chirac to garner votes, it failed. Mitterrand was re-elected by a comfortable margin, although it should be noted that in New Caledonia, the vote was overwhelmingly pro-Chirac. (Tables 12, 13) As had been the case in 1981, the New Caledonian electorate was at odds with the national majority vote for Mitterrand.

By 1988 Pons appeared incapable of inspiring the peace and dialogue which he had hoped for in 1986. He had established the rule of democratic Republican law in New Caledonia, and had implemented his vision of the territory's future, but did so at the expense of alienating the FLNKS to a greater extent than the Socialists had, which led to a toll in human lives as Kanaks vented their discontent. The self-determination referendum, while reaffirming that the majority of voters in New Caledonia wished to stay French, aggravated rifts with Kanak nationalists rather than cementing over them. Moreover, the time of the Chirac Government in power was not long enough to ascertain whether their new territorial statute would have functioned as intended. Rather than solving New Caledonian problems, the interlude of liberal-conservative administration had served to aggravate them. It is a measure of the narrow perspectives of his Gaullist predecessors that, in spite of the RPR fulfilment of its reform schedule, in June 1988 Prime Minister Rocard was to find himself confronted with a territory more in need of urgent government intervention and mediation than in 1986.

Michel Rocard and the Matignon Accords

Accusations of who was to blame for the Ouvéa incident continued into June 1988. The incoming Socialist administration condemned the deaths in custody of Lavelloi, Amossa, Dianou and Wamo, and instigated an inquiry which confirmed their maltreatment.(272) Meanwhile, New Caledonian leaders were in a state of shock. The realisation that worsening violent confrontation could develop into civil war produced a moderation of attitudes in the executives of the FLNKS and the RPCR.

The FLNKS reassessed the utility of maintaining its active boycott. The balance sheet of its actions was a death toll that was likely to continue to rise should violent protest continue, without any prospect of forcing the issue of independence. The boycott had fallen short of expectations. The New Caledonian elections of April and May 1988 had not been called off as a result of disruption caused by Kanak activism. The Front had not managed to achieve a full mobilisation of its struggle committees. On the Grande Terre, as on Maré and Lifou, most committees displayed an unwillingness to push confrontation with the French State to the extent that their counterparts on Ouvéa had. Struggle committees were constrained by their ill-preparedness for extended campaigning, and by concern for the consequences of French loyalist or military reprisals against Melanesian settlements in their areas. The military build-up in New Caledonia undertaken by the Chirac Government had a dissuasive effect on Kanak militants, although not in all cases, as a partial mobilisation was achieved. The FLNKS was confronted with the superior military strength of French forces in New Caledonia. Against its poorly armed, partially mobilised militants, who were no more than several hundred in number, by 1 May there existed a combined total of 12,000 men under arms deployed in New Caledonia: the equivalent of one man for every twelve civilians in the territory.(273) The Ouvéa incident demonstrated that although the harassment tactics of the FLNKS could inconvenience the Chirac Government by gaining extensive media coverage in Paris at the height of the presidential elections, if it came to armed confrontation, the French military had greater numbers and firepower.

In an abrupt change of position, Lafleur also sought reconciliation. The RPCR turned away from a belligerent response to the FLNKS. Following the admission by the FLNKS that the Fayaoué operation was its responsibility, the RPCR had unsuccessfully called on Chirac to outlaw the FLNKS as a terrorist organisation.(274) Before the elections Henri Morini, the head of the RPCR security force had travelled with his subordinates into rural areas to mobilise bush militias in defence of farms and settlements. On 23 April, near Canala, a truck Morini was travelling in was hit by gunfire from Kanak activists. He was wounded and had to be hospitalised.(275) An informal network of bush militias coordinated by the RPCR was kept on alert during the FLNKS boycott and into May, in case Kanaks should decide to burn and pillage the rural homes of French loyalists, as they had during the first election boycott in 1984. After the re-election of Mitterrand, a sudden moderation of attitudes ensued in the RPCR executive. Contemplating the five years of Socialist administration that lay ahead, Lafleur realised it was in the best interests of his party not to persevere with its past belligerence to Socialist authority if he wished to promote in Paris reforms for the socio-economic development of the South. Continued antagonism toward the FLNKS would achieve neither peace nor economic prosperity for New Caledonia, but would instead lead to further destruction of life and property. The RPCR decided following the assault on the grotto in Ouvéa, after having described the FLNKS as a group of lawless terrorists that should be outlawed, to negotiate with the coalition in the hope of a return to peace. Discussions with FLNKS leaders were deemed preferable to their continued alienation.(276)

By early June 1988 Lafleur and Tjibaou were displaying an openness to a negotiated solution in New Caledonia which had not existed since before the Nainville les Roches negotiations. A dialogue mission sent by Rocard to New Caledonia on 18 May facilitated a reconciliation. The mission had been assigned the task of re-establishing political dialogue in the territory, a daunting task after years of deepening divisions. At the time of Rocard's appointment as Prime Minister on 12 May 1988, the future of New Caledonia was the most pressing issue that confronted him.(277) Once again, the contrast with New Caledonia's portfolio status in 1981 was striking.

Olivier Stirn, the new Minister to the DOM-TOM, announced on 18 May that the Pons Statute would be annulled.(278) Rocard had previously called into question the validity of Pons's policies for New Caledonia. In April 1987, he had written prophetically that the self-determination referendum would not diminish New Caledonian ethnic divisions and would lead to bloodshed.(279) In the same year he had also criticised the shortcomings of governments which tried to resolve problems in the DOM-TOM by recourse to statutes and dispensing aid.(280) He stressed instead the concept of signing development contracts between the State and regions in the DOM-TOM on the basis of consensual dialogue to stimulate local autonomy. As Prime Minister, Rocard called into question the use of formally democratic logic which discounted Kanak identity. He criticised Pons's tendency to disregard the FLNKS because of its lack of an electoral majority.(281) Once again, a change in philosophy had occurred in Paris. Unlike the intellectual renovations which accompanied reforms under Fabius and Pons, those brought about by Rocard were to take firmer root in New Caledonia. Just seven weeks after the Regional Autonomy Statute had been implemented, the achievements of Pons in New Caledonia seemed hollow.

The dialogue mission led to the arrangement of tripartite discussions between Kanak nationalists (from the FLNKS and LKS), the RPCR, and Rocard at the Hôtel Matignon in Paris from 23 June. On 26 June the Matignon negotiations produced a document establishing a territorial entente cordiale signed by all participants. The bulk of the Matignon Accord was reaffirmed with minor modifications after further negotiations in Paris from 17 to 20 August 1988. This second statement is referred to as the Oudinot Accord. For the purposes of this work it is grouped with the first agreement under the collective title 'the Matignon Accords'.(282)

On 29 June the first part of the Matignon Accord was implemented with the transfer of New Caledonia's executive powers to the High Commissioner.(283) Following precedent established by the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute and by many decades of colonial administration, the Matignon Accord centralised power around the High Commissioner. The Executive Council was stripped of powers accorded to it by the Regional Autonomy Statute. This was a preliminary step to a one-year period of direct rule by the High Commissioner while new territorial administrative structures were installed. New Caledonia would regain its administrative powers on 14 July 1989, after the election of a new Territorial Council. As in the past, executive control of the implementation of this raft of reforms would be exercised from Paris.

New elections would be held so that the FLNKS and LKS could regain territorial representation. As a result of the FLNKS and LKS boycott of the regional elections on 24 April 1988, loyalist parties had monopolised the Territorial Congress to the near exclusion of Kanak representation. Of the 48 seats established by the Regional Autonomy Statute, all except two went to loyalist parties.(284) It was accepted by the parties to the Matignon Accords that the recasting of New Caledonia's future could not take place while Kanak nationalists remained excluded from political representation. Although the Territorial Councillors elected in April 1988 thereby had their legitimacy called into question, no doubts were cast on the New Caledonian results of the boycotted legislative elections in June 1988. (Table 15) Lafleur and Maurice Nenou, standing for re-election as RPR Deputies, were re-elected unopposed by FLNKS challengers. The Government considered it necessary to revise territorial representation, but challenging the results of national elections was never seriously contemplated. This position was held in spite of the fact that the FLNKS objected to new electoral boundaries drawn up under Pons for legislative elections in New Caledonia. Nouméa had been combined with the Loyalty Islands for one constituency, while the remainder of the Grande Terre comprised the other constituency. The effect was to practically guarantee the RPCR majority representation over the Loyalties, an area where majority electoral support was traditionally for the UC, as the numerical strength of the loyalist vote in Nouméa far outweighed the number of Kanak voters in the Loyalties. Lafleur and Nenou were re-elected in the legislative elections of March 1993, each with an absolute majority of votes cast in his constituency. (Table 19) Legislative elections were not controlled by the territorial statute. Their boycott by the FLNKS stemmed from its policy dating back to 1986, which held that their national representation was ineffectual, regardless of boundaries. The FLNKS ended up discarding its past objections to the electoral boundaries of the two constituencies when it presented two candidates for the legislative elections of March 1993.

Amid majority indifference in metropolitan France, national acceptance of the Matignon Accords was put to the test in a referendum on 6 November 1988. (Table 16) A national turnout of 36.92% of eligible voters constituted the lowest response to a French referendum since 1958.(285) As the majority of those who voted, 70.47%, expressed approval for the Matignon Accords, they became law.(286) A national referendum was used to affirm the Accords because of the greater democratic legitimacy attached to a direct consultation with the entire French electorate. Not insignificantly, this decision also precluded extended debate which might have led to complications and delays had the Matignon Accords been tabled as a bill before Parliament. The Rocard Government received only a relative majority in the National Assembly from the legislative elections of June 1988, (Table 14) which left it vulnerable to opposition filibustering. The referendum's air of legitimacy was undermined by a poor turnout. The 70.47% who voted for the Matignon Accords represented only 26.02% of French electors.

In New Caledonia the turnout was 63.24%. (Table 16) Although 52.37% of votes cast were for the adoption of the Matignon Accords, in certain communes opposition to them was high. Majorities in six of the 13 communes to be included in the South Province under the new statute voted against the accords. In Nouméa, the heartland of RPCR electoral support, 56.0% of voters cast 'no' votes, as did 73.46% in Farino, 54.67% in Dumbéa, 51.78% in Bourail, 50.53% in Mont Dore, and 47.67% in La Foa.(287) These figures were signs of a combination of loyalist voter distrust of RPCR dialogue with the FLNKS and a Socialist Government, and the influence of the FN and RPR representatives in Paris who opposed the referendum. It was speculated at the time that the RPCR might be on the verge of a mass desertion of electoral support to the extreme right for its signature of the Matignon Accords but this prediction did not eventuate in the provincial elections of June 1988. (Table 17) While for the RPCR results in these communes were unsettling, in November 1988 majority approval of the Matignon Accords was expressed in the remainder of New Caledonian communes.

Designed to re-establish civil order and permit decentralised economic, social and cultural reform, the Matignon Accords established a ten year development plan, at the end of which a territorial self-determination referendum would take place. In accepting a ten-year moratorium on self-determination the FLNKS assented in 1988 to a condition which its predecessor, the FI, had found reprehensible when it was made by Dijoud in February 1979.(288) The terms of this future referendum differed in some important respects from those of the 1987 vote. Those eligible to vote in 1998 would include only inhabitants resident in the territory since 1988, and New Caledonians who had come of voting age since then.(289) These conditions represented a compromise solution. They excluded more non-indigenous voters than either Fabius or Chirac had been prepared to, while failing to fulfil any previous FLNKS conditions for organising a self-determination referendum with restricted voter eligibility. The FLNKS had considerably moderated its past positions on self-determination in the pursuit of consensual dialogue with the French State. The RPCR too showed moderation in accepting these new eligibility conditions. Previously the three-month residency qualification adopted by the Chirac Government for participation in the self-determination vote of 1987 had marked the limit of the concessions the RPCR was prepared to accept.

New regional boundaries also reflected the consensual approach of the Matignon Accords. Under article 6, the four regions of the Regional Autonomy Statute were replaced by three provinces. Whereas the Regional Autonomy Statute had divided most of the Grande Terre longitudinally, ending with a transverse cutting separating the three communes of the South from those of the East and West, the Matignon Accords employed a transverse division, roughly across the centre of the Grande Terre. This new delineation combined the predominantly European settlements of the west coast with the Melanesian ones of the east coast in the north of the Grande Terre. Under the Regional Autonomy Statute, the loyalist voters on the west coast had retained their administrative and political identity in the West Region as non-Kanaks formed an electoral majority there. Under the new division the FLNKS would be likely to gain majority control of the North Province because of the greater numbers of Kanak voters living on the east coast. On the other hand, the RPCR would be given majority control over a greater area than either the Regional Autonomy Statute or the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute had offered, including Bourail, the most populous settlement outside Nouméa, where the loyalist vote was strong, and the mining centre of Thio.(290) This new structure was intended to create an electoral balance somewhere between those established by the two preceding statutes, which had in turn permitted FLNKS majority control over three of four regions, and two of four regions.

This balance was confirmed by the results of the first provincial elections held under the Matignon Accords on 11 June 1989. (Table 17) Votes for the FLNKS gave that party majority control over the North and Loyalty provinces, while the RPCR held a majority in the South. The elections repeated established electoral patterns in reaffirming the electoral strength of French loyalism in the South, and of Kanak nationalism in the northern half of the Grande Terre and in the Loyalty Islands. Loyalist parties continued to hold a majority of seats in the Territorial Congress, with 32 of the 54 seats set up under the new statutory arrangements. LKS and the FLNKS held one and 19 seats respectively. A new force, the Wallisian UO, won the remaining two seats, drawing on Wallisian support in the South. As they had under past statutes, Kanak representatives remained a minority in the Territorial Congress. After a decade of Kanak participation in territorial elections, the percentage of the vote accorded to Kanak parties had declined slightly. In the territorial elections of July 1979, the FI had gained 34.13% of votes cast.(291) In 1989, the FLNKS and the LKS gained a combined total of 30.54% of votes cast. (Table 17) Obtaining the electoral majority needed to win independence constitutionally was still a distant prospect for Kanak leaders.

The Councillors elected in the provincial elections assumed their functions in July 1989. Having scrapped the Regional Autonomy Statute, the Matignon Accords created new institutions whose salient powers did not however differ greatly from the bodies they replaced. Paris retained its extensive control over the territory and boosted the status of its representative in Nouméa. As he had done under Fabius, the High Commissioner reassumed executive control over New Caledonia. Under article 65 the High Commissioner was charged with representing and directing the territorial administration. The State generally maintained the powers it enjoyed under the Regional Autonomy Statute. Article 6 of the Regional Autonomy Statute and article 8 of the Matignon Accords, which outlined the powers of the State, were nearly identical. One exception was that under the new statute the State retained control over external relations, with the concession that the territory could negotiate foreign investment of up to 6MFF without prior approval. On the other hand, the High Commissioner was attributed command over the guiding principles of land reform, a response to the insider trading for territorial officials which the ADRAF had indulged in under the Chirac Government. The High Commissioner gained some control over primary education, excluding the areas of culture and language. Apart from these and other minor differences, article 6 would not have looked out of place in the text of the Regional Autonomy Statute. The Matignon Accords maintained continuity with preceding statutes in safeguarding the powers of the French State in New Caledonia. Nonetheless greater leeway was given to initiatives at territorial or provincial level than under the preceding statute. For example article 88 allowed provincial or territorial leaders to propose negotiations with foreign governments in the Pacific region. This adjustment represented an innovation in terms of local autonomy, although New Caledonian leaders desirous of developing their relations overseas would remain dependent on state expertise in foreign affairs.

The specific responsibilities of the provinces conformed to most of the orientations of the Regional Autonomy Statute. Provincial representatives received more control over their own budgets than the previous regions had, and were reattributed powers over land reform which had been lost by the regions, but otherwise responsibilities at this level remained much the same as before. The major innovation was to be found in the implementation under articles 84 to 87 of annual state-provincial development contracts of the sort envisaged by Rocard in 1987. These enabled the establishment of direct links between Paris and the two FLNKS-controlled provinces, bypassing the RPCR-dominated Territorial Congress in the process. From 1990 to 1992 inclusive, 50.7% of contract funds were attributed to the North Province, and 18.3% went to the Loyalty Islands Province. The remainder, 31%, was allocated to the South Province.(292) Article 87, which instituted an investment fund for economic and social development, was not without precedent, but this aid was in practice to be distributed more freely in the North and in the Loyalty Islands than Pons's special development fund had been.

Neither were the Economic and Social Committee and the Consultative Custom Committee without precedent. Their advisory capacities to the State and to the territory were described in articles 59 and 60. Article 79 followed precedents dating back to 1985 in providing indemnities to New Caledonians whose property or health had been damaged or destroyed in political confrontation. A measure which would not have been contemplated under Pons was the amnesty under article 80 to those who had committed crimes relating to civil disorder before 20 August 1988. This article however specifically excluded those guilty of murders. This limitation was imposed at the insistence of the Constitutional Council, which had rejected an FLNKS proposal in the negotiations of July 1988 of an amnesty for murder.(293) This limitation was lifted in January 1990, when the Rocard Government promulgated a law extending the amnesty to those responsible for murder.(294) Such leniency would have been unthinkable under Pons, as would have been the lessening of tensions needed for such legislation to be approved in Nouméa and in Paris.

Rocard hoped to gain, and indeed achieved, a return to civil order in New Caledonia by granting or restoring to Kanak nationalists various concessions proscribed under Pons. Of particular importance was support offered by Rocard for provincial development.(295) Article 85 of the Matignon Accords established the target of improving living conditions in rural areas by encouraging economic, educational and cultural activity there. Communications and public works would be expanded. Emphasis would be placed on offering educational facilities which would broaden opportunities for professional training. In proposing this, the Matignon Accords offered Kanaks the chance of building a stronger economic base in the provinces, and professional training, an area where Melanesians generally lagged behind the European population. This initiative cut two ways. It reinforced the FLNKS policy of furthering regional development as the basis for independence. And should Kanaks fail to gain independence in 1998, they would still enjoy greater economic power within a French New Caledonia than they had prior to 1988. Either way, such moves unavoidably rendered Kanak development dependent on Parisian finance and expertise.

Article 85 strengthened state support for Melanesian cultural promotion, although within a multicultural context, an orientation which harked back to the Dijoud Plan. This represented another of the compromise positions in the Matignon Accords cultural policy which sat between the pluralism established in cultural policy under Pons, and the exclusive concentration on Melanesian culture by the Socialists between 1981 and 1986. Article 93 of the Matignon Accords embodied renewed government support for Melanesian culture by setting up the Agency for the Development of Kanak Culture.

Land reform, a topic of particular contention under Pons, was tidied up. Article 94 of the Matignon Accords retained the ADRAF, but its RPCR administrators had already been replaced by November 1988 and were the subject of an inquiry by the Ministry of Finance in 1988 and 1989. Fast track land deals conducted by the agency just prior to the advent of the Rocard Government were revoked, not without complaints from the RPCR. The official investigation was reassuring to the FLNKS, which was confident of tribal land claims receiving greater attention from the new administrators of ADRAF.(296)

FLNKS leaders signed the Matignon Accord in June 1988 to re-establish dialogue and regain access to territorial institutions after the failure of their militant option. Tjibaou abandoned militancy in the hope that dialogue would serve as the basis for progress toward independence and gaining more acceptable conditions for the FLNKS than the Regional Autonomy Statute had offered. To a limited extent the FLNKS got a better deal from the new provincial structure. FLNKS-dominated areas had more autonomy than under the preceding statute, and the development facilities at regional level offered under Rocard were more generous than those offered by Pons. It should be noted however that the State retained control over provincial budgets and natural resources. The provinces had limited capacity to raise their own funds, being restricted to levying tariffs on certain activities. The autonomy that the Matignon Accords offered existed within narrowly defined limits that in no way jeopardised state control over New Caledonia.

Concessions made by the French State in the fields of provincial development, Melanesian culture and land reform, were counterbalanced by the concessions of the FLNKS. As has been mentioned, the acceptance of the voter eligibility criteria for the self-determination referendum in 1998 marked an abandonment of its various past positions on this issue. Tjibaou and the FLNKS delegation took this deal as the best they could get, in the hope that Melanesian population growth, the exclusion from the referendum of transients and new arrivals, the spread of popular support for independence, and the possible emigration to metropolitan France of French loyalists, would tip the balance in 1998.

This optimism was not shared by some other members of the FLNKS, who were reluctant to assent to the concessions made by their representatives in Paris. The UC called for a revision of the initial Matignon Accord at a meeting hosted by the Ndé tribe on 14 July 1988.(297) Yann Céléné Uregei, the leader of the FULK, vehemently opposed the Matignon Accord, and called for Tjibaou's resignation at the FLNKS congress at Thio on 16 July 1988.(298) At the FLNKS congress at Gossanah, on Ouvéa, on 23 and 24 July 1988, Tjibaou found himself subjected to criticism for having conceded too much in terms of the self-determination referendum, and for not having pushed hard enough in other respects.(299) The Gossanah congress rejected the referendum conditions.(300) It decided that ten years was too long a period to wait for the self-determination referendum, which should be held instead before the next legislative elections. Although the prospect was constitutionally improbable, the congress claimed that should the Socialists lose power in the legislative elections in March 1993, the referendum could be abandoned by a liberal-conservative government. The congress contested the voter eligibility criteria of the Matignon Accord, proposing a vote limited to inhabitants with parents born in New Caledonia. The congress also called for a redefinition of regional boundaries which would enable the FLNKS to gain elected majorities over three of four regions, called for the State to surrender control of natural resources to the provinces, and demanded an amnesty on Kanaks imprisoned or wanted by the law for political actions from 1984 to 1988.

FLNKS dissatisfaction with the Matignon Accord was the reason for the second round of negotiations between its signatories in Paris in August 1988. Only one major concession was made to the FLNKS the granting of an amnesty on politically-motivated crimes, with the exception of murder. Neither the RPCR nor the Rocard Government were prepared to meet other demands from the Front. The FLNKS delegation did not have a great deal of room for manœuvre when faced with opposition from these quarters. Had the Front broken off discussions it would have been left at an impasse. A return to violent militancy would have been fruitless as a means of pushing for independence. A peaceful boycott would have achieved little for Kanak interests either. In both scenarios, the FLNKS would have given the impression of being recalcitrantly obstinate in the face of unprecedented overtures of good will from the RPCR and the Socialist Government in Paris. The FLNKS delegation therefore relented. The signature of the Oudinot Accord was represented by its signatories as a triumph for consensus, and by Tjibaou as a stepping stone to independence,(301) but resentment persisted within the ranks of the FLNKS over Tjibaou's failure to negotiate greater concessions. Kanak dissent would become evident upon the assassination of Tjibaou in May 1989 and the estrangement of two founding formations from the Front.

Kanak Loyalty Islanders have been most visible in the articulation of Kanak opposition to the Matignon Accords. Their different geographical and cultural situation from Kanaks on the Grande Terre has had an influence in their feeling of becoming distanced from the FLNKS, led mainly by Grande Terre mainlanders. In the Loyalties, widespread European settlement did not take place. In the absence of a large French presence, local tribes have retained land ownership in the islands, along with a stronger sense of tribal identity. Having retained the integrity of their lands and their tribal identity, Kanak Loyalty Islanders tend to be less prone to compromise with France than Kanak mainlanders.

The assassinations of Tjibaou and Yeiwené, the FLNKS Vice-President, on 4 May 1989 were an ugly expression of the divisions between the FLNKS executive, and party activists on Ouvéa.(302) These Ouvéans already felt that during the Ouvéa hostage incident, the FLNKS executive on the Grande Terre had not displayed sufficient support for local militants. The signature by FLNKS leaders of the Matignon Accords reinforced disenchantment on Ouvéa.(303) Djubelly Wea, the man who murdered Tjibaou and Yeiwené, believed like other members of the Ouvéa struggle committee that the FLNKS executive had sold out to the French. Wea claimed that in accepting what were seen to be the Matignon Accords' unfavourable terms, the executive had been duped by the Rocard Government and had effectively renounced the goal of Kanak independence.(304) Wea paid for that belief with his life, when killed by Tjibaou's bodyguards.

Doubt in the ranks of the FLNKS about the Matignon Accords was not confined to Ouvéa. Following the deaths of Tjibaou and Yeiwené, the FULK dissociated itself from the FLNKS. Yann Céléné Uregei, the leader of the FULK, had been notable for his lack of condemnation of their murders, and unconfirmed rumours spread that the party was in some way responsible.(305) Uregei's opposition to the Matignon Accords was already well known. His party, alone among the members of the FLNKS, had refused to approve the Matignon Accords, and had boycotted the provincial elections in June 1989.(306) That year the UC called for the departure of the FULK from the FLNKS due to the former's hostility to the Accords. The FULK declined to leave the FLNKS then, arguing that its adherence to the FLNKS charter was not dependent on its absence from the Matignon Accords.(307) Before the FLNKS congress at St Louis from 20 to 21 January 1990, FULK leaders were informed that they would not be welcome, and party members who turned up were barred from entry.(308) The rift between the FULK and the FLNKS was formalised in January 1992, when the former dissolved itself to form a new party in broad opposition to the Matignon Accords and the FLNKS's signature to it.(309) Congrès Populaire held its first conference on Lifou, the home ground of the FULK, on 24 September 1992.(310) The gathering, attended by 300 to 400 Kanaks, including a delegation of around 50 people from Ouvéa, asserted the importance of transcending party political differences, as well as preserving tribal traditions from erosion by European values.

FULK had always been a minority party in the FLNKS, with only a few hundred party members,(311) although its opposition to the Matignon Accords has not been isolated. The independent LKS, with its following centred on Maré, has found itself taking a similar position. On 11 April 1991, its leader Nidoïsh Naisseline, announced the withdrawal of LKS from the Matignon Accords.(312) He claimed that Socialist Governments were eroding custom authority through their policies and that the Matignon Accords were leading Kanaks away from independence. As can be seen from past election results LKS, like Congrès Populaire, enjoyed the adherence of a minority of Kanak voters, but the positions of these movements were locally important for the political balance in the Loyalty Islands Province, where the FLNKS held four of seven seats, a majority which it lost as a result of the Territorial Elections on 11 July 1995,(313) which resulted in the installation of an RPCR/Kanak majority led by Naisseline.

The USTKE, the trade union whose representatives adhered to the Matignon Accords as members of the FLNKS, has also distanced itself from political participation in them. In July 1989, the USTKE voted to withdraw from the FLNKS to concentrate on its primary concern, syndicalism.(314) As the President of USTKE, Louis Kotra Uregei, is Yann Céléné Uregei's nephew, the union had been regarded with suspicion by the UC after the assassination of Tjibaou and Yeiwené. At the funeral service for Tjibaou and Yeiwené in Nouméa in May 1989, an USTKE delegation was turned away by UC members for this reason.(315) Although the USTKE has not disavowed its participation in the Matignon process, it has expressed reservations over the agreement. Louis Uregei has stated that the USTKE still supports certain measures in the Matignon Accords, even if not their overall implementation.(316)

In spite of this minority Kanak dissent over adherence to the Matignon Accords, the FLNKS has continued supporting them.(317) The disenchantment expressed by the leaders of FULK, a minor party with three or four hundred members, LKS, a party with only one seat in the Territorial Congress, and the qualified reservations of a trade union, did not count as opposition which threatened FLNKS participation in the Accords. Its partnership with the State and the RPCR has persisted in the face of this marginal dissent.

Dissent over adherence to the Matignon Accords has also circulated in the ranks of the RPCR. Lafleur, like Tjibaou, had the task of convincing his rank and file of the need to adopt the Matignon Accord in July 1988. He had less trouble in this respect than Tjibaou. On 23 July 1988, at its congress at Mont Dore, the RPCR unanimously approved the orientations of the Matignon Accord.(318) The national referendum on the Matignon Accords in November 1988 proved that not all of New Caledonian loyalist voters were as positive about the agreement as the RPCR leadership.(319) Their negative votes and abstentions were respectively a response to FN rejection of the Accords, and to RPR disapproval of ratifying them by a national referendum. The FN, alone among French parliamentary parties, denounced the Matignon Accords for their promotion of decentralisation and for supposedly placing New Caledonian links with the Republic at risk in 1998.(320) As was the case with Kanak dissent on the fringes of the FLNKS over adherence to the Accords, this extreme right challenge to RPCR adherence to the agreement failed to develop into a threat to its electoral hegemony in New Caledonia. As a result of the Territorial elections of July 1995, the FN saw its representation in the Territorial Assembly fall from three seats to two.(321) Unexpectedly, the RPCR likewise lost seats, its total falling from 27 to 18, mainly as the result of the advent of Une Nouvelle Calédonie, the first major liberal party presence in the Assembly since the collapse of the FNSC in 1985. A New Caledonia, led by Didier Leroux, a metropolitan French businessman, gained seven seats in the South Province following an electoral campaign attacking RPCR clientelism and old boy networks.

RPCR assent to the Matignon Accords had been given because they were not fundamentally threatening to loyalist interests. The development period the agreement established worked to the economic advantage of the South as well as to the North and the Loyalty Provinces, and fulfilled party policy of encouraging economic growth.(322) As the provincial elections demonstrated in 1989, the new provincial structure permitted the reaffirmation of the electoral dominance of the RPCR in the South, and did not threaten its territorial electoral majority. As for the self-determination referendum, the RPCR was confident that, under the conditions of the Matignon Accords, French loyalism would be triumphant in 1998.(323)

Not only was the RPCR confident that the Matignon Accords posed no menace to ties with France, RPCR leaders also felt that the ten year development period would lead to a softening and eventual abandonment of support for independence. Having experienced the benevolence of state funding for regional development, it was argued, Kanaks would realise it was in their best interests to remain French rather than to accept the uncertainties of independence. The veracity of this thesis had been neither conclusively confirmed nor disproved by the early 1990s. On 27 April 1991, Lafleur suggested hopefully that the negotiation of a consensual solution to the differences the RPCR had with the FLNKS might lead to the abandonment of the self-determination referendum.(324) The FLNKS, then holding a congress at La Foa, did not respond to Lafleur's comments. At its La Foa congress and at its Touho congress from 29 to 31 August 1992, the FLNKS determined that obtaining independence through participation in the Matignon Accords remained its fundamental goal.(325)

The RPR was at odds with the RPCR at the time of the referendum on the Matignon Accords. RPR leaders doubted the capacity of the Rocard Government to establish lasting peaceful dialogue between Kanaks and loyalists, and the suspicion persisted from the time of the Lemoine Statute that the Socialists might be attempting to lead New Caledonia into independence. The willingness of Lafleur to cooperate with the FLNKS and the Socialists left him in disagreement with Chirac. While in July 1988 the RPR had at first expressed tentative approval of the reconciliation initiated under Rocard,(326) and Chirac had deigned to meet Tjibaou in October 1988,(327) Gaullists later concluded that the referendum was a trap. The RPR advised its followers to abstain from voting in the referendum of November 1988.(328) To vote against the Matignon Accords would have appeared a negative, disruptive reaction, but to vote for them would have implied a renunciation of past RPR policy conduct in New Caledonia.(329) Chirac preferred the Matignon Accords to be approved by Parliament rather than by referendum, so that the RPR and other parties could influence their contents, and so that the final law could be more easily overridden by future legislation.(330) In October 1988 the RPR expressed a lack of confidence in the capacity of the Rocard Government to oversee the Accords impartially, an odd position from a party whose representatives had been less than impartial in government from 1986 to 1988. The RPR was in addition hostile to the voter eligibility criteria for the self-determination referendum in 1998, asserting that the conditions used for the self-determination vote of 1987 had been adequate. Alain Juppé, the RPR Secretary-General, stated that the Matignon Accords would be open to revision should his party return to government.(331)

Juppé's comment remained applicable during the period of Socialist government until March 1993. The RPR remained dissatisfied with the structure of the Accords. Juppé maintained into 1993 the RPR position that the legislation needed adjusting.(332) However in June 1991, showing signs of some restraint, Juppé had promised Burck, the UC President from 1989, that the RPR would not call the Matignon Accords into question if his party came to power in the French legislative elections of March 1993.(333) The New Caledonian High Commissioner, Alain Christnacht, felt in 1992 that the RPR would not repeat the mistakes it made in New Caledonia between 1986 and 1988. He stated in November 1992 that the RPR should proceed more carefully in its second period of cohabitation. He supported this claim by pointing out that, unlike its time in opposition from 1981 to 1986, from 1988 to 1992 the party had engaged in constructive dialogue with Kanak leaders.(334) This theory was put to the test under Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, whose appointment in April 1993 marked the beginning of a second period of cohabitation which lasted until the election of Jacques Chirac to the French Presidency on 8 May 1995. The observation by the FLNKS in July 1988 that the arrival of another RPR-led administration could lead to a revision or abandonment of the Matignon Accords showed no signs of being fulfilled from 1993 to 1995. There was no announcement of changes comparable to those made by Pons upon his appointment as Minister to the DOM-TOM in March 1986, even though the Balladur Government had a large enough mandate to push through parliamentary legislation over New Caledonia had it so wished. The legislative elections of March 1993 (Table 19) gave the RPR/UDF coalition the largest parliamentary majority of any French political group since the 1830s. Dominique Perben, the new Minister to the DOM-TOM, indicated in June 1993 that socio-economic change, rather than statute reform, was his preliminary concern. Perben's message to the Territorial Congress during his first official visit to Nouméa in June 1993 consisted of images of governmental calm and the exercise of impartial administrative continuity.(335)

Doubts expressed by Juppé in 1988 concerning the capacity of the Socialists to manage the Matignon Accords impartially had not been justified by March 1993. The legislation outlasted five years of Socialist administration, a longevity which territorial reforms from Dijoud through to Pons had failed to achieve. In May 1991 Mitterrand affirmed to Paul Néaoutyine, the FLNKS President, that he would act as the ultimate guarantor of the fulfilment of the Matignon Accords.(336) This comment was offered as reassurance following the resignation of Rocard as Prime Minister earlier that month. The two Prime Ministers who followed Rocard, Edith Cresson and Pierre Bérégovoy, both stated support for the Matignon Accords.(337) Mitterrand's fulfilment of his constitutional duties toward the Matignon Accords lasted to the end of his second term in office in May 1995. Since that month, Chirac, his successor, previously so forceful in pushing for change in New Caledonia as Prime Minister from 1986 to 1988, has demonstrated far greater restraint, and has left the Accords intact so that they might continue until their conclusion. The reasons for this are greater concern for larger, more pressing problems such as metropolitan French strikes, rising national unemployment, and the issues of European Union, in addition perhaps to the realisation, unlikely to be admitted, that it would be foolish to repeat past errors committed in New Caledonia.

Whether or not the Matignon Accords reach their conclusion with an orderly self-determination ballot in 1998 may depend to a great extent on whether the FLNKS believes itself capable of winning independence by popular vote. Should this appear improbable, then Kanak nationalists could return to their boycott tactics of past years. Rocard stated in July 1988 that Kanak nationalists had a good probability of gaining independence in ten years' time. By his estimation then, Melanesians would comprise over 50% of the electoral body by 1998.(338) Another official estimate differed from that of Rocard. A confidential DOM-TOM Ministry report in 1988 estimated that if no metropolitan French left New Caledonia between 1988 and 1998, Melanesians would represent 44.5% of the electorate in the referendum.(339) The report added optimistically that if 16,000 eligible metropolitan French voters left New Caledonia between 1988 and 1998, then Melanesians would enjoy the backing of 53% of the electorate. This scenario is improbable. The departure of just under 10% of the total New Caledonian population in 1989 (Table 18) before 1998 would represent a drastic demographic shift. These ethnically based statistics are far from conclusive in indicating future support for local sovereignty. Moreover not all Melanesian votes in 1998 will be for independence. In 1985, around 20% of Melanesian votes went to loyalist parties.(340) The FLNKS employed this statistical assumption, and estimated in July 1988 that Kanak nationalism would gain the support of 36% of voters in 1998.(341) Although plausible, this total of 36% was slightly higher than the level of combined support for Kanak nationalist parties in past territorial elections.

Disregarding speculative projections, and considering the evidence of past elections alone, it is clear that Kanak nationalism has not had and does not enjoy the following of an absolute majority of the New Caledonian electorate. The results of the territorial elections unmarred by FLNKS boycotts, those of 1979, 1985 and of 1989 (Tables 7, 17) confirm this assessment, as do the first legislative elections which the FLNKS contested in March 1993. (Table 20) In March 1993, the two Kanak candidates between them gained 20.23% of votes cast in the two constituencies. In the Territorial elections of July 1995, a vote of considerably greater interest to Kanak voters, the FLNKS gained 19.21% of territorial votes cast. The other Kanak parties involved in the poll, the LKS and the National Union for Independence, a Palika platform, gained 9.87% and 3.26% of territorial votes cast respectively. The total pro-independence vote thereby amounted to 32.34% of votes cast.(342) On the basis of these indicators, it is apparent that unless a great surge in FLNKS support occurs in 1998, based on a major transfer of voter allegiance to the Kanak cause, in direct contradiction to historic majority voting patterns against independence, then the FLNKS and its rivals will not gain independence. On the strength of the existing electoral balance, it appears French loyalism will be reaffirmed in the 1998 self-determination vote.

Kanak Development: Towards Integration or Independence?

Apart from disillusionment with the shortcomings of militant activism, the FLNKS signed the Matignon Accords because they presented avenues for Kanak development. Since the time of cooperation with the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute in 1985 members of the FLNKS executive had been aware of the handicaps of attempting to found a sovereign nation-state with a largely rural, tribal support base in a territory where non-Melanesian immigrants dominated the cash economy. Under the Matignon Accords the strategy of the FLNKS was to employ state development funding to improve the socio-economic standing of the North and the Loyalties. Such activity would, the theory went, endow Kanaks with the infrastructure upon which to found the Republic of Kanaky.(343) The inevitable drawback was the inherently dependent position in which it placed the FLNKS with regard to the French State.

The level of Melanesian dependence on non-Melanesian expertise was apparent with the construction near Nouméa of the Jean-Marie Tjibaou Cultural Centre. This monumental piece of architecture, incorporating Melanesian design features and European engineering techniques, was funded with 320MFF from the French presidential budget, and was designed by an Italian architect, Renzo Piano.(344) The project is symbolic of the extent to which the affirmation of Melanesian identity under the Matignon Accords is reliant on the French State.

The dependence of the FLNKS on state funding for development is reflective of a wider territorial economic dependence that has persisted into the 1990s. It can be observed that New Caledonian dependence on mainland France had not substantially diminished. The coverage of import payments by exports fell slightly from 53.4% in 1990 (Table 5) to 52% in 1991.(345) Given its mineral wealth, estimated to include between 20 and 40% of global nickel resources,(346) chrome, copper, cobalt and manganese,(347) as well as its largely unexplored maritime resources, New Caledonia has great economic potential. The territory has the capacity to increase its financial self-sufficiency, but this expansion may ultimately be restricted by its small population base, its comparative isolation from major markets, and the level of development capital available. Criticism of New Caledonian dependence on state aid persists, particularly from commentators opposed to the islands' continued status as a French territory.(348) It is true that the level of aid per capita in New Caledonia is among the highest in the insular South Pacific.(349) But compared to the rest of the DOM-TOM, the New Caledonian level of economic self-sufficiency is high. Thanks to the presence of its mining industry, and despite its drawbacks, New Caledonia is financially the most self-reliant part of the DOM-TOM.(350) New Caledonian economic difficulties are far from being as pronounced as those of Réunion, with unemployment affecting 40% of its workforce in 1992,(351) and exports in real terms which covered 8.8% of the value of imports in 1990.(352) Although by metropolitan French standards, New Caledonia was not particularly self-reliant, compared to the rest of the DOM-TOM it had attained an enviable level of self-sufficiency and economic growth.

Using New Caledonian GDP in 1974 as a base value of 100%, annual territorial production increased from 93% in 1981 to 146% in 1988.(353) But the economic structure of the territory has not been fundamentally altered. The dominant role in the territorial economy of mining and the tertiary sector has been largely unaffected by French government policy since 1981. The financial contributions of nickel mining and civil service salaries will continue to play a determining role in local economic well-being until long after the Matignon Accords reach a conclusion. Metallurgy and mining comprised 23.07% of territorial GDP in 1988, a climb from its level of 15.93% in 1980, reflecting a general climb in international nickel prices since the late 1970s.(354) The plethora of legislation implemented in New Caledonia, and the introduction of the Matignon Accords, have encouraged the continued presence of a proportionately large number of state and territorial civil servants. Administration accounted for 22.51% of GDP in 1980, and increased slightly to 23.99% of GDP by 1988.(355) The proportionally marginal status of agricultural production remained a constant during the 1980s, in spite of various government attempts to revive local agricultural production. In 1980, agricultural production totalled 2.99% of GDP; this figure had declined to 1.59% of GDP by 1988.(356) State development efforts in the 1980s to encourage commercial agricultural production by Melanesians did not result in a surge in activity. Coffee cultivation, the domain of Melanesian tribes, accounted for approximately 2% of total territorial agricultural production in 1990.(357) Most tribal agriculture consisted of subsistence cultivation, concerning which statistics were not recorded. In 1990, 78% of commercial agricultural production in the territory came from the South Province, 21% from the North, and 0.5% from the Loyalties.(358) These proportions reflected the financial importance of meat and vegetable production, fields of largely European and Asian activity along the west coast of the Grande Terre.

While sector growth predicted in tourism by the Eighth Plan for the DOM-TOM did occur, progress has been erratic. After a marked decline in the mid-1980s, the total number of visitors to New Caledonia in 1990 was 8.6% higher than ten years before. (Table 8) Total visitors fell from 85,213 in 1990 to 80,930 in 1991.(359) This trend continued into 1992, the result of high accommodation and living expenses in New Caledonia, accentuated by a decline in the values of the Australian and New Zealand dollars compared with the French Pacific Franc.(360) In spite of this downturn, tourism should continue to expand as Japanese arrivals increased during the 1980s.(361) The yen has been more stable than the Australian and New Zealand dollars, and as Japanese tourists tend to have higher incomes than their Australian and New Zealand counterparts, local prices are not perceived by Japanese as being so high.

Fisheries, the other area of great potential mentioned by the Eighth Plan, expanded too, although not as far as had been expected, and in a direction with unencouraging implications for local enterprise. Two local European attempts at developing industrial-based fishing companies collapsed in the mid-1980s following inadequate catches.(362) Three Melanesian companies which established small-scale commercial operations in the early 1980s also collapsed.(363) Coastal fishing by locals is predominantly for New Caledonian consumption. Most commercial European fishermen are based in Nouméa and supply the local market, while the majority of Melanesian fisherman do so on an artisanal basis, serving tribal needs.(364) Deep sea fishing is the domain of foreign trawlers which pay fishing levies to the territory. This practice began in territorial waters in February 1978. By 1991, 52 Japanese vessels were authorised to fish in the New Caledonian EEZ. In exchange for a maximum annual combined catch of 2,225t, they paid 36MF CFP.(365) In March 1991, the first Franco-US fishing accord was concluded, allowing 14 American ships to fish simultaneously, at a total cost of 18MF CFP in access rights, and a license payment of 750,000F CFP per vessel.(366) While providing returns, these arrangements are indicative of the limits of local fishing enterprise. In the field of aquaculture, specifically prawn production, local initiatives have fared better. Aquaculture in New Caledonia progressed beyond the experimental stage, and by the 1990s had become an area of increasing export activity.(367) As with tourism, the expansion of commercial activity in New Caledonian waters should continue, but will be slow due to the small scale of local operations.

Although informed assessment of the end result of the Matignon Accords will retain elements of speculation until after 1998, some analysis of their development achievements can nonetheless be made. The extent to which the consensual solution offered by the Matignon Accords meets the sometimes conflicting demands of indigenous Melanesians is a major issue. Dijoud's recognition of Melanesian concerns in formulating policy, considered innovative in the late 1970s, has since been recognised as an essential element for productive change under the Matignon Accords. Under the Socialists from 1981 to 1986, recognition of Kanak specificity was introduced into government policy, only to be discarded under Chirac, then reintroduced by Rocard. Political divisions in Paris and in Nouméa stalled the implementation of durable Giscardian, Socialist and Gaullist administrative reforms. Attention below is devoted to considering socio-economic reform achievements under the Matignon Accords and their consequences for Melanesian and Kanak identity, before postulating where these efforts might lead.

Tensions accompanying the Matignon Accords hinge on the extent to which development is to be accompanied by Melanesian integration into the economic, social and cultural values of New Caledonia's immigrant population. The difficulty resides in ascertaining exactly what Melanesian values are. The New Caledonian population of over 73,000 Melanesians in 1989 (Table 18) were not the homogeneous Kanak people they have been portrayed as being by the FLNKS.(368) The status of the FLNKS as the privileged mouthpiece of Kanak interests under the Matignon Accords tends to act detrimentally to the interests of those Melanesians who do not share the goals of the Front. Divisions between Kanaks under the Matignon Accords, mentioned in the preceding section and detailed further below, highlight the pluralistic nature of the indigenous population. Such divisions have been skimmed over in the only academic work published by 1993 on the implications of the Matignon Accords for indigenous Melanesian development. Published in 1993, Isabelle Leblic's Les Kanak face au développement. La voie étroite makes a cardinal analytic error in assuming that the word 'Kanak' is synonymous with 'Melanesian'. Although her training as an ethnologist, and her extensive field work in New Caledonia from 1983 might have led her to conclude otherwise, her work habitually makes reference to "Kanak society", as a single entity, when no such homogeneity exists. The linguistic and tribal divisions among Melanesians in New Caledonia contradict such an assumption, as do political divisions among Kanaks, and the existence of loyalist Melanesians who do not consider themselves to be Kanak.

Furthermore, Leblic tacitly considers the FLNKS to be the sole arbiter of the future of the Kanak people. After lengthy description of traditional Melanesian values, she turns to the indigenous response to development issues, although she does so solely through the policies of the FI and the FLNKS.(369) This approach is selective, and discounts minority currents of Melanesian opposition to the FLNKS. The recognition under the Matignon Accords of the FLNKS as a privileged partner in ongoing development in New Caledonia has been seen by some custom authorities as posing a threat to their established privileges in the tribal milieu. Kanak party authority, while sometimes coinciding with custom authority, as in the case of Naisseline, who is both a high chief on Maré and the leader of LKS, represents an inherent challenge to the authority of tribal chiefs. Kanak nationalism assumes a subordination of the tribe, the central unit in traditional Melanesian society, to the greater interests of a Kanak Republic. As Burck, the UC President, pointed out at a UC meeting at Nakéty on 23 January 1993"Independence is not a régime of feudal castes and hereditary kingdoms".(370) Ironically, this subordination of parochial interests to national unity follows a French Republican model, not a Melanesian one.

The development priorities of the FLNKS under the Matignon Accords have at times clashed with custom authority. A notable case occurred on Lifou. Early in 1991 the FLNKS Mayor of Lifou, Cono Hamu, leased land from a clan for port construction at Wé. Another clan contested ownership of the land and embarked on a campaign against Hamu with the support of two of Lifou's three great chiefs. Roadblocks went up, and houses were burnt down. Hamu was declared persona non grata on Wetr and Löessi tribal domains and he was hospitalised in 1991 after being assaulted.(371) The dispute flared again at the end of November 1992, when Wetr and Löessi chiefs occupied the Wé town hall in protest at ongoing port construction.(372) In January 1993 Richard Kaloi, then FLNKS President of the Loyalty Islands, referred to the incident obliquely in calling for an end to local divisions and squabbling. His response, in line with FLNKS adherence to the Matignon Accords, was an appeal for unity and dialogue.(373) Disunity showed no immediate evidence of dissipating. The following month Hamu resigned from his post in the face of tribal opposition and attempted to reassert his authority through re-election. A municipal by-election, which had the distinction of being the first in New Caledonia to be contested by a custom candidate, Macate Wénéwa, allowed Hamu to re-establish his electoral legitimacy, although without silencing his critics.(374)

Kaloi held that Kanak development lay through the mixing of custom and European modernity,(375) but as the Lifou dispute demonstrated, this was not necessarily a comfortable mix. Melanesian custom chiefs justifiably see FLNKS cooperation with the French State under the Matignon Accords as furthering Melanesian integration into French society. Under the Matignon Accords, the FLNKS has reaccepted the principles of French electoral democracy which it once rejected.(376) Along with its re-entry into French democratic mechanisms, FLNKS acceptance of the Matignon Accords involved an acceptance of French state development methods and funding. These administrative orientations have led the North and the Loyalty Provinces to promote capitalism and entrepreneurial activities. If Kanaks are to conform to European economic models, which the North and the Loyalties have accepted to some extent, they have a great deal of catching up ahead before approaching the level of economic development in the South Province. The South has numerous advantages in possessing Nouméa, the only large town, and largest port, as well as Tontouta international airport, the Doniambo nickel smelter, the Yaté hydroelectric dam, and the largest pool of skilled labour.

However some effort has been exerted to close the gap. Kanak integration into the European economy has led to provincial investments in enterprises once the domain of European owners. The state-assisted purchase by the North Province in April 1990, of the SMSP, Jacques Lafleur's mining company at Ouaco, is the most prominent symbol of this trend. The SMSP purchase, criticised in some quarters as being a very profitable deal for Lafleur and possibly a bad investment for the North Province,(377) marked the entry of major Kanak investment in mining. This entry was made by means of a company established under the public authority of the North Province. At Canala, a local private initiative by Kanaks led to the reopening of a nickel mine and to the establishment of the Kanak Mining Company. Employing 60 Melanesians, this company began exporting nickel to Japan in 1993.(378) The importance of mining in the territory has prompted Kanak leaders to participate in a market where the potential for profit can be great, as can the potential for commercial failure, depending on international commodity prices.

Kanak commercial interests have also spread into tourism. Fourteen hotels with a total of 197 rooms have been established in the North Province under the Matignon Accords, including a branch of Club Med at Hienghène, which opened in 1992.(379) Club Med set up on Ouvéa too, one of 11 hotel projects begun in the Loyalty Islands in an attempt to increase the provincial share of New Caledonian tourism profits.(380) But Nouméa has kept its majority share of the tourist market in New Caledonia due to its existing large network of accommodation, and to 665 additional rooms planned for the construction of the Doh Sheraton Hotel and the Pointe Mangin Hotel.(381) The North Province, realising that Nouméa is the most profitable area of New Caledonian tourism, purchased in November 1992 a majority interest in the Nouméan Casino Royale, the Hotel Ibis and the Surf Novotel. Surf Novotel was the largest hotel in New Caledonia at the time of its construction in 1987, and the Casino Royale was likewise a prestigious investment.(382)

Large-scale Kanak investment in mining and high-prestige tourism operations followed well-established patterns of French commercial initiative. Micro-scale investment at tribal level has no such precedent and is more problematic.(383) Whether the implementation of the Matignon Accords can effect positive change at tribal level to the satisfaction of traditional values is uncertain. Rural Melanesians now have better access to roads, schools, hospitals, electricity and running water thanks to public works projects financed under the Accords, although questions surround the future status of these people. The major issue is the extent to which the tribal milieu should become westernised in order to conform to French development models.

A lack of employment opportunities persists, with a 36% unemployment rate in the Loyalty Islands in 1989, and a 21% rate in the North.(384) This situation was presented by the New Caledonian High Commission as a pressing challenge which needed to be addressed.(385) However whether Melanesians living in tribes really count as unemployed depends on one's cultural values. Those not in full-time paid employment contribute to tribal subsistence economies. Is it preferable that these societies should be further eroded by Western values of individual achievement, private ownership and profit? Conversely, should New Caledonia's tribal population experience a materially impoverished existence while the local urbanised population enjoys a modern, consumer lifestyle? These questions are not merely rhetorical, but pose issues with which all New Caledonian Melanesians, Kanak or not, must grapple.

Judged either by custom values or by European economic values, unemployment may or may not be a problem. Traditionally, members of Melanesian tribes have lived outside the cash economy, on subsistence agriculture, mixed with some paid seasonal employment at most. Tribal reliance on paid employment has been increasing since the 1940s, a trend which has shown no sign of abating under the Matignon Accords. As European economic values spread in the tribal milieu, with their emphasis on personal achievement, ownership and profit, as opposed to the communal orientation of the tribe, the authority of traditional structures has been undermined. Traditional Melanesian economic values, centred on tribal subsistence and collective ownership, with barter as the basis for exchange, have been correctly gauged by the FLNKS as not offering a strong financial basis on which to build Kanak independence. By promoting increased Melanesian integration into the New Caledonian cash economy, the FLNKS has contributed to weakening custom authority.

Land issues are symptomatic of differing cultural perceptions between Kanak administrators and tribal elders, as has been seen in the case of the dispute at Wé, on Lifou. As well there exist between Kanak tribal elders and the French State differing perceptions of land reform. The Matignon Accords have increased Melanesian land ownership. Land distribution since 1988 has been beneficial to individual Melanesians, and has benefited tribal landowners to a greater extent. Between 1989 and 1991, land redistributed to Melanesian tribes amounted to 48,417.8ha, while individual Melanesians received 38,833.9ha. Redistribution to non-indigenous inhabitants included 9,986.9ha to Europeans, 993.2ha to Wallisians, and 279.4ha to communes.(386) Nonetheless, dissatisfaction persists in this controversial area. Paul Néaoutyine, as FLNKS President, berated the ADRAF for perceived slowness in redistributing land,(387) although there were reasons for this in many instances. Inter-tribal disputes over land ownership have been described by Bruno Arbouet, an ADRAF director, as an intractable problem.(388) Arbouet declared that the state approach to land reform, which viewed land as an agricultural commodity, remained out of tune with the tribal perception of land as a source of prestige, which mere ownership rendered valuable.(289) The French State prefers that private and public land be ceded to Melanesians for cash cropping. This view is at odds with the tribal perception of land as a source of clan prestige regardless of that land's state of cultivation. Herein lies a major barrier to the spread of commercial agriculture and the lessening of territorial dependence on imported food. The FLNKS ambiguously straddles the two positions. While its member parties have habitually characterised the restitution of alienated land to Melanesian clans as paramount,(390) the Front's pursuit of Kanak economic development through the adoption of European commercial values implies that restituted land should not be allowed to lie fallow but should be cultivated for cash cropping.

The wave of construction undertaken in the North and the Loyalties from 1989 until the early 1990s - roads, schools, hospitals, hotels, telecommunications, electrification, port facilities - has encouraged improved integration with, and also increased reliance on, the South Province. The shortage of trained locals capable of contributing in these areas has caused these two provinces to become more reliant on metropolitan French and Nouméan expertise. Néaoutyine commented ruefully on how the bulk of rural construction work is completed by Nouméan firms, as nearly all the available contractors are based there.(391) The development funds paid to these firms are transferred to the South rather than circulating in the rural economy.

The lack of skilled labour in the North and the Loyalties stems from the low success rate of indigenous Melanesians in the French education system. Disproportionately few Melanesians attain levels of higher education compared to other ethnic groups in New Caledonia. By 1989, a mere 0.5% of indigenous Melanesians had obtained tertiary level education, compared with 10.8% of the local European population, which in itself constitutes a very low figure by metropolitan French standards.(392) At that time, indigenous Melanesians represented almost 45% of the New Caledonian population, while Europeans represented just under 34%. (Table 18) The Matignon Accords aim to counteract this inequality through increased funding for all levels of education, and by offering Kanaks greater access to higher education. FLNKS leaders are well aware of this problem and have allocated large portions of their provincial budgets to education.(393) A major project set up by the Accords was the 400 managers programme, designed to permit young New Caledonians to receive professional training in metropolitan France. From 1989 to 1991, 75.4% of the young people on this programme were Melanesian.(394) By 1998, a total of 400 young people will have been trained under the scheme, but this will mark only the first major step toward integrating Melanesians into management positions. In 1992, Melanesians were under-represented in the upper echelons of the territorial and state public service. There were five Melanesians out of 62 functionaries in the A or highest salary category, 12 out of 125 in category B, and 30 out of 244 in category C.(395) The FLNKS has backed the scheme for helping to create the management skills Kanaks will need to further their autonomy. The Melanesians among the 400 managers, who are intended to play a prominent part in territorial development, are being taught French values, skills and techniques. It is uncertain how successful or how willing will they be to integrate tribal values into their careers.

Young Melanesians are being inculcated with French values through the state education system, after unilateral attempts by the FLNKS at formal education have foundered. From February 1985 the FLNKS reacted against the French socialisation of Melanesian youth by setting up independent Kanak Popular Schools. This was to be a territorial network which would teach traditional culture, thus allowing Kanak youth a greater understanding of its heritage. For lack of funds and trained personnel, the schools declined in number to just five by 1992,(396) leaving most Kanak children reliant on the French education system.

Within that system, recognition of Melanesian culture has been belated and marginal. Four of New Caledonia's 27 Melanesian languages were offered as subjects for the baccalaureate in 1992, although there was a shortage of professional teachers fluent enough to teach and examine these languages.(397) The Matignon Accords have permitted the Provinces to assume some control of primary education, allowing the North and the Loyalties to promote the use of local languages in primary school curricula, but from secondary level French remains the main language of instruction. In education, as in administration, law, medicine and other fields of professional endeavour, Kanak social advancement under the Matignon Accords lies through the acceptance and mastery of European systems.

In spite of the assertion by Emmanuelli in 1982 that the French Republican ideal of integration belonged to another era,(398) the concept has shown unexpected resilience in becoming an integral part of the Matignon Accords' development programme. Although Socialist Ministers would have been reluctant to admit the point, vocational training efforts since 1988 harked back to another era in teaching young Melanesians French administrative, technical and commercial values far removed from those of their tribal societies.

The language of instruction for the 400 managers is, of course, French. The role of Melanesian languages will undoubtedly remain marginal outside the tribal milieu in years to come, as it has always been. Within the French national education system as a whole, Melanesians will always play a marginal role, due to their lack of numbers. Although efforts are being made to alter national curricula in the territory to account for tribal languages, particularly at primary level, most of the education of young Kanaks will not be much removed from that of their counterparts in metropolitan France. Studying in what is effectively a foreign educational setting has been an historical disadvantage for Melanesians that has yet to be turned around.

Over two centuries of contact with Europeans have caused lasting modifications to traditional Melanesian society in New Caledonia. The European presence forcibly made the tribal milieu aware of broader horizons. The spread of the French language and the acceptance of Christianity there represented two major cultural changes which took place at the same time as Melanesian economic marginalisation caused by French expropriation of tribal domains. The French presence served to broaden the cultural awareness of Melanesians. The introduction of French language coupled with Christianity in the tribal milieu from the nineteenth century assisted the greater consciousness of territorial Melanesian identity. These two European elements provided the starting point for Kanak nationalism by providing a means of intertribal communication and common philosophical ground. Paradoxically, French Republicanism also played an important role in providing other philosophical elements and political tools basic to Kanak nationalism.

In spite of inaccurate and politically motivated conservative French claims that Kanak nationalism was the product of FLNKS contacts with, variously, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, Soviet, Cuban, Vietnamese, North Korean or Libyan activists, the influences of French nationalism and the French Left have had far greater bearing. The majority of indigenous Melanesians first learnt the concepts of 'nation' and 'patrie' in French schools, not from the writings of Marx, Mao, Lenin or Castro.(399) The first New Caledonian political group which promoted Kanak identity, the Foulards Rouges, was the creation in 1969 of the first young Kanaks to receive tertiary education in metropolitan France. While there, they assimilated the philosophical currents of the French Left in the 1960s, notably its preoccupation with Third World liberation movements, and applied them to their own context.(400) The extent to which French political culture has penetrated Kanak nationalist parties is fundamental but tends to be overlooked. The FLNKS reflects the French political milieu in which it exists in having a president, with an executive and all the other structural paraphernalia of European political parties. Congrès Populaire was formed in reaction to this orientation, although it has not been able to transcend the entrenched use of various European political practices by Kanaks.

The confrontation for primacy in New Caledonia between two distinct identities, those of French nationalism and of nascent Kanak nationalism, has been an unequal contest. French nationalism has retained its ascendancy in the territory, and will continue to do so in the near future thanks to the lasting and dominant implantation of French Republican institutions. The preponderant influence of the French State in territorial administration, law, education and language, the strength of state finance, as well as European dominance over the New Caledonian cash economy, have long left Melanesians marginalised in their own homelands. This situation was not fundamentally challenged by the Matignon Accords. The inevitable paradox of the Accords is that while one of their targets is to improve the social, political and economic participation of the Melanesian minority in the implanted French society in New Caledonia, this participation is largely, perhaps inevitably, determined and limited by French criteria. As critics in the LKS and the FULK have pointed out, by cooperating with the French State, the FLNKS has surrendered control over its claim to independence. As has been demonstrated however, at no point since its foundation had the Front been in a position to attain Kanak sovereignty unilaterally.

Mitterrand at no time conceded the FLNKS proposition that Kanak identity had moral primacy in New Caledonia. In any case, by signing the Matignon Accords, the Front to a degree abandoned this claim by cooperating with the RPCR. Mitterrand reaffirmed in his election platform of 1988 the position that the French Republic stood as the ultimate arbiter of the destiny of New Caledonia and that Republican law served in the best interests of Kanaks:

But I do not believe that the historical anteriority of the Kanaks on this land is sufficient to establish a right. [...] The stymied right of the Kanaks will only be revived and restored by internal peace and the guarantor of this peace and of those rights can only be the French Republic. There is no other arbiter. In this I am not enouncing a principle, I am observing a fact and this fact determines the fate of all.(401)

These observations hint at the ultimate limitation of the Socialists from 1991 to 1994; like more conservative French political parties, while in government they were bound to uphold Republican law. Reforms implemented by Socialist Governments had been intended to improve the lot of Kanaks, but constitutional considerations precluded acting against the sovereignty of the Fifth Republic over the islands by promoting Kanak nationalism, let alone by engineering the secession of New Caledonia from France. Under such conditions, the prevailing bias in New Caledonia could not avoid being in favour of French priorities, however sympathetic Socialist representatives such as Pisani and Rocard might have been to Kanaks.

As the FLNKS itself stated in a petition to the UN in 1991"the Matignon Accords do not open a clear path to independence and three years after the signing of the agreement what can be seen are only small signs of the things that would enable viable economic, social and cultural conditions for a viable independence".(402) The potential remains for the FLNKS to protest violently against the territorial status quo should Kanaks not receive satisfaction from future governments in Paris. Such protest, as in the past, would ultimately be an unproductive method of gaining sovereignty in the absence of majority territorial backing for independence. Conversely a majority vote against independence in the self-determination referendum scheduled for 1998 may lead Kanak leaders to accept further development funding from the French State. This cooperation might either be the prelude to a patient wait by Kanak politicians for a conjunction of political, electoral and demographic conditions likely to allow a successful push for independence, or might mark the beginning of a definitive Melanesian cultural, political and economic integration into the Fifth Republic.

Notes

1. In order to protect against unscrupulous operators, no notes, bibliography or other references are provided in this Web publication. Readers wanting a specific reference may contact me at wsmccall@maxnet.co.nz.

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