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French South Pacific Policy 1981-1996

 

 

by Dr W. S. McCallum © 1996

 

 

8. French Regional Aid and Cooperation

 

  

In 1987 Rabuka staged his illegal coup in the name of indigenous rights. But where is his concern now at the plight of our brothers and sisters in Kanaky and French Polynesia?

The silence is deafening because he has been bought off by the Pacific's most hated colonial regime, the French.

Timoci Bavadra, deposed Prime Minister of Fiji, September 1989.[i]

 

It's a sort of obsession, people saying that France is paying off Fiji, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa - it's absurd.

Philippe Baude, French Permanent Secretary to the South Pacific, July 1989.[ii]

 

 

Cheque-book Diplomacy?

 

During the 1980s aid and cooperation were aspects of the French role in the South Pacific which were neglected in analysis made both by French and foreign commentators. This situation remained unchanged in the 1990s. Outside administrative circles, little attention has been dedicated to the patient efforts of French diplomats and aid workers in the Pacific Islands.[iii] The exception to the rule was provided by Flosse during his time as Secretary of State to the South Pacific. His rapid interventions in May 1986 and in January 1987 with cyclone relief assistance to the Solomon Islands and to the Cook Islands, as well as his negotiation of development aid to the nascent Republic of Fiji in 1987, held significant domestic political implications for the countries involved. Aid initiatives by Flosse also prompted some conjecture in Wellington and Canberra over French motives. Otherwise more dramatic events usually preoccupied and conditioned regional scrutiny of France's South Pacific presence. An examination of the bibliography will reveal a plethora of publications devoted to the controversial questions of Kanak nationalism and French nuclear testing, and very little in relation to French foreign aid, either from a South Pacific or from a French perspective.

 

For those interested in French foreign aid efforts in the South Pacific since the 1980s, there exists very little source material to work on. The author's researches failed to reveal a single published book or article solely devoted to the topic, although doubtless some pertinent classified reports reside in ministerial files in Paris yet to be opened to public access. This deficiency has only inadequately been compensated for by resort to regional press coverage, resulting in an admittedly incomplete, and statistically patchy, overview. The inadequacy of available material stands in poor contrast to the French literature available on the aid and cooperation of the Fifth Republic in other regions of the world. For example, many reports, books and articles have been published on French aid and cooperation to Sub-Saharan Africa. It is most likely that these differing levels of coverage stem from the recentness and small scale of French aid operations in the South Pacific when viewed by African or Asian standards. France has most of its aid workers and development projects deployed in Africa, a circumstance which reflects the higher level of French economic, cultural and military interest in that continent than in the micro-states of the South Pacific.

 

When the matter of French foreign aid in the South Pacific was raised in the member nations of the South Pacific Forum during the 1980s, it was usually introduced in a partisan manner with reference to heated, political disputes. The first epigraph on French aid to Fiji by the former Prime Minister of Fiji, Timoci Bavadra, furnishes a vivid example of this tendency. Bavadra employs Rabuka's acceptance of French aid as a rhetorical bludgeon with which to swipe at the claim of his opponents to legitimacy. Bavadra was highly critical of French aid to Fiji after the coups of 1987. He portrayed such assistance as a "bribe", which Paris was employing to buy the silence of the Fijian Republic on the questions of Kanak nationalism and nuclear testing at Moruroa.[iv] His speculation made extensive reference to a concept colloquially termed 'cheque-book diplomacy' the dispensation of aid by a power to influence the foreign or domestic policy of recipient nations. In response to such uncomplimentary comments, Rocard cancelled a meeting with Bavadra which had been organised as part of his stop in Suva on 23 August 1989.[v]

 

As the second epigraph by Baude demonstrates, such allegations were emphatically rejected by French representatives. Henri Jacolin, the French Ambassador to Fiji from 1990 to 1993, likewise rejected the assertion that Paris was attempting through the distribution of aid to buy off the Fijian Government, or indeed any other in the South Pacific.[vi] The official French position on aid was that it came without strings attached, and reflected France's willingness to pursue its goal of regional integration. As Pons indicated to the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly in May 1986:

 

France intends [...] to develop a policy of friendship and cooperation completely without any ulterior motives with the Polynesian and Melanesian world, as well as with the Anglo-Saxon countries in the region. Insofar as France is concerned, it contests neither the institutions nor the domestic or foreign policy orientations of any of its Pacific neighbours.[vii]

 

There is reason to doubt the validity of Bavadra's dismissive characterisation of the motives for French aid. Contrary to the image he projected, such assistance to the Fijian Republic did not buy the silence of its leaders on events in New Caledonia and French nuclear testing. It was Mara, then Prime Minister of Fiji, who in July 1991 announced the South Pacific Forum's declaration of support for the FLNKS goal of sovereignty, and its backing for the intention of the Front to persuade non-Kanaks to vote for independence in the referendum of 1998.[viii] In June 1989 Ms Taufa Vakatale, the Fijian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, declared that Fiji intended to continue stating its opposition to French nuclear testing regardless of the level of French aid to his government.[ix] Fijian opposition to French testing, which had not progressed beyond statements of opposition in the early 1980s, was maintained after the coups of 1987,[x] when Suva began receiving larger amounts of French aid.

 

Whereas in the case of French aid to Fiji there was no clear evidence to suggest that France either attempted to, or succeeded in, influencing Fijian policy, it is unnecessary to assume that the distribution of French aid, to Fiji or to any other nation, was totally disinterested. As was the case with other regional powers such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States, aid was employed by France as a method of promoting national foreign policy interests. French aid to Vanuatu in particular was subject to political considerations. In 1981 and again in 1987, when faced with confrontation from Lini's VP Government that led to the expulsion of the French Ambassador, Paris did not hesitate to use the reduction of aid to force a reconsideration of attitudes in Port Vila. However the actions of Vanuatu left France with little alternative but to react, and these signs of deterioration in bilateral relations were counterproductive to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation pursued by France.

 

Island nations, for their part, had their own interests which should not be overlooked when considering French regional aid. Since 1988, Vanuatu has made concerted efforts to rebuild its relationship with France, in spite of past differences, as French finance is essential to the economic development of the archipelago. Island micro-states, confronted with the physical limitations of marginal resource bases, and slender financial means for their development, have usually been reluctant to reject French aid in the name of political principles, such as support for New Caledonian decolonisation, or opposition to nuclear testing. The mainly receptive attitude of South Pacific nations to French aid and cooperation marked the limit of their opposition to the French regional presence. A misconception which persists, heedless of this receptiveness, is that South Pacific Forum members have refused to build substantial links with Paris due to differences over matters such as nuclear testing. In 1992, Keith Suter, President of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, wrote:

 

France has been a military power in the South Pacific, but not a South Pacific nation. Its nuclear testing has alienated too many nations for it to develop close ties. If the testing were to stop permanently [...] it has an opportunity to develop closer ties with the surrounding nations. It could use its foreign aid, education and cultural programmes to create a fresh set of relations.[xi]

 

The bulk of this chapter demonstrates that France in the 1980s and early 1990s was not as alienated from South Pacific nations as was frequently believed. French financial, agricultural, scientific, educational, and military aid was offered to, and accepted by, island states during this period. The misconception that the members of the South Pacific Forum were implacably opposed to France in the 1980s is belied by the fact that since 1981, well before the advent of improved multilateral relations due to the implementation of the Matignon Accords in 1988 and the suspension of nuclear testing at Moruroa in 1992, Paris diversified and expanded its aid and cooperation with Forum members. This chapter examines the particular forms this activity took, its international and domestic implications, and its part in the broader French policy of regional dialogue and integration.[xii]

 

The aid referred to throughout this chapter is French external aid. French subsidies to the Pacific TOM have been considered by some South Pacific analysts to fall under the same definition. For the purposes of this work, official French criteria are applied. French ministerial thinking treats aid to the DOM-TOM as domestic funding.[xiii] This chapter concentrates on French bilateral aid to South Pacific nations. French government policy has greater direct influence over the distribution of bilateral aid than over French aid channelled through multilateral agencies such as the South Pacific Commission, or the EC. Private French aid distributed to the region by non-governmental agencies is disregarded. In the absence of available data, a detailed statistical analysis of the various aid initiatives undertaken by France, and the effectiveness of these projects in promoting development, is not offered in this chapter. Such an examination is properly the concern of a specialist in the field of development. Rather, the intention below is to ascertain the political consequences of French aid and cooperation in the South Pacific since 1981 to assess the extent to which efforts in this field contributed to, or hindered, the French goal of regional integration.

 

A Question of Scale

 

The level of French aid in the South Pacific was one of various aspects of the Fifth Republic's presence in the region which was described by the Pacific boosters of the Institut du Pacifique as inadequate. In 1983, the foundation's book Le Pacifique, nouveau centre du monde called for increased French aid and cooperation in the region in order to promote national interests.[xiv] It was argued that more funding, more personnel and the opening of new facilities would enable greater French participation in the Pacific, and would increase the prestige and influence of the Republic. Similar arguments have been applied more specifically to the South Pacific by Georges Ordonnaud, one of the founders of the Institut du Pacifique:

 

[...] through lack of foresight, arrogance or lack of imagination, France has not  in the past been in a position to give aid to these small States (Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the Cooks, Kiribati, Tuvalu, etc.), bilateral aid in the form of grants which would be significant for these countries, but extremely small in relation to our overall development funds. This would enable us to make friends and better justify our nuclear tests.[xv]

 

The members of the Institut du Pacifique had unrealistic expectations. Considering that most of the island states of the South Pacific mentioned by Ordonnaud had received independence in the 1970s, were insignificant actors in global politics, retained ties with Britain, Australia and New Zealand rather than with France, and were of marginal interest for French foreign policy, it should not be considered unnatural that France had no close bilateral aid relations with them. Moreover Ordonnaud neglected to do justice to French efforts in Vanuatu, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, where the establishment of resident ambassadorial posts in 1980 demonstrated that Paris was not unaware of the role bilateral aid could play in its South Pacific diplomacy.

 

It is nonetheless reasonable to assert that the South Pacific played a marginal part in French global development programmes. In 1984, the French Foreign Ministry admitted that aid to Asia and the Pacific was of a modest nature, before pointing out that this was largely because of the comparatively recent establishment of aid operations there.[xvi] Paris had turned its back on South-East Asia after the collapse of French Indo-China in the 1950s and only once more began taking an active interest in the region from the 1970s. The Fifth Republic had maintained a presence in the Pacific through the three TOM there and until 1980 the condominium with Britain over the New Hebrides. Nevertheless, prior to British decolonisation in the 1970s there had been no great need, or indeed possibility, for Paris to develop direct relations with the island possessions of its historical rival. Such a development might have been counteractive to good relations in any case as it could have been misinterpreted in London as an attempt to promote French influence at British expense.

 

During the 1980s, French development aid was concentrated in Africa. In 1984, 68% of French state development and cooperation funding was deployed in Africa.[xvii] French aid funding for "The Rest of Asia and Oceania", a polyglot area consisting of certain Asian nations that formed minor areas of French aid distribution and appended states of the South Pacific, amounted to 9.9% of total French aid in 1981, 8.0% in 1982, 11.0% in 1983, and 9.3% in 1984.[xviii] The number of aid workers deployed in the Pacific confirmed the modest nature of French development operations there in relation to its global efforts. In 1984 there were three French aid workers in Fiji, two in Papua New Guinea, one in Western Samoa, two in Tonga and 76 in Vanuatu. The total number of French aid workers in the region was 84 from a global figure of 15,711 (0.5%). In 1985 there were four aid workers in Fiji, one in Papua New Guinea, one in Western Samoa, one in Tonga, and 59 in Vanuatu; amounting to 66 personnel among 13,549 (0.49%).[xix]

 

At the beginning of the 1980s, the level of French financial aid to its various South Pacific recipients was negligible to their economies in all cases except that of Vanuatu. In 1980, Vanuatu received 41.95% of its foreign aid from France,[xx] a reflection of the historical links between the two countries and French preparedness to maintain a major presence after independence. The recipient of the next largest amount of French aid was Papua New Guinea, although this sum amounted to 0.1% of its total foreign aid received that year.[xxi] Following were Tonga, for which French aid constituted 0.5% of its foreign aid,[xxii] and Western Samoa (0.4%).[xxiii] French regional projects that transcended national boundaries accounted for 2.5% of total foreign aid of a similar nature in the region.[xxiv] Total French foreign aid in 1980 amounted to approximately 99.76MFF.[xxv]

 

By 1986, French aid distribution in the South Pacific remained similarly orientated, with Vanuatu again as the largest single recipient. That year France dispensed 78MFF to Vanuatu, 5.4MFF in total to Fiji, Tonga and Nauru, 2.3MFF to Papua New Guinea, and 0.9MFF to Western Samoa. Including technical and scientific cooperation with the two developed countries of the South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, which was worth 14MFF and 2.3MFF respectively, the total bilateral French aid and cooperation budget amounted to 102.9MFF.[xxvi] For 1987, total bilateral aid allocated to the South Pacific was 107.1MFF, and was budgeted at 104.7MFF for 1988.[xxvii] The annual total for French aid to the South Pacific fell slightly at the end of the 1980s. In 1989, France spent approximately 95MFF on regional cooperation.[xxviii]

 

In comparison with the sums spent annually on development assistance to the Pacific TOM during the 1980s, these figures are of a modest nature. These amounts were also modest compared to the level of aid Britain continued to dispense in the South Pacific after its decolonisations there. In 1984, Britain contributed the equivalent of around 313MFF in bilateral aid to its former Pacific island possessions.[xxix] During the 1980s Australia was the largest single donor of bilateral aid to the South Pacific. In 1988 its total bilateral aid to the region amounted to approximately 1,750MFF. In 1989 the Australian regional aid figure was around 1,880MFF.[xxx] New Zealand was the second largest aid contributor in the South Pacific in the 1980s. In 1987 its annual bilateral aid to the region totalled around 260MFF, and had fallen in value to around 220MFF by 1989.[xxxi]

 

Although not the principal concern of this chapter, some passing indication should also be given of French contributions to multilateral aid agencies working in the South Pacific. France was a major contributor to development schemes for the African Caribbean and Pacific states associated with the EC. For the period of the third Lomé Convention, from 1986 to 1990, France contributed 23.57% of the 133M Ecu worth of European aid to the South Pacific.[xxxii] This percentage was equivalent to 33MFF.[xxxiii] Such funding was channelled to Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga, the eight convention members in the region.

 

French aid to the South Pacific Commission in 1988 amounted to 14% of the organisation's core budget, compared with the 33% contribution by Australia, 16% by both New Zealand and the United States, and 12% by Britain. Extrabudgetary funding supplied by France amounted to 14% of the total in 1988, second only to the 16% of the United States.[xxxiv] French funding to the Commission for 1988 for the core budget amounted to 3.59MFF, while extra-budgetary funding was 4.13MFF. Total French funding to the South Pacific Commission that year reached 7.72MFF.[xxxv] French participation in the Lomé Convention began with its creation in 1975. The French role in the South Pacific Commission dated back to its foundation in 1947, further evidence that although this was not bilateral aid, France had not been as neglectful of aid to the zone prior to the 1980s as members of the Institut du Pacifique might suggest.

 

In February 1991 France opened a new avenue for its aid to multilateral development projects when it agreed to provide funding for the South Pacific Forum. This participation constituted a major sign of the degree to which relations between Paris and the Forum had improved since the middle of the 1980s. The traditional view in Paris was that French funding for multilateral development in the South Pacific should be distributed mainly by the body specifically established for that task the South Pacific Commission. The Forum had been an unlikely candidate for French development funding because of its traditional ambivalence to France, and because neither France nor its Pacific TOM were members and in the TOMs' case had been refused membership. By 1991, mutual differences between Forum members and Paris had been shelved. The Forum Secretariat was prepared to receive direct assistance from a power its members had characterised as a destabilising, reactionary presence in the South Pacific. Paris on the other hand was prepared to fund a body which had been formed in 1971 as a platform from which to attack French nuclear policy, and which had developed during the 1980s into the main critic of French sovereignty over the Pacific TOM. By November 1993, France had contributed a total of $F408,000 to Forum aid projects.[xxxvi] The funding was distributed by the Forum Secretariat to regional trade promotion, technical assistance, training schemes, and energy projects in member countries. Paris would argue that this assistance was not counter to its interests as the money was not to going to be used by the Forum for political activism.

 

Until 1996, the French approach to international aid and development was peculiar in that it distinguished between countries which were "du champ" and "hors champ" for the Ministry of Cooperation and Development. Prior to 1996 the field of operations administered by its personnel was centred on Africa, followed by the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. The South Pacific was considered to be outside the domain of the Ministry.[xxxvii] For this reason, until 1 January 1996 the Quai d'Orsay played the dominant role in administering French bilateral aid in the South Pacific, although where specialised advice was needed it necessarily acted in consultation with experts from other Ministries and technical bodies over certain development programmes. From 1 January 1996, a decree made by the Juppé Government came into force which changed that situation. The Ministry of Cooperation extended the scope of its field operations from 37 to 71 countries. Among the new additions were Fiji, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea. Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, and Tonga.[xxxviii] Prior to this reshuffle, the tasks of approaching island governments, organising assistance packages, and financing them, had been performed through the offices of the Foreign Ministry. An exception was the period during which Flosse was Secretary of State to the South Pacific. His mission to improve French relations in the region included provision for arranging development assistance to island states. Flosse had placed at his disposition a special aid and development fund, drawn from the budget of the Quai d'Orsay.[xxxix] This South Pacific Cooperation Fund grew rapidly during his time as Secretary of State. He was allocated 10MFF for 1986, 29MFF for 1987 and 35MFF for 1988.[xl] By 1988, Flosse had also been accorded the command of 50MFF for treasury loans to South Pacific states.[xli] It is unclear just how much of his 1988 budget he disbursed before the end of cohabitation brought about the closure of his Secretariat in June 1988. The channels open to Flosse for the distribution of his development funding were threefold his office in Papeete, and the French Embassies in Wellington and Suva.[xlii] A large part of Flosse's aid funding went through the Suva embassy, which in 1987 spent 7.88MFF on regional development projects. Of this sum, multilateral aid (exchanges between Fiji, Vanuatu and New Caledonia) accounted for 3.77MFF, aid to Fiji 1.31MFF, and aid to Tonga 2.51MFF, while Tuvalu received 0.3MFF.[xliii] The activities of Flosse were seen by French diplomats in the region as intrusive. The need to give what was in effect a roving ambassador discretion to negotiate aid packages to Fiji was superfluous considering that the Quai d'Orsay already had a permanent staff there able to form more lasting contacts with local community and political leaders than Flosse could have made on his flying visits to Suva. Nevertheless, Flosse's travels did have an impact, as is discussed further below.

 

As the figures offered above demonstrate, during the 1980s, overall French regional aid did not radically increase in scale, although its distribution pattern changed, and greater provision was made for loans to regional governments. Globally and regionally, development funding offered by Paris to the South Pacific remained a financially small concern. This fact should not be considered extraordinary given the sizes of the populations and the economies of island states. Appropriate aid to such countries tends to be on a small scale. While for some countries this assistance came to be perceived as increasingly important, certain relativities should be borne in mind. Although on Rarotonga a soft loan of 50MFF from Paris might be regarded as an outstanding example of French munificence, such a figure is small when compared to French development loans to Africa or to Eastern Europe. While still a minor budgetary expenditure for the French State, the political importance of French regional aid increased to some degree during the 1980s, particularly in Fiji and the Cook Islands, where French finance contributed to improved bilateral relations. Conversely, in Vanuatu, the withdrawal of French spending during the 1980s was an indicator of French discontent with the Lini Government.

 

This difference in scale should not be overlooked, although it might have been in Paris. Massive increases were not necessarily advisable for regional aid. Such a change in state spending might have led to detrimental consequences. However unlikely, were France to have flooded the South Pacific with aid funding in the 1980s, transferred say from a portion of its African operations, other regional aid donors such as Australia and New Zealand would have regarded this push as a French intrusion on their zones of interest. Moreover, the harmful economic effects that a sudden large influx of metropolitan French funding could have on an insular economy have already been observed in the case of French Polynesia, where local production has collapsed and a cycle of dependence on metropolitan France has been installed. More was not necessarily better in the case of aid funding to the South Pacific.

 

The remaining sections of this chapter discuss the political role of French aid and cooperation with various island states since 1981. French aid to the South Pacific remains a small, peripheral part of French development activity in the world, but for island states the comparatively small sums involved are desirable for their socio-economic progress, and in certain cases have represented an increasingly important political stake.

 

Overcoming Ambivalence: Aid to the Spearhead Group

 

From 1980 French relations with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were marred by trouble in maintaining normal diplomatic links, and by the animosity of these three Melanesian states toward French nuclear testing and policy in New Caledonia. The expression of attitudes inimical to France from Port Moresby, Port Vila and Honiara was made on the basis of a sentiment of pan-Melanesian solidarity. This solidarity came to find its most unified expression in meetings of Melanesian leaders, held from June 1985,[xliv] which passed judgement on French regional policy independently of the South Pacific Forum. In Port Vila on 14 March 1988, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu formally established what had already become known as the Melanesian Spearhead Group.[xlv] The Group maintained opposition to the French presence as the cornerstone of its policies after the signature of the Matignon Accords in 1988. In June 1991 the FLNKS became a full member, enjoying the same status as the three member countries, at a time when the South Pacific Forum was still insisting that the Front could not attain observer status in the Forum because it did not have governmental status.[xlvi]

 

The Spearhead Group did not represent all Melanesian countries Fiji has remained notably absent from it. Moreover, the Group demonstrated growing disunity in the early 1990s over border clashes near Bougainville between the Solomons and Papua New Guinea. To the extent of its members' traditional animosity with France the body can be considered homogeneous, and may thus be treated as a unified entity in discussion of French regional policy. This section considers how ambivalence and periodic disputes with the Melanesian Spearhead Group members hindered French efforts to further relations through aid and cooperation.

 

As the recipient of the largest portion of French foreign aid to the South Pacific in 1980, compared to other island states, Vanuatu found itself in a privileged relationship with France. Yet less than a year after independence, political differences between Paris and Port Vila suggested that the distinction might not last. Both in the months before and the years since the election of Mitterrand in 1981, the level of French bilateral aid has reflected the general health of relations between Paris and Port Vila. A diplomatic incident in the months before the elections of 1981 offered the first example of the relationship between the two elements.

 

On 2 February 1981, Prime Minister Lini handed Yves Rodriguez, the French Ambassador to Vanuatu, a letter informing him that he was required to leave the country within 24 hours. Rodriguez was also ordered to reduce embassy staff from 13 to five within 48 hours, with the excess personnel likewise being constrained to leave.[xlvii] The measure represented retaliation for the refusal by French authorities to allow Serge Vohor, the Vanuatu First Secretary, to enter New Caledonia at the end of January. Sixteen hours after being issued with a visa in Port Vila, he and other members of an official delegation were refused entry at Tontouta airport, on the grounds that the intention of the delegation to meet members of the FI constituted interference in local politics.[xlviii]

 

The dispute called into question the implementation of a series of aid agreements between France and Vanuatu, which had been negotiated in November 1980 but which had yet to be signed. They had been scheduled for signature the day after Rodrigues was expelled, a piece of poor timing by the VP Government. Lini insisted that the expulsions were a matter of national pride, as the treatment of Vohor and his colleagues was an affront to the VP Government.[xlix] Olivier Stirn, then Secretary of State to Foreign Affairs, indicated that Paris was not going to suffer Lini's retaliation. On 3 February he announced that the 200 French aid workers in Vanuatu would be returned to France.[l] It was an open-ended threat, in that no timetable was offered for the return of personnel, although 20 of them were instructed to prepare to leave as early as 7 February.[li]

 

The differences between Paris and Port Vila were not to last and the promised withdrawals of aid workers did not occur. Lini, in a belated placatory statement on 8 February, said that he did not wish to see bilateral relations broken, and expressed the hope that the contretemps would be just a transitory one.[lii] Paris elected not to turn its threat into reality and did not, in the end, repatriate all its workers. The incident was set aside in the weeks that followed. By 10 March, the eight aid agreements negotiated in November, worth approximately 46MFF,[liii] had been signed, and the two countries had officially buried their differences for a future of entente cordiale. The agreement declared:

 

On this occasion the two Governments affirm their willingness to promote cordial relations between their two countries based on mutual respect of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country.[liv]

 

Both parties consented to protect their respective citizens residing in each other's territories from discrimination and harassment. After the expulsion of expatriates accused of having participated in the attempted secession on Santo Island in 1980, France wanted an assurance that those French citizens who remained in Vanuatu would not be discriminated against, or victimised. Vanuatu wanted similar assurances for ni-Vanuatu living in New Caledonia.

 

The non-interference undertaking was designed to avoid a repeat of events in February. Both parties to the agreement compromised in order to maintain relations deemed mutually beneficial. Vanuatu agreed to permit French embassy representatives to determine the allocation of the approximately 33MFF which was to be offered to French language education in the archipelago, whereas formerly it had insisted that the Vanuatu Ministry of Education should determine which state or private schools were to be recipients of the funds. France showed some patience in concluding negotiations in the absence of an ambassador in Port Vila, and did not press for the return of Rodriguez.[lv]

 

Neither country desired a break in relations. Vanuatu was too dependent on foreign development funding to antagonise France to that extent. In 1980, 41.95% of foreign aid to Vanuatu had been supplied directly by Paris.[lvi] French aid formed a vital component of national development plans to diversify exports and boost the importance of the cash economy in Vanuatu. At independence, the productive capacity of the nation was low by Western standards. Average GNP per capita was $A452, of which $A325 was derived from foreign aid transferred to the local cash economy. The value of Vanuatu's exports in 1980, $A31.40M, was outstripped by aid revenue, which amounted to around $A38.0M.[lvii] Although Vanuatu had gained political sovereignty, it remained in a state of economic dependence on London and Paris which its leaders could disregard only at the peril of national economic health.

 

French motives for wishing to retain relations with Vanuatu hinged on questions of national prestige and regional influence. In a television interview with FR3 on 20 March 1981, Stirn stated that the aid agreement between France and Vanuatu represented the appeasement of Vanuatu bitterness over the troubles on Santo during decolonisation. He added that the aid agreements would assure the maintenance of French technical cooperation in the archipelago. The undertaking that neither country would involve itself in the internal problems of the other was portrayed as being of special significance. Stirn claimed "in doing so Vanuatu fully recognises that New Caledonia is French territory".[lviii] As later events were to demonstrate, this was a case of wishful thinking.

 

In spite of local political stirrings, Paris wished to maintain its influence in Vanuatu. The islands, while not representing any great, or even minor, economic or military interest to France, were the only place in the South Pacific outside the TOM where there existed a French-speaking population. In 1979, around 40% of the national population of approximately 120,000 were French-speakers. Paris did not intend to abandon this group, and was concerned that French speakers' interests should be assured under the administration of the English-speaking VP Government, which was not notable for its Francophile tendencies. At the time of independence, aid was considered to hold a significant part in maintaining relations with Vanuatu. It was considered that the closer relations were, the more the likelihood of vehement local opposition to France would be reduced. As Jean François-Poncet, then Foreign Minister, replied in answer to a written question dated 16 February 1981:

 

[...] Government policy in Oceania must aim to defend the major political and strategic interests of France in this region and protect the French Pacific Territories against any attempt at external interference. This policy must be based on the development of bilateral relations with States in the region. For this reason, while it has devoted itself, following the independence of Vanuatu, to obtaining guarantees essential for the security of its nationals, their persons and their property from the authorities in Port Vila, at the same time the Government has negotiated cultural, scientific and technical agreements with the primary aim of preserving the heritage of our country within a State where for many years a large part of the population, particularly amongst its young people, have spoken our language.[lix]

 

In 1981, the VP considered a referendum on the issue of making English the principal foreign language in Vanuatu. Although the measure was not implemented, it showed that Paris had reason to be wary.[lx] The stipulation that the educational funding under the accords signed in March was to be distributed by the French Embassy was a timely precaution that assured it would not be diverted to English language schooling.

 

During the period of Socialist administrations from 1981 to 1986, French foreign policy regarding Vanuatu did not change. Cheysson, the first Socialist Foreign Minister during that period, articulated a policy of restraint which was exercised by the Mauroy and Fabius Governments in the face of opposition in Port Vila to French activities in the South Pacific. This opposition assumed the form of discontent with perceived French slowness to recognise Kanak claims in New Caledonia, and with French nuclear testing. In November 1981, in answer to a written question from Michel Debré, which asserted that Paris should not put up with insulting behaviour from Lini and his subordinates while continuing to dispense aid to Port Vila, and asking why relations should not be reduced, Cheysson declared:

 

I am convinced of the disastrous effects a vindictive attitude on the part of France, contrary both to its traditions and its image, would have on our interests in the South Pacific. Any decline in our relations with Port Vila would have as its consequence the constitution of a united front - against us - by the young States of the Pacific, who would interpret any overly vigorous reaction on our part as a humiliation inflicted on a government which as yet has but limited experience of the rules of international life.[lxi]

 

France should therefore be patient with the inexperienced leaders of Vanuatu, as it was in the better long-term regional interests of the Fifth Republic. Cheysson had some reason for adopting this stance toward Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea's despatch of troops to Vanuatu to quell separatists on Santo Island in August 1980 was an example of support for Lini in reaction to what was considered to be French-inspired intransigence over decolonisation.

 

It turned out that Vanuatu too had to be patient. The aid funding agreement concluded in March, the first instalment of which was due to be paid in March, was not paid until September 1981. While French officials in Port Vila blamed bureaucratic complications in Paris, the change in government, and even the summer holidays, Lini's Ministers perceived the delay as French vindictiveness.[lxii] They were not above further antagonism themselves. On 1 October 1981, it was announced that Dick Ukeiwé, then the New Caledonian Territorial Vice-President, had been refused permission to attend the South Pacific Commission conference in Port Vila as the head of the New Caledonian delegation. This measure, taken against a Melanesian RPCR leader well known for his opposition to the FI, followed an undertaking by Lini after the death of Pierre Declercq in Nouméa in September 1981. Lini had declared he would intensify the support of his administration for Kanak campaigning against French rule.[lxiii] Ukeiwé asserted that the visa refusal should be challenged by the Mauroy Government, as foreign affairs were beyond his jurisdiction under the New Caledonian territorial statute. At that time the Mauroy Government preferred to calm relations rather than antagonise them.

 

On 12 October 1981, a new Ambassador, Marc Menguy, was appointed to replace Rodrigues.[lxiv] Unlike his predecessor, Menguy managed to complete his term of office without being summarily evicted by the Lini Government. His appointment appeared to indicate the beginning of a new phase in bilateral relations. From 16 to 21 November 1981 Lini, Kalpokor Kalsakau, his Minister of Finance, and Donald Kolpakas, his Education Minister, visited France to discuss development funding. They were accorded high-level meetings with a range of Socialist Ministers. As well as Mauroy, they met Jean-Pierre Cot, Delegate Minister for Cooperation and Development, Le Pensec, then Minister of the Sea, and Alain Savary, the Minister of Education.[lxv] On 9 December 1981, Lini announced that France was to donate approximately 24.1MFF in health and education aid to Vanuatu in the year to come,[lxvi] an indication that past differences were not to stand in the way of bilateral aid.

 

French tolerance was likewise evident when Mitterrand accepted the credentials of Barak Sope, Vanuatu's roving ambassador, at the Elysée on 13 May 1982.[lxvii] The acceptance statement made by Mitterrand pointed out that the occasion was symbolic of the "new quality of the relationship between our two countries" and that past difficulties had been overcome.[lxviii] Mitterrand held no personal responsibility for these past difficulties and he hoped that under his presidency France would be able to open a new era of cordial relations with Vanuatu. This presidential observation formed more a combination of wishful thinking and the observance of polite diplomatic formalities than a description of observable reality. Although there had been a change in President and Government in Paris, as there had been no change in French policy on nuclear testing or on New Caledonian self-determination, the hostile attitude of VP leaders to these aspects of the French South Pacific presence had not changed. While Vanuatu was eager to retain aid links, bombastic VP declarations against French and other nations' colonialism had not been abandoned. In December 1981 Sope had addressed a conference at the USP on Vanuatu foreign policy. He outlined VP policy of support for the decolonisation of all Pacific "peoples", "whether in West Papua, East Timor or French Polynesia", opposition to French "fascism and racism" in New Caledonia. He declared: "The Pacific will only be nuclear-free when it is free of colonialism".[lxix] On 23 January 1982, a VP demonstration in Port Vila presented a petition to the French Ambassador demanding an end to French nuclear testing in French Polynesia.[lxx]

 

These examples were expressions of the distrust harboured by the VP Government for large foreign powers in general, and of its desire to exert its autonomy and establish Vanuatu as an active, independent participant in international affairs.[lxxi] The antagonism of the VP Government toward what it regarded as neo-colonialism in the region was not limited to France. In May 1987 Lini characterised neo-colonialism from Australia and New Zealand as being just as potentially threatening to the sovereignty of the nation as that of France.[lxxii] Vanuatu became a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1981, the first South Pacific state to join.[lxxiii] In the 1980s, Port Vila was to explore the establishment of relations with some unorthodox prospective partners. Governmental contacts with Cuba were established in 1983, and with Vietnam in 1984. None of these links evolved into substantial economic or aid relations.[lxxiv] In April 1987, two Libyan representatives arrived in Port Vila. They reportedly had plans to set up a Libyan diplomatic post there, a prospect viewed with alarm in Canberra, Wellington and Paris. In the event, the pair failed to achieve anything, and were expelled on 7 May for having failed to present their credentials to the VP Government.[lxxv] Lini refrained from taking the matter further. The fishing agreement signed with the Soviet Union in January 1987 proved short-lived, and was not the precursor of a major Soviet penetration in the region. Relations with these nations, explored in the hope of diversifying Port Vila's aid and economic relations beyond France, Britain and Vanuatu's regional neighbours, did not result in new directions for national development. They served instead to antagonise relations with established aid and trading partners.[lxxvi] On 11 May 1987, responding to reports that Canberra disapproved of any Vanuatu links with Libya, Lini suspended visits by Australian warships and military aircraft to signal his disapproval of the position held by the Hawke Government. Days before, Lini had asserted that as a sovereign nation Vanuatu had the right to form links with whomever it chose.[lxxvii] In the absence of closer relations with Libya, Vanuatu permitted Australian visits to resume, the first of which was made by a patrol boat in August 1987.[lxxviii]

 

It is unlikely that Mitterrand would have been unadvised of the foreign policy articulated by Sope. He and the Mauroy Government chose to overlook it in preference to consolidating ties with Vanuatu. On 26 May 1982 the French Council of Ministers approved cultural, scientific and technical cooperation accords with Vanuatu which, along with the aid accord of March 1981, were promulgated on 20 October 1982.[lxxix] From 12 to 19 July, a visit to Paris by Ati George Sokomanu, the President of Vanuatu, continued high level contacts. Sokomanu met Mitterrand on 15 July, and Cheysson four days later.[lxxx] Sokomanu was less dogmatic than Sope, and articulated moderate views on relations with France. He had criticised Lini for refusing to allow the entry of Ukeiwé into Vanuatu in 1981 as unnecessarily provocative, and did not agree with much of the VP's militant foreign policy views.[lxxxi] Sokomanu was one of those English-speaking, Protestant-educated, British-trained island leaders whose conciliatory attitude towards France undermined the Anglo-Saxon Protestant conspiracy theory voiced by certain conservative French commentators. He saw his role as President as that of encouraging national unity between French speakers and English speakers.[lxxxii] He was not convinced that Lini and his Ministers were acting in the best interests of the national economy when they took abrupt foreign policy actions. In this respect he shared the views of the largely French-speaking leaders of the opposition UMP in Vanuatu.

 

Moderation was granted a lower priority in government circles in Port Vila. The unilateral declaration of sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter Islands made by the Lini Government in March 1983 exacerbated Franco-Vanuatu relations. The action was rendered ineffective by the installation of a French garrison to assure the sovereignty of the Fifth Republic over these desolate islets. Dijoud's declaration in March 1981 that Vanuatu had agreed not to interfere in French internal affairs sounded increasingly hollow as Lini campaigned from 1980 for the South Pacific Forum to voice support for Kanak demands in New Caledonia, and to take the territory's case to the UN decolonisation committee.

 

Lini presented himself as the unstinting supporter of Kanak nationalism, acting in pan-Melanesian solidarity with those who still remained subject to French control. When he was asked in 1982 how far he was prepared to go to support New Caledonian Kanaks, he boldly stated: "I am prepared to go as far as possible for as long as it takes. [...] It's my moral duty as a Melanesian to act this way and to prove that this territory must attain independence sooner than certain people think."[lxxxiii] Unabashedly pro-FI and later pro-FLNKS, Lini publicly attributed responsibility for New Caledonian problems to the French Government, which he described as resistant to change.[lxxxiv] He portrayed decolonisation as the sole solution to New Caledonia's divisions, ignoring the complex ethnic balance, and the absence of majority electoral support for independence.[lxxxv]

 

In November 1984 Lini backed the provisional government of Kanaky as the basis for an independent state in New Caledonia.[lxxxvi] During their visits to Vanuatu to lobby for international support, from November 1984 to early 1985,[lxxxvii] FLNKS leaders such as Tjibaou and Yann Céléné Uregei predictably found Port Vila to be the foreign capital most in tune with their outlook, mainly due to Vanuatu's experience of French colonialism, which set it apart from the other Melanesian states. While VP Government representatives offered them verbal support, and lobbied the South Pacific Forum, there were limits to Vanuatu campaigning for the FLNKS. Lini admitted that he was not prepared to offer Port Vila as the base for a Kanak government in exile for fear of alienating the French.[lxxxviii] There is no evidence of any material support offered by Port Vila to Kanak activists. Vanuatu leaders lacked the means, either to offer clandestine military assistance of any consequence, or to impose economic sanctions on France. The formal abandonment of the FLNKS boycott from May 1985 to cooperate with the French State under the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute meant that these options were not to become even remote prospects. The VP Prime Minister was slow to respond to FLNKS pragmatism. In August 1985, Lini predicted that the Pisani/Fabius Interim Statute was destined to fail.[lxxxix] He later changed his mind, and told the UN General Assembly in October 1985 that France should be given more time for its "decolonisation".[xc] Vanuatu exercised some moderation of its previous support for immediate decolonisation. While the FLNKS was collaborating with the French State it would have been incongruous to have actively maintained a militant posture.

 

While the Mauroy and Fabius Governments did not view positively Vanuatu lobbying for the FLNKS, they did not waver from the standing policy of assisting Vanuatu to assure French regional interests. For Paris, the importance of the maintenance of its regional presence outweighed the marginal pressure of VP Government lobbying over New Caledonia. Substantial amounts of French aid continued to be transferred to Port Vila. On 8 December 1985 France finalised a loan of 78MFF to Vanuatu for coffee plantation development on the island of Tanna. Philippe Baude, then the French Ambassador to Vanuatu, signed the agreement in Port Vila.[xci] On 1 January 1986, Baude presented a cheque worth 10.17MFF to the Vanuatu Ministry of Health for the renovation of the Georges Pompidou Hospital in Port Vila.[xcii] Mauroy and Fabius alike refrained from implementing sanctions against Vanuatu for its stance regarding Kanak nationalism.

 

France's tolerance of Vanuatu solidarity with the FLNKS continued into the period of cohabitation. Restraint was exercised in Paris in spite of provocative actions and adverse comments from Lini about reforms instituted for New Caledonia under Chirac. For instance, in September 1986 Lini presented the FLNKS's case to the Non-Aligned Movement summit at Harare, Zimbabwe, and gained the approval of the Movement to take the issue to the UN.[xciii] Lini referred to the "apartheid" in New Caledonia while speaking at the UN in October 1986, and pleaded for the cause of the FLNKS.[xciv] Opposition to French policy persisted into 1987. The VP and a variety of church, lobby and social groups in Port Vila responded to the New Caledonian self-determination referendum by organising a demonstration outside the French Embassy on 13 September and presenting a petition calling for the abandonment of the vote.[xcv] The Foreign Minister of the day, Sela Molisa, condemned France for staging the referendum and praised the FLNKS abstention.[xcvi]

 

A greater challenge to French restraint was presented by Vanuatu's notice of expulsion served on 1 October 1987 to another French Ambassador in Port Vila, Henri Crépin-Leblond, as well as to the head of the Cooperation Mission, Denis Pelbois. They were claimed to have interfered in local politics by allegedly channelling finance to the French-speaking UMP. Although Lini claimed to have irrefutable proof of this allegation, he failed to present it.[xcvii] Hours after the announcement, the Quai d'Orsay announced that there would be "a reexamination of all cooperation with Vanuatu".[xcviii]

 

In 1986 the Chirac Government had already decided on a redistribution of French aid to the South Pacific.[xcix] French aid to Vanuatu dropped from 64.7MFF allocated in the 1986 budget, to 28.3MFF in the 1987 budget.[c] Vanuatu's expulsion of Crépin-Leblond and Pelbois served to aggravate matters. Pons stated while in New Caledonia on 2 October that the expulsions showed "an escalation in radicalisation" was under way in Port Vila; "For Vanuatu's sake it is regrettable."[ci] Funding that had been allocated to Port Vila was diverted for distribution elsewhere, notably from September 1987 to the new Republic of Fiji, which was in need of foreign aid as Australian and New Zealand programmes there had been either cut or suspended. Funds allocated to Vanuatu dropped sharply from 60.4% of the French bilateral aid budget for the South Pacific in 1987, to 27.02% of the budget for 1988.[cii] As had been the case in February 1981 after the expulsion of Rodriguez, France could not take the traditional retaliatory action of expelling the Ambassador to Paris, as Port Vila had no permanent representation there. Its sole permanent overseas diplomat was Robert Van Lierop, a private consultant paid to represent Vanuatu at the UN General Assembly.[ciii] The reduction of aid thus served as French reprisal.

 

Lini was unrepentant: on 3 November 1987 three more French diplomats were expelled from Port Vila on similar charges of interfering in local politics. The domestic political context of the period had bearing on these and earlier expulsions. The accusation that the UMP was dealing with the French was aimed to discredit it in the weeks before the general elections scheduled for 30 November. Lini faced a dual challenge to the renewal of his mandate, from both the UMP and Sope. As VP Secretary-General, in July 1987 Sope had unsuccessfully contested the re-election of Lini as VP President.[civ] The UMP and Sope advocated improving relations with France, the latter having moderated his earlier hostility to French colonialism. Lini's refusal to reconcile with Paris distinguished him from his opponents. After the Prime Minister had a stroke in February, opponents of Lini characterised him as unfit to lead the nation. The articulation of militant foreign policy positions was one of the stances which exercised enough appeal among VP supporters and members to permit the re-election of a six member VP majority in Parliament, and to allow the formation of a new government led by Lini on 15 December 1987.

 

Lini held on to political power, but was constrained to bear the consequences of his actions. Paris responded to the various expulsions by cutting back its diplomatic staff, and by withdrawing 30 aid workers. A skeleton staff of two was left at the French Embassy in Port Vila.[cv] Although bilateral relations had not been broken, the extent of the displeasure of the Chirac Government with the VP Government was clear. Attitudes did not immediately change in Paris with the arrival of the Rocard Government in 1988. French aid continued to be dispensed at a reduced level, totalling 29.6MFF per annum by 1989.[cvi] At that time, the total number of French aid workers in Vanuatu was 61, of whom 51 were employed as teachers in Vanuatu schools. The remaining ten were working in agricultural development.[cvii]

 

Lini continued to pillory French conduct in New Caledonia after the departure of the Chirac Government in May 1988. In April 1988 both Lini and Donald Kalpokas, his Foreign Minister at that time, had attributed blame for the violence in New Caledonia to Chirac and his Ministers.[cviii] The VP demonstration which attempted to prevent French residents from voting at the Port Vila Embassy during the second round of the French presidential elections took place in this climate of disapproval. The VP Government did not exhibit much concern about the promotion of détente with Paris from April to May 1988. The end of cohabitation and the return of the Socialists to power in Paris did not greatly change relations. The VP Government was the major critic of the Matignon Accords within the South Pacific Forum, berating them for not guaranteeing independence to Kanaks, and holding that 1998 was too long to wait until a self-determination vote.[cix] In November 1988, Lini reiterated VP calls for the unconditional decolonisation of New Caledonia, even though the FLNKS had abandoned that stance by its signature of the Matignon Accords.[cx] Just as the VP was slow to rally to approve the implementation of the Accords, so too the Rocard Government was slow to restore aid funding to Port Vila. Bilateral aid dropped from the level of 29.6MFF in 1989 to 25MFF in 1990, and 20.9MFF in 1991.[cxi]

 

The economic price for the expression of an independent foreign policy in the 1980s had been high. While Lini had demonstrated his capacity to champion Kanak nationalism in international fora, Vanuatu economic dependence was not reduced under his leadership. In its first National Development Plan for 1982 to 1986, the Lini Government had declared the ambitious target of obtaining economic self-sufficiency within ten to 15 years.[cxii] By the end of the 1980s, it was apparent that this target was not likely to be achieved within that period. In 1989, foreign aid still accounted for around 50% of government revenue.[cxiii] By 1991 the national trade deficit was approximately Vt9,200M. The value of exports totalled around Vt1,600M, while imports were worth around Vt10,800M.[cxiv] Lini's administrations had not managed to stimulate local production to the extent desired.

 

Two key sectors of the economy experienced a marked decline after independence. Tourism, the income earner with the best chances of rapid expansion, proved disappointing. In the absence of an established international reputation, a well-developed hotel industry, and for want of good marketing, tourist arrivals fell from around 32,000 in 1982 to 14,600 in 1987.[cxv] Since then, concerted efforts to improve facilities and to advertise overseas have reaped benefits. The number of tourist arrivals rose to 31,047 in 1989, 45% of whom were Australian.[cxvi] As is the case in the Pacific TOM, tourism in Vanuatu has yet to realise the potential expected of it, and has not provided economic salvation.

 

Copra exports, the single most important Vanuatu crop, collapsed in the 1980s. The departure of most French plantation owners during decolonisation had a disastrous effect on copra production, which fell from almost 40,000t in 1979 to just under 27,000t in 1980.[cxvii] This decline continued after independence due to a combination of elements. Lack of careful management resulted in the production of lower quality copra after independence, while the reduced number of experienced plantation owners affected harvest levels. The market price for the commodity also fell in the 1980s, from $US598 per tonne in 1984 to $US204 in 1987. The combined result was lower production levels, both because of lower productive capacity, and due to lower returns on the international market. In 1984, 46,682t were exported, worth $US27.76M. In 1987, 31,846t were exported, worth $US6.49M.[cxviii]

 

The state of the national economy led President Sokomanu to open Parliament on 28 March 1988 with a call for Lini to normalise relations with France. He declared that it was in the better interests of Vanuatu to restore full relations with France, as its cooperation was needed for economic development. Maxime Carlot, the UMP leader of the Opposition, agreed with these statements and added that Vanuatu should set its own internal affairs in order before venturing to criticise France over New Caledonia.[cxix]

 

The restoration of full relations with France was to take over four years. The first sign that substantial improvements were to occur came when Kalpokas, as Lini's Foreign Minister, made an official visit to Paris, from 12 to 15 November 1989, to discuss the restoration of aid and diplomatic representation. He met with Rocard, Le Pensec and with Edwige Avice, Delegate Minister to Foreign Affairs. Kalpokas managed to voice more positive comments about the Matignon Accords than Lini had in 1988, saying that they offered Kanaks a chance to gain their autonomy and that the agreement promoted peace and stability.[cxx] By 1990, Lini was publicly supportive of an immediate resumption of full relations with France and increased aid.[cxxi] Whereas in previous years he had been less concerned, the easing of tensions over New Caledonia, combined with Vanuatu's need for development funding, brought about a change in attitude. Symbolic of slowly dawning reconciliation was the presence of Le Pensec as the French representative at the tenth anniversary of independence in July 1990. Le Pensec declared in his speech for the occasion that the appointment of a French ambassador was a more immediate likelihood than it had been. Lini in turn declared his gratitude for French and British aid. Le Pensec was the first French Minister to have visited the archipelago since independence.[cxxii]

 

It was not until the demise of the VP Government that reconciliation between Paris and Port Vila developed further. In 1991 the VP split over Lini's conduct as party leader. His behaviour had become increasingly erratic since his stroke in 1987. He had riposted against rising internal opposition by dismissing various government ministers, and by expelling dissidents from the VP. These methods failed to prevent his removal as VP leader and as Prime Minister.[cxxiii] After having gained election to the presidency of the VP, on 6 September 1991, Donald Kalpokas was elected Prime Minister by the Parliament. The general elections held on 2 December 1991 changed further the face of Vanuatu's government. The Kalpokas Government was defeated by the UMP. Some exceedingly pragmatic alliance building ensued, of the sort commonplace in French Polynesian politics. Combining with Lini's newly created National United Party, on 16 December Carlot formed a predominantly French-speaking coalition government which regarded Paris far less antagonistically than had done the VP Governments of the 1980s.[cxxiv]

 

Carlot exercised a more conservative approach to international affairs than Lini. As the Vanuatu representative of the World Anti-Communist League,[cxxv] he had had little sympathy for VP attempts at forming relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the 1980s. Past emphasis on non-alignment was abandoned. Carlot permitted the participation of Vanuatu in the Non-Aligned Movement to lapse by neglecting to send a delegation to its summit at Jakarta in 1992.[cxxvi] In December 1993, Carlot dismissed Van Lierop as the Vanuatu representative to the UN, replacing him with Jean Ravou-Akii, an expatriate New Hebridean who had been living in New Caledonia since the Santo rebellion in 1980.[cxxvii] As a French speaker and a Francophile, as well as being the Prime Minister of a tiny country in deep deficit and with a collapsed economy, Carlot was disinclined to berate French regional policy as vehemently as Lini had in the 1980s. However there persisted a governmental willingness to act imprudently toward major foreign aid donors. Claims by Carlot of foreign interference have been directed at English-speaking nations rather than at France, while retaining the same potential to be damaging to the economy of Vanuatu. While trying to form his coalition government in December 1991, Carlot accused Australian, New Zealand and British diplomatic staff in Port Vila of opposing his progress because they did not wish to see an upturn in French influence in Vanuatu.[cxxviii] This unsubstantiated allegation held the same appeal to Carlot's French-speaking support base as Lini's anti-French pronouncements had exercised on VP followers in the 1980s. In July 1992, Vanuatu expelled James Pearson, the Australian Ambassador. Pearson's offence was to have voiced Australian criticism of a new investment law, which was interpreted as being possibly discriminatory to Australian investors.[cxxix] The incident resulted in mild reprisals compared to past French reactions. Prime Minister Keating banned naval visits, ministerial and other high level contacts with Vanuatu until 31 December 1992.[cxxx] To the extent that Carlot retaliated against what he perceived as foreign interference in domestic affairs, his foreign policy was no different from that of Lini.

 

On the issues of French nuclear testing and New Caledonia, Carlot was restrained, and cautious not to offend Paris. During a visit to New Zealand in early April 1992, Carlot observed that although nuclear testing was a problem, the positive aspects of the French role in the Pacific had been largely overlooked by the regional media. His Government had made no decision to formally oppose nuclear testing, he said, and was more preoccupied with internal problems such as the welfare and the education of ni-Vanuatu.[cxxxi] Shortly after the announcement of the French test suspension removed any pressing need for Port Vila to take an individual stand on nuclear testing, although it has supported South Pacific Forum calls for the extension of the suspension into a general moratorium on testing. Carlot's policy on New Caledonia has facilitated better relations with France. Carlot regarded the question of the future of New Caledonia as an internal matter to be settled between France and New Caledonian political leaders.[cxxxii] At the end of 1991 Serge Vohor, his Foreign Minister, had commented "It isn't our duty to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country."[cxxxiii] Carlot was reported in January 1992 as having confidence in the implementation of the Matignon Accords as the solution to New Caledonia's internal problems.[cxxxiv] Almost ten years after Dijoud stated that Vanuatu had recognised New Caledonia as a domestic matter, Port Vila had finally officially adopted that position. During Carlot's tour of New Caledonia from 19 to 24 April 1993, Néaoutyine, as FLNKS President, refused to meet Carlot because of the Vanuatu Government's abandonment of support for Kanak independence.[cxxxv] Carlot stated his position upon his return to Port Vilahis administration did not back the cause of the FLNKS, as to do so would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of France. Carlot did however back the Matignon Accords as the path to a peaceful resolution of New Caledonia's problems. This support was assumed not to constitute interference in domestic politics as the Accords allowed territorial cooperation with foreign nations such as Vanuatu.[cxxxvi]

 

VP critics pointed out that Carlot had ulterior motives for handling these two issues cautiously, as he wished to reestablish good relations with France,[cxxxvii] which would be the necessary precondition to the upgrading of French aid. One of his Government's first gestures of good-will to Paris was the lifting on 31 December 1991 of the expulsion orders imposed on various French expatriates who had been accused of involvement in the Santo troubles in 1980.[cxxxviii] This undertaking was little more than a gesture, as it was unlikely after over a decade that the people concerned by it would be prepared to return.

 

This New Year's resolution opened an eventful year for Franco-Vanuatu relations. In February 1992, Carlot announced that he had asked Vice-Admiral Querat, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Pacific Naval Squadron, for French naval assistance in the surveillance of the Vanuatu EEZ, as a supplement to Australian assistance. The proposal was accepted, and led to an arrangement for 30 hours' worth of aerial surveillance annually.[cxxxix] Such military cooperation would have been unthinkable under a VP Government in the 1980s. From 11 to 20 May 1992 Carlot led a government delegation in Paris, the first call there by a Vanuatu head of government since Lini's stay in November 1981. Although the theft of the delegation's passports and other documentation in a Parisian restaurant forced the abandonment of a scheduled meeting with John Major, the British Prime Minister,[cxl] a meeting with Bérégovoy did take place. The party returned to Port Vila with an undertaking of 10MFF in French supplementary aid for small projects in various sectors, as well as for the establishment of a television network.[cxli] During its visit, the delegation was informed that the Quai d'Orsay was considering who to appoint as Ambassador to Port Vila, and would consult Carlot in weeks to come.[cxlii] This information represented the first sign of substantial progress over French diplomatic representation at Port Vila since Kalpokas had made the first official request for the reappointment of a French Ambassador on behalf of the VP Government in August 1990.[cxliii] The appointment of Jean Mazeo, a career diplomat, was announced on 1 September 1992.[cxliv] From 1991 to 1993 French bilateral aid to Vanuatu rose. Whereas in 1991, total bilateral funding had been 20.9MFF, in 1992 it reached 21.4MFF (as well as a Treasury loan of 3.5MFF), and 23.1MFF in 1993.[cxlv]

 

With the removal of past tensions, the way was open for the restoration of French aid to Port Vila, and the more active promotion of French culture and influence in the only French-speaking nation in the South Pacific. Two events in late 1992 offered evidence of changing times. On 28 August, the first director of the newly-established Alliance française in Port Vila arrived to take up her posting.[cxlvi] Although a non-governmental body, the Alliance française is recognised by the French State as a major promoter of French culture and language, and is a recipient of state funding. In December Vohor concluded an exchange agreement permitting French teachers to assist in French language education in Vanuatu.[cxlvii] French participation in local education had dwindled in the 1980s. This agreement offered a new lease of life to the teaching of a language that had not been considered a high priority under Lini.

 

While the fortunes of French relations with Vanuatu fluctuated in the period under consideration, Paris refrained from severing ties with Port Vila, perhaps in the hope that the end of the VP's time in government would come and that an administration more amenable to French interests would be installed. France had continued links, however reduced, in the face of VP pronouncements because of its established presence in the archipelago, and the existence of a sympathetic French-speaking community there. In this respect, Vanuatu initially enjoyed privileged status among island states in the South Pacific. VP foreign policy conduct tested the diplomatic resolve of Paris to maintain relations, although not to any great extent. Diplomatic squabbles with Vanuatu since 1980 were far less troublesome for French Governments and the staff of the Quai d'Orsay than maintaining relations with, say, Chad in the early 1980s, Lebanon in 1983, Iraq in 1991, or Algeria in 1993. Having endured various contretemps with Port Vila, in the 1990s the way was open for more cordial relations, enabling the reinforcement of French influence in Vanuatu.

 

Whereas in the course of the 1980s, the improvement of relations with Fiji and the Polynesian island states of the South Pacific displaced the importance of Vanuatu in French aid distribution, of the three founding members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, Vanuatu remained the only country with substantial links to Paris into the 1990s. The absence of any heritage of a French presence in the Solomon Islands and in Papua New Guinea, along with the animosity of these two nations to French regional policy, combined to limit the development of French relations.

 

The Solomon Islands was the Spearhead Group member with which France had the least important bilateral relationship. Although diplomatic relations had been established between Honiara and Paris in 1978,[cxlviii] the ambivalence of the Solomon Islanders to France prevented any great progress during the 1980s. In January 1982, the Government of Solomon Mamaloni cancelled a visit by Menguy from Port Vila. It had been intended that the French Ambassador to Vanuatu would present his credentials at Honiara, until Ezekiel Alebua, the Solomons Foreign Minister, said that accreditation would be postponed due to the risk of violent protests in the streets.[cxlix] Mamaloni did not want to be seen negotiating with France in the face of popular opposition. During a visit by Mamaloni to Port Vila in July 1983 on the occasion of celebrations of the anniversary of Vanuatu independence, Menguy suggested another attempt at presenting his credentials. Mamaloni refused.[cl] No haste was shown to discard this reluctance. In October 1986, eight years after the Solomon Islands had established diplomatic relations with France, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Peter Kenilorea, Mamoloni's successor, decided to accept the credentials of the French Ambassador to Vanuatu. Unfortunately for French relations, actual accreditation was yet again postponed because of the effects of domestic opposition to the extension of diplomatic links with France.

 

Flosse's first major rapid aid intervention as Secretary of State to the South Pacific had occurred in May 1986 in the aftermath of cyclone Namu. In the Solomons, 90,000 people were rendered homeless. Flosse oversaw the arrival of French disaster relief. The Jacques Cartier arrived from New Caledonia laden with machinery and military personnel to assist with recovery work. Two French medical teams were also sent, along with 20t of food and 1t of medicine. In all, 1MFF was allocated by Flosse for disaster relief work in the Solomons.[cli] It was during this operation that Flosse established contacts with Kenilorea. Among the French aid Flosse dispensed in the aftermath of cyclone Namu, $S129,000 had been allotted for the reconstruction of a school and private housing in Rara, the village where Kenilorea lived. Kenilorea defended himself from allegations of corruption from his party colleagues and the Opposition by pointing out that he was not the personal beneficiary of French funds, and that although he had six children, none of them attended Rara School. After he admitted that Rara was in his constituency, he declared that its population was too small to affect his electoral following.[clii] Three parliamentarians in Kenilorea's Nationalist Front for Progress resigned to protest this use of French funds, threatening his majority support in Parliament. On 17 November 1986, Kenilorea resigned as head of government in recognition of the unpopularity of what was perceived to be his conciliatory attitude to France, even though he did not accept allegations concerning misappropriation of funds.[cliii] Kenilorea's resignation in November 1986, stemming from his acceptance of French aid, was a sign of the unpopularity of closer relations with Paris that the recognition of the Ambassador from Port Vila would have marked.

 

His replacement, Alebua, periodically decried French policy in the following months. He reiterated the support of the Solomon Islands for the FLNKS and decried "France's colonial attitude" in the South Pacific.[cliv] The coincidental timing of South Pacific Forum lobbying in the UN in December 1986 gave the impression that under Alebua the Solomon Islands were having greater influence on New Caledonian policy, and were more active in assisting the FLNKS.[clv] Nevertheless Kenilorea too had criticised French handling of New Caledonian issues and had advocated action at the UN as early as 1981.[clvi] Opposition to France voiced by Prime Minister Alebua, and the expulsion of Crépin-Leblond from Port Vila in October 1987, effectively excluded any prospect of French accreditation occurring via Vanuatu.[clvii] Alebua's comments from late 1986 also provoked a French reaction.

 

In June 1987, France blocked Wilson Ifunaoa, the Solomon Islands roving ambassador, from presenting his credentials to the EEC in Brussels. Every member of the EEC Council except France was prepared to accredit Ifunaoa. British representatives claimed that France was reacting against the anti-nuclear and anti-colonial policies held by the Solomons.[clviii] The refusal may have been a negative reaction merely to the prior refusal of French accreditation in Honiara. It was not until 1990 that the French Ambassador to Port Moresby presented his credentials at Honiara and opened the way for more substantial bilateral relations.[clix] Without stable diplomatic links, French relations with the Solomon Islands did not progress greatly from 1980. This lack of progress did not necessarily concern Paris and, unlike Vanuatu, the Solomons could afford to ignore France. Apart from French aid received via multilateral sources such as the South Pacific Commission and the Lomé Convention, the country had no substantial aid relationship with France. Substantial economic relations did not exist either. Although the arrival of French development assistance or investment would have been a useful supplement to existing sources, this prospect was not considered as important in Honiara as solidarity with the FLNKS and opposition to nuclear testing.

 

Stirn's visit to Port Moresby in January 1980 clearly suggested that relations between Papua New Guinea and France were to expand during the decade to follow. He announced a soft loan worth 20MFF to the PNG Government, proposals for increased technical aid, and the arrival of the first resident French Ambassador to Port Moresby in February.[clx] Yet the barriers to improved bilateral relations that existed also surfaced during this call. Stirn informed Ebia Olewale, the Deputy Prime Minister, that PNG advocacy of taking New Caledonia's case to the UN decolonisation committee would be divisive and that France would simply ignore any UN resolutions concerning the territory. He rejected PNG support for Kanak primacy and pointed out that France would only accord independence if a majority of the New Caledonian electorate desired it.[clxi] The conduct of successive French Governments in the 1980s bore out the veracity of his comments.

 

While French Ambassadors in Port Moresby did not experience the treatment meted out to their counterparts in Port Vila, Papua New Guinea shared the militant positions of Vanuatu, advocating French decolonisation and opposing French nuclear testing.[clxii] Papua New Guinea, with Australian funding, offered material support to Vanuatu when Lini was faced with internal unrest in 1980. The expedition at Lini's request of Kumul Force, a detachment of the PNG Defence Force, to quell the secession attempt on Santo opened close political cooperation between Port Moresby and Port Vila.[clxiii]

 

PNG cooperation with France was not so close. In the 1980s French representatives expressed the hope of expanding French cooperation and investment in Papua New Guinea beyond the minor extent then current.[clxiv] There was little sign of great progress in bringing such hopes to fruition in that decade. While Papua New Guinea possessed the largest economy and population of the South Pacific island states, this was not reflected in French aid funding. For 1987, the country was allocated 1.7MFF in bilateral aid by France, constituting 1.6% of the total French bilateral aid budget in the South Pacific for that year, 107.1MFF.[clxv] The first French trade mission to Port Moresby was not organised until November 1991.[clxvi] Major French contacts in these areas had yet to be formed 17 years after the independence of Papua New Guinea. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s bilateral trade fluctuated. In 1988, France exported 25.45MFF worth of goods to Papua New Guinea, while it imported 65.76MFF.[clxvii] In 1991 the respective totals were 34.17MFF and 30.40MFF. By 1992, annual French exports to the country were worth 22.44MFF, while imports from Papua New Guinea were valued at 31.66MFF.[clxviii] At the time of the signature of a cooperation agreement between the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce and the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Australia, Bernard Ould Yahoui, the French Trade Commissioner in Canberra, stated that there were ten French companies operating in Papua New Guinea.[clxix] In the 1990s, Australian, Japanese, and British investment and aid formed the bulk of Papua New Guinea's sources of revenue, while the French contribution formed a minor proportion.[clxx] In spite of the fact that after Australia and New Zealand, Papua New Guinea has the largest population of the South Pacific states, has the greatest mineral resources, and the potential for major economic development, French interests have not played a great role in the economic growth of the country.

 

In December 1988, Steven Mokis, the PNG Secretary of Defence, described his country's bilateral relations with France as "lukewarm".[clxxi] It was an apt characterisation. Events in the 1990s suggested that some mutual sentiment existed in Paris, despite talk there since 1981 of expanding French relations with the South Pacific. The intention announced in March 1991 of closing the French Embassy in Port Moresby as part of austerity measures by the Quai d'Orsay[clxxii] was a reflection of the low esteem in which the post was held in Paris, and of the lack of progress that diplomats had been able to make during the previous decade. The subsequent abandonment of the plan to close the post showed that this pessimism did not prevail, although it had yet to be shown as unfounded. Ironically, there was fleeting sign of greater interest in maintaining relations on the part of Papua New Guinea in the early 1990s. Sir Michael Somare, the PNG Foreign Affairs Minister, announced in March 1992 that Andrew Yauieb had been appointed resident Ambassador in Paris, mainly to solicit French mining investment and agricultural assistance.[clxxiii] This link was not to last. In June 1993, Prime Minister Paias Wingti announced that the Embassy in Paris was being closed. As was the case with its French counterpart, budgetary reasons were cited. The opening of new PNG Consulates in Australia announced at the same time suggests that Wingti was redeploying his diplomatic funding and staff to more promising areas of commercial activity for Port Moresby.[clxxiv] Wavering diplomatic intentions in Paris and Port Moresby confirmed that bilateral relations were still "lukewarm" in the 1990s.

 

In the cases of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, the term cheque-book diplomacy has little, if any, validity. The VP Governments of the 1980s exercised foreign policy that ran counter to French regional interests regardless of the threat of the reduction of French development assistance. Lini exercised an irresponsible disregard for financial considerations during the 1980s. Paris, on the other hand, showed no great haste in dispensing greater funding and reinstating its diplomatic representation in Port Vila once tensions had calmed during the early 1990s. As far as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea were concerned, close relations were not cemented due to local resentment of French nuclear policy and anti-colonialism. French relations with the founding members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group exhibited an ambivalence punctuated by tempestuous disputes, snubs and missed opportunities. Under such circumstances, the spread of French influence, facilitated by the distribution of development assistance, was not possible for much of the period under consideration. The development of better French relations with Vanuatu since the appointment of the Carlot Government in December 1991 provided an exception to this characterisation. Such an improvement might be indicative of a future norm in French relations with the other members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, provided that no resurgence in pan-Melanesian hostility over French policy in New Caledonia occurs.

 

Developing Relations with Fiji and Polynesia

 

During the 1980s French relations with Fiji and its Polynesian neighbours became more harmonious than was the case with the founders of the Melanesian Spearhead Group. While French diplomacy experienced indifferent progress in the latter's case, other island governments had fewer qualms about accepting French development aid. Fiji and the Polynesian members of the South Pacific Forum, while voicing varying degrees of anti-nuclear and anti-colonialist sentiment, were generally less abrupt in their dealings with French representatives than the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

 

The most important example was that of Fiji. It was unfortunate for Lini that his altercations with French ambassadorial staff at Port Vila occurred at the same time as Flosse was actively working to improve French aid relations with other South Pacific nations. The first Fijian coup d'état occurred just one day before the meeting of 15 to 17 May 1987 in Nouméa, at which French ambassadors and senior officials in the Pacific greeted Flosse's announcement of the goal of increased French regional cooperation. Part of the discussions concerned the Fijian coup, and what response France should make. Pons expressed some disapproval of the coup from a democratic viewpoint, but was largely non-committal.[clxxv]

 

It turned out that for the Chirac Government the promotion of democratic values was subordinate to the furtherance of French regional influence. To a great degree, the coup was advantageous for France. Relations between France and Fiji appeared to be on the verge of deterioration at the election of Bavadra in April 1987. Bavadra had been elected on a policy platform which, among other issues, stressed the need for more vigorous Fijian opposition to nuclear arms. One of the first decisions made by Bavadra's administration, hours after his appointment as Prime Minister, was to forbid US warship visits on the grounds that Washington would not confirm whether such vessels were nuclear armed or not.[clxxvi] Since the 1970s governments led by Mara had been the subject of repeated criticism from the Fijian anti-nuclear movement. Groups supporting Bavadra included the Pacific Council of Churches, the YWCA, the USP Students' Association, and the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group, which advocated boycotts of French products and reducing diplomatic links with Paris as part of their campaigning for a nuclear free, independent Pacific. Rabuka's coup allowed the return of Mara and his colleagues to government.

 

From May 1987 Fiji offered an expedient candidate for better bilateral relations. In the wake of the coup d'état of May 1987, Fiji's most important aid donors, Australia and New Zealand, suspended development aid and military cooperation to signal disapproval of the overthrow of the constitutionally elected Government of Bavadra. The United States likewise withdrew military support,[clxxvii] a major setback as much of the equipment used by the Fijian Army was of American manufacture. Washington did not cut other links, and promised aid if Australian and New Zealand enacted trade embargoes.[clxxviii] Rabuka was constrained to consider other sources to fill the gap these sanctions created. The question of French assistance was raised during Flosse's stop in Suva from 14 to 15 August.[clxxix] During his stay, Flosse announced that France intended to develop its aid to Suva, which was to include military aid.[clxxx] His presence resulted in some speculation, including the unfounded rumour that France intended to build a naval base near Suva.

 

Unlike Wellington and Canberra, Paris had not condemned the coup d'état in May. Long experience of similar situations in dealings with African states had resulted in France adopting a different approach when confronted with the overthrow of a foreign government. Standing policy was to recognise states rather than the governments ruling them, thus dispensing with the problem of determining whether constitutionally dubious governments merited diplomatic recognition.[clxxxi] Generally this approach had served Paris well, although not always. Sometimes it was difficult to distinguish who was the commanding claimant to state authority. The civil war in Chad in the early 1980s had forced Paris to switch allegiance from one side to another as the opposing factions of Hissène Habré and Goukouni Oueddei gained and lost control of N'djamena, the capital. As a result Paris appeared fickle in its allegiances.

 

In Suva there was no opposition which threatened the new regime, so France faced no such difficulties in establishing dialogue. In August 1987 Flosse was able to talk to Rabuka as the Fijian head of state with no qualms that the coup instigator might himself soon be overthrown, at a time when his regime was being snubbed by Australian and New Zealand representatives. After the second coup on 25 September, and Rabuka's proclamation of the Republic of Fiji, the French Embassy in Suva informed Dr Jona Senilagakali, the Fijian Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that France was prepared to maintain relations with Fiji.[clxxxii] This was welcome news compared to protests from Wellington and Canberra. The Australian and New Zealand positions in this instance were based on different criteria. As the leaders of centre-Left Labour parties, Lange and Hawke felt sympathy for Bavadra rather than for Rabuka. And as Prime Ministers of Commonwealth nations, Hawke and Lange felt themselves obliged to some extent to protest the affront that the Republic presented to the authority of the British monarchy, and to its local representative, the Governor-General. Sir Ratu Penaia Ganilau was less vigorous in this regard, as was Mara, one of the founders of the Fijian Constitution of 1970, which had been overridden by the creation of the Republic. Both men later collaborated with Rabuka in the creation of a new constitution.

 

On 22 October, Chirac's Interministerial Committee on the South Pacific met in Paris to discuss Fijian requests for aid. Flosse reportedly presented the committee with a list of requests from Rabuka which included the despatch of military vehicles, French military training for Fijian Army officers, and a GIGN mission to assist in security planning.[clxxxiii] Although it was decided to allocate additional aid to Fiji for 1988, not all of the Fijian requests would be met. The request for a GIGN team was not acted upon, probably because to give policing advice to Rabuka would have been too controversial. The arbitrary arrests and detainment in 1987 of parliamentarians, unionists, lawyers, journalists, and academics from the USP, who were either opponents of, or who were merely suspected of opposing, Rabuka had not reflected well on the new regime. It might also have been concluded, considering the zeal of members of the Fijian Army and Police Force, that Rabuka did not need the advice of foreign experts on such matters. The other two requests however, were acted upon. In January 1988 a package worth approximately 39MFF was announced. It included 53 Renault trucks and an Ecureuil helicopter, intended partly for development work. Thirty-seven of the trucks and the helicopter became the property of the Fijian Army, which since 1975 had administered a civilian conservation corps using unemployed labour for construction work.[clxxxiv]

 

The end of cohabitation in Paris did not affect relations with Fiji. The Rocard Government and its Socialist successors followed up the progress made with Fiji under Chirac. Rocard, like Chirac, avoided judgemental declarations of the sort issued by Hawke and Lange. When asked during his visit to Suva on 23 August 1989 by a Fijian Indian journalist whether it might be incongruous in the year of the bicentenary of the French Revolution to be lending assistance to a regime which had suppressed a democratically elected government and the rights of non-indigenous Fijians, Rocard replied circumspectly, yet revealingly: "All I can say is that various countries of the world are, in terms of democracy and respect for human rights, evolving at different speeds."[clxxxv]

 

Undemocratic conditions which would have been considered unacceptable in the Fifth Republic were left uncriticised in the case of Fiji. French Governments since Chirac have not refrained from dealing with a self-appointed government in Suva affirming Fijian indigenous identity as its right to preeminence. On the other hand, in New Caledonia, FLNKS claims on sovereignty employing similar arguments of indigenous priority were deemed secondary to the Republican argument of equal rights for all citizens irrespective of ethnic origin. Just as Paris has expected South Pacific nations not to interfere in its internal politics, it has not passed judgement on the internal affairs of Fiji. This was a happy, and fortuitous, combination for Franco-Fijian relations, as was suggested in a speech given by Rocard in Suva:

 

When, two years ago now, your country passed through a difficult period, France did not hesitate to show its solidarity. Working from the principle that it is not up to her to interfere in the internal affairs of Fiji and that it was up to the Fijians, and them alone, to handle this matter, France continued its cooperation.[clxxxvi]

 

Rocard denied during his time in Suva that France was according military aid to the Republic.[clxxxvii] Admittedly, while France had not given anything as dramatic as Exocet missiles to the Fijian Republic, both before and since Rocard's visit, Paris dispensed assistance of some benefit to the Fijian military. In April 1990, France undertook to provide $F12.5M for the construction of a vehicle repair depot for the Fijian Army.[clxxxviii] The Ecureuil helicopter, supplied by France in 1988, was manned by army officers, and appears to have been used predominantly for emergency evacuations.[clxxxix] The Ecureuil was supplemented in January 1992 with the donation by France of a Dauphin helicopter, worth $F6M.[cxc] Aid to the Fijian military has been a prominent component of French assistance since 1988.

 

French training for Fijian military personnel was offered on a small scale that did not supplant the programmes offered by Australia and New Zealand before the coups, and which had subsequently been discontinued. In August and September 1989 two Fijian Army lieutenants were able to receive training as helicopter pilots, thanks to French funding to enable them to attend a flight school in Singapore.[cxci] From April that year a Fijian major spent nine months at the French staff college at Compiègne.[cxcii] French naval visits continued after the coups, and constituted reassuring signs of foreign support for a country facing problems with its traditional defence partners. Two French patrol boats, La Glorieuse and La Railleuse, called on Suva in October 1987 and were greeted by Rabuka. La Railleuse exercised with a Fijian vessel during its departure from territorial waters.[cxciii] From 24 to 28 January 1988, the frigate Balny visited Suva, and was greeted by Rabuka.[cxciv] While such calls represented signs of continued French relations, they were by no means new. Naval visits were a long-standing part of the French military presence in the South Pacific.

 

An innovation in the field of French military cooperation in the South Pacific took place in 1990. In June, the French Navy demonstrated the surveillance capacities of one of its Gardian jets. Suva was sufficiently impressed to ask France to undertake monitoring of the Fijian EEZ. Prior to the coups, this task had been performed by the RNZAF. In the absence of the RNZAF, the French Navy assumed this duty, and conducted periodic surveys for the Fijian Government.[cxcv] From January 1991 to October 1993, French Gardians made 22 trips to Fiji, mainly from Nouméa, to conduct aerial patrols.[cxcvi] By 1993, France was spending around $F230,000 per annum on aerial surveillance of the Fijian EEZ.[cxcvii]

 

These events were part of Fijian efforts from October 1987 to secure substitutes for American, Australian and New Zealand military assistance.[cxcviii] France was not the only country which responded with this policy to benevolent help. As the coups had caused the suspension of an Australian plan to provide the Fijian Naval Squadron with patrol boats, in 1991 Fiji purchased four Israeli patrol boats on credit.[cxcix] French aerial patrolling in itself was insufficient to police the Fijian EEZ, which covers 1.26MkmADVANCE \u32. Fiji that year secured a $F2M loan from Taiwan to buy army vehicles. Suva also increased its national defence expenditure in response to the gap created by the withdrawal of Australian, New Zealand and US military assistance. The Fijian defence budget increased from $F15M in 1986 to $F25M by 1989.[cc]

 

Fijian efforts to maintain a defence programme in the absence of Australian, New Zealand and US cooperation were not considered adequate in Suva. The few individuals trained with French assistance could not replace the extensive training programmes set up with Australia and New Zealand prior to the coups. Although France deployed its surveillance aircraft to assist Fiji, and made port calls, the primary task of French units in the region was to patrol the EEZs of the Pacific TOM, a major mission in itself. When Australia offered to resume full military cooperation in July 1992,[cci] followed by New Zealand in September,[ccii] these offers were accepted by Rabuka, who had solicited the reinstatement of these links from the time of his appointment as Prime Minister in June that year. Following the reopening of Australian and New Zealand defence links with Fiji, French cooperation was retained. French naval aircraft went on conducting aerial sweeps of the Fijian EEZ.[cciii] French naval vessels continued to make port calls. The Rhin and the Dumont d'Urville stopped at Suva at the end of July 1992.[cciv] In March 1993, France and Fiji agreed to commence troop exchanges.[ccv] A platoon of French soldiers from New Caledonia was flown to Fiji for exercises in May, at the same time as a Fijian platoon exercised in New Caledonia.[ccvi] Such cooperation would have appeared fantastic prior to the signing of the Matignon Accords, and the quietening of tempers over the political future of New Caledonia. Times had changed radically since Mara's declaration in May 1988 that France was indulging in "gunboat diplomacy" in the territory.[ccvii]

 

An initially unforeseen consequence of this rapprochement has been to facilitate closer cooperation between the military forces of France, Australia and New Zealand. Their units were constrained to liaise over the coordination of their respective assistance to Fiji, whether it be funding, training or maritime surveillance, if only to avoid duplication of effort. There has been no official expression of opposition to such cooperation either from Canberra or Wellington. In February 1993, at the time when France accepted a request from Vanuatu to begin monitoring its EEZ, John Trotter, the Australian Ambassador to Suva, voiced Canberra's support for French surveillance efforts as a complement to those of Australia.[ccviii] New Zealand has been positive about the assistance France can provide to island states in EEZ surveillance. Wellington's support was first offered in the case of French sweeps of the Cook Islands' waters in 1990.[ccix] Neither Australia nor New Zealand are capable of offering continual surveillance of South Pacific EEZs in addition to their own extensive territorial waters. French cooperation is a useful extension to their efforts. In May 1993, French, Australian and New Zealand officials met in Honiara to discuss the coordination of EEZ surveillance efforts in the South Pacific. It was agreed to exchange flight information.[ccx]

 

Australian and New Zealand military personnel have been combining stops at New Caledonia with their missions to Fiji. In September 1992 30 RNZAF officer trainees visited New Caledonia to view the operations of their French counterparts before travelling on to Suva to make a tour of Fijian military bases.[ccxi] The following month the patrol boat HMAS Ipswich called in at Suva before travelling on to the Loyalty Islands.[ccxii] Such contacts occurred in a time of already improving defence ties. In May 1991, the HMNZS Southland, in mooring at Papeete, became the first New Zealand naval vessel to visit a French port since the Greenpeace affair.[ccxiii] In May 1993 the Jacques Cartier paid the first visit to New Zealand by a French naval vessel since the same affair.[ccxiv] Two months later the HMNZS Canterbury and the Endeavour arrived at Toulon.[ccxv] These contacts form part of an important trend. It appears that the absence of cooperation between the French, Australian and New Zealand military forces is being broken down, to an extent that would have been inadmissible during the diplomatic rows of the 1980s. The demands of assistance from island states, namely the Cooks, Vanuatu, and Fiji, served as a catalyst to multilateral military cooperation. In the early 1990s French forces were less isolated in the South Pacific than they were in preceding decades.

 

The French maintenance of cooperation with Fiji and other island states into the 1990s has challenged the earlier assertion that Paris was motivated by fickle self-interest. In November 1987, in response to French negotiations with the Fijian Republic over aid links, Foreign Minister Hayden and Kim Beazley, the Australian Defence Minister, accused France of short-term pragmatism and warned that the country could not be regarded as a serious long-term regional partner.[ccxvi] The Australian and New Zealand Labour Governments displayed signs of pragmatism themselves. Neither was a stayer in the sense of opposition to the undemocratic foundation of the Fijian Republic. Both recognised the Republic, and restored non-military aid, in 1988.[ccxvii] This about-turn was perhaps made in response to the inroads French assistance was making. The pronouncements which Hawke and Lange made in 1987 concerning the defence of democracy and the undesirability of Rabuka were not acted on. Neither was prepared to offer more than fleeting moral support to Bavadra, despite their professions of outrage at the overthrow of his Government. Canberra and Wellington were not prepared to commit themselves militarily in the defence of Fijian democracy. Such action could have been costly, in both human and financial terms. It would also have alienated the other members of the South Pacific Forum, who largely supported Rabuka's argument that he was crusading to defend the rights of indigenous Fijians in the face of the local Indian community.

 

Negative analysis in Canberra of French cooperation neglected certain precedents. French relations with independent Fiji began in the 1970s and predated the events in 1987. Paris had long-term reasons for seeking closer ties with Fiji which transcended the diplomatic setting created by the coups of 1987. Ties were initially mainly confined to the two countries' membership in the South Pacific Commission, and French scientific and technical aid lent to the USP,[ccxviii] contacts which have persisted into the 1990s. Antagonism between France and Suva over the question of nuclear testing formed the main obstacle to closer diplomatic relations in the 1970s. Fiji, represented by Mara, was the motive force behind the creation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971, which acted as a major vehicle for the expression of regional hostility to French nuclear testing. Fiji's anti-nuclear stance was the probable cause of the nine-month wait France imposed in 1976 before agreeing to the nomination of a Fijian Ambassador to the EEC.[ccxix]

 

Yet, as elsewhere in the region, differences over nuclear testing did not prevent the extension of diplomatic ties. The posting of the first resident French Ambassador to Suva in 1980 was a reflection of French interest in furthering cooperation with a major player in regional affairs. Suva came to perceive valid reasons for exploring better contacts with Paris. As Britain was a major importer of Fijian sugar, it was in the interests of Suva to improve its rapport with France, a member of the EEC whose displeasure might have had deleterious consequences for this trade. The French DOM in the Caribbean were also sugar producers for the European market, and it was not necessarily in their interests for Paris to facilitate Fijian sugar exports. The Lomé Convention added a dimension to bilateral relations between Fiji and France. From 1978, Fiji was a prominent regional recipient of aid funds from this agreement. The first Lomé Convention, which lasted from 1978 to 1980, involved only two South Pacific states: Fiji received 24.2M ECU, while Papua New Guinea was given 8.9M ECU.[ccxx] For Lomé II (1981 to 1985), Fiji fell to second place out of eight countries in the South Pacific receiving this funding, although its 35.8M share of the 106.5M ECU in question was not negligible.[ccxxi] Considering the importance of European trade and aid funding to Suva, it was not unnatural for Suva to be receptive to the establishment of a French Embassy.

 

The basis for Franco-Fijian cooperation was laid, not in the aftermath of the coups of 1987, but a decade before. Rocard's visit to Suva in August 1989 was hailed by French and Fijian representatives as the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations. Its antecedents should not be disregarded. Just as Rocard spoke in Suva of the importance of Fiji for French relations with the South Pacific, and his hope of improving aid, trade and cultural links,[ccxxii] on 12 September 1980 François-Poncet, as French Foreign Minister, had used similar terms during a reception held in Paris for Mara. François-Poncet praised Fiji for its handling of negotiations under the Lomé Convention, its successful collaboration with France in UN peace-keeping efforts in Lebanon since 1978, and expressed the hope for enhanced relations between France, Fiji, and its regional neighbours.[ccxxiii]

 

It was however not until 1987 that French bilateral aid to Fiji climbed to a level which reflected well upon the glowingly positive sentiments offered by François-Poncet. Before the coups Fijian anti-nuclear policy and, from 1986, Suva's backing for the FLNKS, acted as disincentives to a major increase in bilateral aid. Such aid to Fiji accounted for 5% of the French foreign aid budget to the South Pacific for 1987, 5.3MFF out of 107.1MFF.[ccxxiv] Funding escalated from 1987. In September 1987, 30MFF had originally been reserved for aid to Fiji, 28.65% of the 104.7MFF in regional funding allocated. This figure was increased further in 1988.[ccxxv] On 6 April 1988, during a visit to Paris which included an audience with Chirac, Mara obtained a development loan for 43MFF.[ccxxvi] The loan agreement, signed on behalf of the French Government by Balladur, then Minister of Finance, stipulated a low interest rate of 3%, and the debt was repayable in 30 years.[ccxxvii] The Fijian Government denied that there were any strings attached to this or other French aid. Inoke Kubuabola, the Minister for Information, wrote in April 1990:

 

The provision by France of financial and technical assistance to Fiji has in no way inhibited or amended the interim government's policy on French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The interim government has consistently and categorically condemned French nuclear testing in the region and will continue to do so. [...] May I also categorically state that the government of France has never requested Fiji to relinquish its policy and position on nuclear testing as a condition to French aid.[ccxxviii]

 

While the members of the Fijian anti-nuclear movement have rejected such claims, they have not presented conclusive evidence to suggest that Fiji has changed its foreign policy on testing since the coups.

 

Fiji has in fact by no means been a submissive recipient of French aid. Although by the 1990s relations between France and Fiji had improved greatly by comparison with the middle of the 1980s, Fiji retained its capacity to distance itself from France on certain issues, and not only on the questions of the future of New Caledonia and nuclear tests. From 1990 to 1992, Fiji lobbied, in the face of strenuous opposition from France, for the relocation of the headquarters of the South Pacific Commission from Nouméa to Suva. Fijian representatives argued, not disinterestedly, that the buildings in question, dating from the 1940s, had outlived their usefulness and that a modern, more centrally located complex should be constructed in Suva. The relocation of the Commission to Suva would be logical in that other major regional bodies such as the USP and Secretariat of the South Pacific Forum were already there. Having the Commission in Suva would have provided an additional source of prestige for Fiji. The construction, staffing and maintenance of the buildings would have provided employment for Fijians. The Fijian Government received support from an unexpected quarter. As President of the South Province, Jacques Lafleur wanted the Commission to vacate its valuable site on the Anse Vata beachfront so that hotels or other tourism-related developments could be built there. In addition he resented the presence of the Commission, characterising it as a hot-bed of subversive pro-Kanak researchers.[ccxxix] By March 1992, after extended argument, the Fijian proposal was rejected and it was resolved that the headquarters would stay in Nouméa, although it would be relocated to another location. France united with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu in opposing the measure. Paris did not wish to see the headquarters moved, as this would not be in the interests of direct French cooperation with the region. The Melanesian Spearhead Group members contended that the presence of the Commission in Nouméa was useful in providing development assistance and expertise to Kanaks. Other Commission members were against the expense involved in relocating the headquarters to Fiji.[ccxxx]

 

A more short-lived tiff between France and Fiji peaked at the end of January 1993. Carine Kobler, a diplomat working in the French Embassy in Suva, was expelled for refusing to pay $F15,000 customs duty on a 10m yacht which she had imported from the United States. She argued that it counted as diplomatic baggage and should therefore be exempt from any levy.[ccxxxi] The expulsion took place in spite of protests from French diplomats that the Fijian Government's interpretation of the Vienna Convention was too narrow. The French Embassy in Suva issued a declaration declaring the expulsion to be an "unfriendly initiative" which tarnished bilateral relations.[ccxxxii] There was little likelihood however that Paris would allow a dispute over a yacht to threaten bilateral relations built up since the 1970s. In the months that followed it was apparent that links had not been greatly disturbed by the matter. France did not halt its aid to Fiji, which continued to be dispensed in sizeable quantities,[ccxxxiii] or take any other clear-cut action in retaliation.

 

From 1993 to 1995 the two nations retained a healthy relationship during the second period of cohabitation in Paris. The first high-level meeting with a member of the Balladur Government took place from 17 to 20 June 1993, when Dominique Perben visited Suva. In discussions with Rabuka, Perben assured him that his Government held Fiji in high esteem and that his stop during his first tour of the Pacific TOM was evidence of this. Rabuka declared that the Republic valued French assistance.[ccxxxiv]  Regardless of the brief return of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995, cordial ties between the two states appear set to persist into the next century, to the mutual benefit of French efforts toward regional integration, and to the advantage of Fijian national development.

 

Unlike the French Embassies at Port Vila and Port Moresby, the post at Suva served as the hub for a network of diplomatic links with several neighbouring island states. During the 1980s, the French Ambassador received accreditation to Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru.[ccxxxv] Formerly, French embassy staff at Wellington had generally been in charge of relations with the independent states of Polynesia. The Suva post was more convenient because of its geographical proximity. The Suva embassy took charge of relations with Tuvalu, Nauru and Tonga in 1981, followed by Kiribati in 1982. Personnel from Suva liaised with these Polynesian micro-states for the establishment of appropriately small-scale development projects that contributed to the objective of improving the image of France.[ccxxxvi] Since May 1990, aid to these countries has been overseen by a regional councillor for cooperation and development.[ccxxxvii] Staff at Wellington were still formally responsible for liaison with Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, because of these islands' history of close relations with Wellington, and the presence of representatives from these micro-states in New Zealand. During his stewardship of French regional relations from 1986 to 1988, Flosse cut across these divisions, particularly in the case of the Cook Islands. This delimitation has also been overlooked in other cases, for example cyclone relief funding. After cyclone Ofa crossed the South-West Pacific in February 1990, the French Embassy in Suva was responsible for distributing a total of 350,000FF to Western Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Tokelau and Niue.[ccxxxviii]

 

Tonga expressed no reluctance to accept French aid during the 1980s. The kingdom had had relations with Paris since Napoleon III became the first European head of state to recognise the kingdom in 1855.[ccxxxix] Although bilateral relations were initially anything but friendly, expressions of goodwill were more vigorous in the 1980s. The decade began cordially when, during his visit to Nuku'alofa in January 1980, Olivier Stirn renewed the treaty of friendship between France and Tonga.[ccxl] As the Tongan monarchy concurred with the French attitude that what happened in the French Pacific TOM was an internal matter, in the 1980s there were no grounds for disputes between French and Tongan representatives, and no local moral objections to aid links. King Tupou IV and Prince Tupouto'a have viewed French relations positively.[ccxli]

 

While relations have been friendly, they have not presaged a major implantation of French development assistance in Tonga. From 1980 to 1985, French funding constituted only 0.5% of total foreign bilateral aid to the kingdom, although French assistance rose to 12.0% from 1988 to 1989.[ccxlii] The bulk of this increase consisted of $T2.8M in funds for the construction of Lapérouse Outdoor Stadium at Teufaiva, inaugurated by Edwige Avice on 22 August 1989 on the occasion of the Third South Pacific Mini-Games.[ccxliii] Avice, as Delegate Minister to Foreign Affairs, was the most senior French representative to have arrived in Tonga, and her visit was considered a special occasion. French aid to Tonga has otherwise been concentrated on agricultural development. French agricultural cooperation began in 1980 when the first French project worker arrived. Dr Paul Luu became the head of the French Tonga Project at the Vainï Research Farm, which has worked on the development of vanilla production from 1980 to 1986, appropriate technologies from 1982, and joint projects with New Zealand on coffee production and with Australia on black pepper production. In 1990, there were three French specialists in Tonga working on the production of vanilla and spices for export.[ccxliv] In May 1991 six trucks and two cars worth approximately 1.58MFF were presented to the Tongan Government by Jacolin, the French Ambassador to Fiji, for use by the Tongan Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.[ccxlv]

 

Other French assistance has taken the form of funds for reconstruction work. In September 1990 Jean Gardère and Jean Frimat, officials from the French Embassy at Suva, presented the Tongan Government with a cheque for approximately 53,000FF to assist in cyclone recovery work.[ccxlvi] Paris has also provided funding for the operations of the Nuku'alofa branch of the Alliance française, which opened in 1987.[ccxlvii] This event marked the beginning in Tonga of French language teaching, an important agent for the transmission of French culture. French-speaking Tongans were still rare in 1993, with only one national, Lolomana'ai Fili, having obtained a degree at a French university. He studied agronomy at the University of the French Antilles, on Guadeloupe, graduating in 1992.[ccxlviii] Tonga has also played a part in greater French military cooperation in the South Pacific. In September 1993, the kingdom hosted French troops from New Caledonia and US troops from Hawaii for training exercises with the Tonga Defence Force.[ccxlix] Such cooperative developments constitute small beginnings which should lead to further diversification of French aid to Tonga in the 1990s.

 

The efforts in Tuvalu, Nauru and Kiribati of French diplomats based in Fiji have been similarly modest. Although in January 1986 Tuvalu distanced itself from France by refusing a warship visit in order to express opposition to nuclear testing, the Tuvalu Government has subsequently shown signs of cooperation with France. Since the accreditation of the French Ambassador at Suva in 1981, the most significant diplomatic consequence for France has been the signature of a territorial delimitation agreement in September 1986.[ccl] In 1991, negotiations took place concerning the opening of a shipping link between Tuvalu and Wallis and Futuna.[ccli] Nothing has been heard of these talks since. The line would doubtless have been unprofitable to run. French aid in the late 1980s was a minor part of Tuvalu's total aid. In 1987, it comprised less than 5.5% of total aid received, far behind the contribution of Britain (50.1% of total aid).[cclii] The link with France has nevertheless remained active in the 1990s. Jacolin visited Funafuti in September 1990 to offer French funding for reconstruction work in the aftermath of cyclone Ofa.[ccliii] In July 1992 Prime Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu travelled to Fiji to discuss further aid funding and to attend Bastille Day celebrations at the French Embassy in Suva.[ccliv]

 

French aid efforts to the Polynesian island states have on the whole been small-scale and have not matched the importance of French links with Vanuatu or Fiji. French cooperation remains unevenly scattered, with surprising consequences in some cases. The oldest independent island state of the South Pacific, Western Samoa, founded in 1962, has been little affected by French bilateral development efforts. From the late 1970s, French aid was prominent in the activities of one man, Dr René Esser, an orthopedic surgeon who intermittently worked at Apia National Hospital under French funding.[cclv] His presence led to greater things. From 1987, Western Samoan medical staff studied orthopedics in French Polynesia with French financial support.[cclvi] In March 1990, the construction of an orthopedics centre thanks to approximately 19.6MFF assistance from France was announced.[cclvii] This extension to the National Hospital in Apia was officially opened by Gabriel de Bellescize, the French Ambassador to New Zealand, in February 1993.[cclviii] This assistance was not the sole form French aid has assumed in Western Samoa. Cyclone reconstruction aid has also been provided. The relative significance of these developments should not be overestimated in a country with a population of around 160,000, for which developmental, economic and cultural ties with New Zealand remain paramount. Of the European nations, West Germany was the most important to Western Samoa. In 1989 West Germany purchased 23.2% of the country's exports, second only to New Zealand (34.5%).[cclix] Although German sovereignty over Apia ended in 1914, the German presence in Western Samoa was of greater commercial significance than France's, and its bilateral aid funding has been more generous.[cclx]

 

The Emerging Role of the Pacific TOM

 

Preceding sections have examined the role of the French Government in improving French South Pacific integration through the establishment of aid and cooperation initiatives, in accordance with regional policy goals discussed in chapters 1 and 5. This concluding section is devoted to the part that the political leaders of the Pacific TOM have played. The activities of territorial leaders in improving French relations with the South Pacific constituted a new trend in the 1980s, a consequence in part of the greater autonomy that they were accorded under the territorial statutes introduced during that decade. If the regional integration of the TOM described as desirable by French Governments since the 1970s is to become a reality, territorial leaders must, of necessity, participate in that process. The effects of their participation are discussed below in order to gauge the extent to which French regional relations have developed at territorial level.

 

Although the signature of the Matignon Accords has been hailed by Paris and regional governments as the beginning of a new era of regional cooperation with the Pacific TOM, as territorial leaders were allowed an active role in negotiating external trade and foreign investment,[cclxi] similar steps had already taken place in the early 1980s. For example, 1982 was an important year for furthering the participation of the Pacific TOM in regional cooperation. At the Saipan conference of the South Pacific Commission, delegates agreed to allow New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia to have separate representation at commission meetings.[cclxii] Independently of the Commission, French Polynesian political leaders had been active in improving cooperation with the region since the early 1980s. Unlike the multilateral contacts developed by New Caledonian leaders with the assistance of the French State from 1988, this earlier contact was bilateral in nature, involving the Cook Islands.

 

Following several hundred years of separate cultural development, and over a century of differing European influences, Rarotonga and Papeete did not enjoy important economic and diplomatic links prior to the 1980s. The introduction of English culture and administrative models in the Cooks since the 1880s, paralleled by the introduction of Gallic institutions in what became known as French Polynesia, served to isolate the two territories. The disparate European heritages of the Cook Islands and French Polynesia hindered their mutual cooperation. So too did the Cooks' opposition to French nuclear testing, which was voiced from 1963, two years before the islands gained autonomy in association with New Zealand.[cclxiii]

 

Nonetheless, an abiding tie between the Cook Islands and French Polynesia survived the advent of Franco-British colonial rivalry in the South Pacific a common Polynesian heritage. Tahiti and its adjacent isles are ancestral homelands of Cook Islanders, and after several hundred years of separate cultural development, Cook Islands Maori and Tahitian were still mutually comprehensible languages. Territorial boundaries imposed by France and Britain could not dispel this dimension. The Cooks and Tahiti are both culturally and geographically closer to one another than Tahiti is to some parts of French Polynesia, notably the Marquesas. In addition, geographically the Cooks are closer to Tahiti than to New Zealand.

 

The barriers of Rarotonga's and Tahiti's disparate colonial heritages did not start to be significantly broken down in the fields of trade and political links until the early 1980s. In July 1983, during talks in Papeete, the CIP Government of Geoffrey Henry negotiated access to the Tahitian market for the Cook Islands' fruit and vegetables.[cclxiv] Six months after the installation of his DP Government in November 1983, Tom Davis was in Papeete for further discussions.[cclxv] It was agreed that Cook Islands and French Polynesian leaders would hold biannual meetings to discuss trade, agricultural and technical cooperation. These contacts predated the promulgation of the French Polynesian Internal Autonomy Statute in September 1984, as well as setting the stage for further cooperation between Rarotonga and Papeete. In spite of the fact that the Cook Islands' formal link with Paris was through the French Embassy at Wellington, this channel was arguably less important for French relations than direct contacts with Papeete.

 

As Territorial Vice-President before the establishment of the Internal Autonomy Statute, Flosse led negotiations with Cooks representatives in 1983 and 1984. Flosse held the Cook Islands in high esteem, reflecting his desire to develop closer ties between French Polynesia and its Polynesian neighbours, and because he admired the territory as a model for the degree of autonomy that French Polynesia might attain.[cclxvi] The appointment of Flosse as Secretary of State to the South Pacific was a fortunate choice for the Cooks. This obscure territory of around 15,000 inhabitants found for the first time that it had an active advocate at ministerial level in Paris. Flosse facilitated meetings with Chirac and his Ministers that in turn had positive effects in Paris. In July 1986, Davis met Chirac in Paris in his capacity as South Pacific Forum chairman. Among the issues discussed was New Caledonia. Chirac received a sympathetic hearing of his plans for New Caledonia. Significantly, Davis was the only representative to defend these reforms at the annual meeting of the South Pacific Forum in August that year.[cclxvii]

 

During cohabitation, the Cooks became the recipients of unprecedented levels of French assistance, thanks largely to Flosse. After cyclone Sally hit Rarotonga on 2 January 1987 Flosse organised a relief team comprised of 57 military and civilian personnel from Tahiti, which disembarked to help with reconstruction work on 7 January. Flosse fostered considerable good-will, and publicity, with the presentation of two excavators, three front-end loaders, 30 chainsaws, and 40t of food and medicine. One hundred pre-fabricated houses were promised too. Only 33 of these had arrived by the time of the disbandment of Flosse's secretariat.[cclxviii]

 

French assistance did not end with the relief operation organised by Flosse. The Chirac Government budgeted 6.9MFF in aid to the Cooks for 1987, a figure larger than the initial allocation to Fiji of 5.3MFF.[cclxix] From 2 to 9 September 1987 Davis's successor, Prime Minister Pupuke Robati (DP), visited Paris, accompanied by Flosse, to meet Chirac and his Ministers. Robati returned with a French commitment to a 50MFF soft loan for further reconstruction work and hotel development in Avarua.[cclxx] The amount to be loaned was confirmed in July 1988, when the Cooks Foreign Minister Norman George met Avice in Paris to gain reassurance that the Rocard Government intended to honour the existing commitment to make the loan transfer in 1989.[cclxxi] The agreement was honoured, and was the first of a series of loan agreements to be signed with Socialist Governments. In February 1992, the Cooks negotiated a French loan worth approximately 5MFF to upgrade Rarotonga's water supply. Around the same time, it was estimated that French funding for the renovation of the Rarotonga electrical grid had exceeded 14MFF.[cclxxii]

 

Development loans have been just one feature of diversified cooperation between France and the Cook Islands since the late 1980s, in which French Polynesia has played a function. On 12 April 1989 France appointed a permanent representative in Avarua in the form of an Honorary Consul, Dianne McKegg.[cclxxiii] In May 1990 the Cook Islands agreed to allow a French Polynesian fishing vessel to operate in the Cooks' EEZ in exchange for part of the catch. French Polynesia in addition offered technical assistance to the Cooks on pearl farming.[cclxxiv] Three months later de Bellescize and Geoffrey Henry, then Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, signed a territorial delimitation agreement concerning the boundary between the Cooks and French Polynesia.[cclxxv] In October 1990 the Dumont d'Urville called at Rarotonga to transport approximately 360,000FF worth of French-donated solar power equipment to Pukapuka and Palmerston Islands.[cclxxvi]

 

In 1989, Alexandre Léontieff, as the French Polynesian Territorial President, invited Henry to Papeete to meet Rocard during his tour of the South Pacific. In Papeete on 24 August Henry and Rocard discussed the possibility of French assistance in monitoring the Cook Islands' EEZ, and a meeting was arranged to take place in Paris on 17 October to discuss the matter further.[cclxxvii] From 5 to 7 September 1990, a Gardian jet conducted the first French aerial sweep for the Cook Islands. In February 1991, the French Navy sent a Gardian and a patrol boat to conduct a joint patrol with the Cook Islands' lone patrol boat and an RNZAF Orion.[cclxxviii] Henry pointed out that his government needed all the help it could get in the way of maritime surveillance "We have approximately two million square kilometres of water and only one patrol boat to look after it with an inadequate supply of diesel".[cclxxix] Wellington's reaction to this initiative was positive. Don McKinnon, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, responded in February 1991 by saying that the National Government had no objection to the French helping with the maritime surveillance of the Cooks, or to the friendship treaty under discussion.[cclxxx] The latter was signed by Henry and Cresson in Paris during October 1991, and entailed an undertaking to continue French cultural, technical and financial aid.[cclxxxi]

 

The Cooks' contacts with Papeete and Paris were a response to the need to find sources of aid to supplement New Zealand budgetary support, which is scheduled to be phased out by 2007.[cclxxxii] Closer ties with the neighbouring islands of French Polynesia and the acceptance of French finance were part of attempts to diversify sources of foreign development assistance. While French cooperation with the Cook Islands has necessarily been on a smaller scale than funding for Fiji, a reflection of the different sizes of the two island states more than of any hierarchy, it stands as one of the successes of French regional diplomacy from the 1980s. Aid to the Cooks helped the cultivation of a comparatively sympathetic member of the South Pacific Forum, which has refrained from taking a pro-Kanak stand on New Caledonia, and has not been particularly forceful in the expression of anti-nuclear policy since the 1980s.

 

The Matignon Accords allowed New Caledonia to participate in French regional cooperation through article 88, which authorised territorial and provincial leaders to represent New Caledonia in negotiations with South Pacific states. The potential of this particular article was not neglected in the first five years of the implementation of the agreement. From 1988 to 1993, New Caledonian leaders, in close association with representatives of the French State, mainly the High Commissioner and ambassadorial staff in neighbouring countries, have been active in exploring contacts in the fields of trade, culture, education and agriculture.

 

New Caledonian representatives, aided by the High Commissioner and French diplomats in the region, have negotiated various training programmes between the territory and its neighbours. In November 1989 a New Caledonian delegation comprised of members from all three provinces held talks in Australia with the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, which had set aside an allocation of $A400,000 for a training programme for New Caledonians. This programme commenced in 1990.[cclxxxiii] That year the Australian Foreign Ministry funded the diplomatic training of a Loyalty Islander in Canberra at the request of Richard Kaloi, the President of the Loyalties Province, who wanted a provincial representative with knowledge of the Australian administration.[cclxxxiv] In April 1992, an agreement was signed to set up a student exchange programme between the Port Vila branch of the University of the South Pacific and the Nouméa campus of the French University of the South Pacific.[cclxxxv] Although territorial leaders did not play a representative role in the signing of the agreement, international educational cooperation has been initiated by the Loyalty Islands Province. Following a visit to Port Vila by Kaloi in May 1992, a teacher exchange programme was opened between the Loyalties and Vanuatu. From August to December 1992 three English teachers from Vanuatu worked in the Loyalties teaching primary school pupils. This transfer was the beginning of a scheme which for 1993 was expanded to allow five Vanuatu English teachers to work in the Loyalties, and three Loyalty Islanders to travel to Vanuatu to teach French.[cclxxxvi] In April 1993 Kaloi met with John Kaputin, the PNG Foreign Minister, during his tour of New Caledonia, and held preliminary talks concerning a training scheme for Loyalty Islanders, to be run by the PNG Foreign Affairs Department.[cclxxxvii] The Republic of Fiji has also offered some assistance, dedicated specifically to young Kanaks, as a sign of Melanesian solidarity. In January 1991 Fiji funded the training of two Kanak medical students in Suva.[cclxxxviii] Fijian support for the South Pacific Forum's Kanak Training Fund, offered in July 1992, consisted of a donation of $F50,000. The PNG Government donated $F140,000 to the fund, which was administered by the Forum Secretariat in Suva.[cclxxxix]

 

Agricultural exchanges have been of particular interest, both to New Caledonia and to its island neighbours. In the case of New Caledonian missions to New Zealand and Australia, technical advice has flowed toward the territory, a reflection of greater Australian and New Zealand technical expertise. New Caledonians have sought information on new fields such as deer farming, and on export standards for packing and processing.[ccxc] On the other hand, land reform is an issue of mutual interest in Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia. Work carried out by ADRAF on land redistribution and rural development has been studied by Vanuatu officials for ideas that could be applied by Port Vila. In October 1990 Vanuatu’s Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Hopa, and William Mahit, the Land Minister, visited New Caledonia to study the land reform schemes of ADRAF.[ccxci] Fijian land reform and management have similarly interested New Caledonian officials. In August 1990, an ADRAF delegation travelled to Fiji to study Fijian land reform and management.[ccxcii] A year later, Kaloi travelled to Suva as well, to see what Loyalty Islanders could learn from Fijian systems.[ccxciii] The Loyalty Islands showed even greater interest when, in November 1993, it sent a 21-member delegation to investigate Fijian land tenure.[ccxciv] Since 1993, interest in this domain has been ongoing.

 

Regional trade with New Caledonia has been facilitated under the Matignon Accords through the relaxation of territorial import restrictions, and through the multiplication of trade missions since 1988. (See Appendix 11.) In 1990, Australia lent its support to French Pacific trade by offering the facilities of its Market Advisory Services to the French Pacific TOM, allowing access to Australian market research data, facilitation of trade delegations and the use of Australian Trade Development Centres.[ccxcv] The French Embassy in Suva has played its part in improving business links between the Pacific TOM and the region through the Trade Commission it opened in March 1990.[ccxcvi] Its liaison has benefited French Polynesia as well as New Caledonia. In September 1990 a Fijian trade mission was sent to Papeete.[ccxcvii] The following year, a Fijian trade delegation went to New Caledonia in April, which prompted the visit of a New Caledonian group to Fiji in August.[ccxcviii] These exchanges provided the preliminary to the further development of bilateral trade in following years.

 

New Caledonian trade with Vanuatu has traditionally been more important than that with Fiji. Under the Matignon Accords, increased trade was promoted in Nouméa and Port Vila. In January 1992 a ministerial delegation from Port Vila arrived in Nouméa to discuss increasing activity between Vanuatu and New Caledonia.[ccxcix] A month later a New Caledonian trade delegation made a trip to Port Vila for the same purpose.[ccc] The announcement of the establishment of a Vanuatu Consulate in Nouméa in August, was made with the intention of promoting trade.[ccci] This orientation was confirmed by the appointment in April 1993 of Serge Bourdet, formerly the Secretary-General of the Port Vila Chamber of Commerce, as the new Consul in Nouméa.[cccii] The appointment took place in the same month as the official opening of the Consulate, which was presided over by Carlot. During his stay in Nouméa, Carlot and High Commissioner Christnacht agreed to arrange meetings between New Caledonian and Vanuatu representatives every three months to review ongoing bilateral aid and cooperation. Metropolitan French products shipped to Vanuatu accounted for 5.4% of its imports in 1989. New Caledonian products represented 3.0% of imports that year.[ccciii] Nouméa is a significant entrepot for Vanuatu's exports to metropolitan France (9.6% of total Vanuatu exports in 1989). Vanuatu's exports to New Caledonia, mainly beef, represented an additional 7.7% of its annual total.[ccciv]

 

On 19 November 1993, cooperation between New Caledonia and Vanuatu was officially recognised by a friendship and cooperation accord. Christnacht, Simon Loueckhote, the President of the Territorial Congress, provincial representatives, and Lafleur, acting as the representative of the Balladur Government, arrived in Port Vila to sign an agreement covering ongoing aid and cooperation in the areas of education, commerce, sport and health. Christnacht hailed the document as a good example of the spirit of the Matignon Accords being put into practice.[cccv] The friendship and cooperation agreement was consistent with the orientations of article 88 of the Accords, which called for greater territorial integration in the region via the participation of territorial representatives in international agreements.[cccvi] It was estimated that by the time of the signature of the agreement, the value of bilateral aid and cooperation funding between New Caledonia and Vanuatu had exceeded 2MFF.[cccvii] This was a proportionately large amount.

 

On a larger scale, the links opened between French Polynesia, New Caledonia and their regional neighbours since the 1980s have generally been of a minor nature, and are unlikely to displace the dependence of these three TOM on metropolitan France. But these links, along with those established by French diplomats based in the South Pacific, offered signs to suggest that by the 1990s French hopes of regional integration had gone beyond being little more than talk, as they were in the 1970s. The exception to this trend lies in Wallis and Futuna. Whereas the administrative leeway offered by the Internal Autonomy Statute (in the case of French Polynesia) and the Matignon Accords (in the case of New Caledonia) had helped reduce territorial isolation from the region, no such statute reforms were introduced in Wallis and Futuna in the 1980s. Mata Utu has not participated in the increased regional cooperation reflected in greater numbers of official delegations shuttling to and from Nouméa and Papeete in the pursuit of expanded cooperation.

 

While French bilateral aid became more widely distributed in the 1980s, to Vanuatu's relative disadvantage, it did not become so significant by the early 1990s that it had displaced the contributions of established donors such as Australia, New Zealand or Britain. However French assistance became a useful supplement to other sources for island nations, and played an important part in improving bilateral relations in the cases of Fiji, the Cook Islands, Tonga, and eventually Vanuatu. Other than in the Melanesian Spearhead Group nations the deployment of French aid was not greatly hindered by local anti-colonial or anti-nuclear policy. Claims of French cheque-book diplomacy buying the acquiescence of Pacific countries on foreign policy issues are difficult to substantiate, except perhaps in the cases of Tonga and the Cook Islands. Like Australia and New Zealand with regard to French trade, most South Pacific island states were reluctant to refuse French assistance on the grounds of opposition to French testing or New Caledonian policy. Economic constraints outweighed ideological considerations in this respect.

 

 

Notes

[i] In order to protect against unscrupulous operators, no notes, bibliography or other references are provided in this Web publication. Readers wanting a specific reference may contact me at wsmccall@maxnet.co.nz.

 

© Wayne Stuart McCallum 1996.

 

 

 

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